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This thesis explores the relationship between terrorism and political trust. This is done in two 
ways, by two sub-studies, in order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the 
relationship between the two phenomena. The first sub-study uses longitudinal multilevel 
regression to explore the historical empirical relationship between terrorism and political trust, 
in Europe for the time period 2002-2016, focusing specifically on the parliaments, the legal 
systems, the police, and the politicians.   
 
The second sub-study consists of a survey experiment specifically designed to explore the 
causal relationship between terrorism and political trust. Concretely, building on trust theories 
and rooted within an institutional framework, the paper suggests a theoretical framework that 
has a potential for explaining the causal relationship between terrorism and political trust. A 
central mechanism in this theoretical framework is individuals’ perception of institutions’ 
capacity to deal with terrorism. It is this mechanism, capacity perception, that is explored in 
the survey experiment. 
 
The results from the regressions shows that within-country variation over time has affected the 
political trust in Europe. The effect has, however, been somewhat limited. The effect has also 
varied between institutions, where the police have received increased trust, while the 
parliaments and politicians have had their trust reduced, and the legal systems seem unaffected. 
The results from the survey experiment shows that capacity perception is a causal mechanism 
in the relationship between terrorism and political trust, but that its’ influence and role varies 
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1     Introduction 
 
1.1 The paper 
This paper will explore the relationship between terrorism and political trust. The paper will do 
this exploration through two different, but at times supplementing, ways. First, the paper will 
map the empirical relationship between terrorism and political trust in Europe in the time period 
of 2002 to 2016. Second, the paper will explore if ‘capacity perception’ is a causal mechanism 
in the relationship between terrorism and political trust, as assumed by the theoretical 
perspectives utilized in this paper to explain the causal relationship between terrorism and 
political trust. At the outset, the goal was to maximize both the number of units and the amount 
of time to include in this paper. However, there are some factors, mainly relating to what can 
be summed up as data quality, that limits this goal. The paper therefore ended up with including 
nineteen European countries, for the time period of 2002 to 2016. The selection of the actors to 
include in this exploration: the parliaments, the legal systems, the police, politicians and, for 
parts of the paper, the government, was done in accordance with similar considerations. As for 
the selection of the causal mechanism to focus on, this was done after reviewing the theoretical 
foundations for political trust, as well as existing empirical studies. After methodological, 
theoretical, and empirical considerations, the paper ended up with the following research 
question: 
 In what ways has the political trust in Europe been affected by terrorism in the time 
period of 2002 to 2016, and does capacity perception function as a causal mechanism in the 
relationship between terrorism and political trust? 
The research question actually consists of two separate but related parts, as implied above. The 
first part, or question, seeks answers relating to the historical empirical relationship between 
the two relevant phenomena, i.e. how terrorism has affected political trust, while the second 
part seeks an answer relating to the general relationship between the two phenomena, i.e. 
through which mechanism has terrorism affected political trust.1 The two parts are different in 
that they seek different answers and, as will be discussed further below, will be explored by the 
use of different methods. At the same time the two parts are related in that they have the same 
                                                          
1 Both questions are designed to explore the causal relationship between the two phenomena, but in order to 
separate them and to avoid confusion when specifically discussing the two sub-studies they are addressed as 
one  ‘general’ and one ‘empirical’ question.  
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areas of foci, i.e. terrorism, political trust, and the relationship between these phenomena. Both 
parts can also be studied in an empirical manner, based on the same theoretical perspective, and 
in different ways shed light on the same theoretical perspective. It can be argued that the paper’s 
inclusion of an exploration into the causal relationship between political trust and the chosen 
topic of interest, instead of taking the causal relationship for granted, is a beneficial, if not 
necessary, inclusion (Khan, 2016). It is an inclusion that may illuminate the two phenomena 
even greater, one that many studies focused on political trust either forgets or ignores (Ibid). 
 
The first part of the research question, particularly, has countless dimensions to it. Countless 
ways of exploring and answering it. Therefore, in addition to dividing the research question 
into two separate but related parts, the paper concentrates the research question into five 
hypotheses. Four of the hypotheses are connected to the multidimensional first part of the 
research question, focused on the historical empirical relationship between the two phenomena. 
The fifth hypothesis mainly revolves around the more one-dimensional second part of the 
research question, focused on shedding light on the general causal relationship between the two 
phenomena. Although the hypotheses have a stronger connection to one part or another of the 
research question, they can, and will, be discussed in combination. Chiefly in the part of the 
paper that performs an overall discussion of the paper’s theoretical framework. The hypotheses 
are based on evaluations of relevant theories and existing empirical research, combined with 
considerations of the availability and quality of relevant data, and they are presented and 
discussed at the end of the next chapter.  
 
In order to explore the hypotheses and answer the research question the paper employs two 
different methods. Longitudinal multilevel regression (MLR) will be used in order to explore 
the historical empirical relationship between terrorism and political trust, where the MLR 
includes nineteen European countries covering the time period of 2002 to 2016.  To explore the 
general relationship, i.e. if capacity perception is a causal mechanism or not, the paper will 
analyse the result of a survey experiment especially designed in order to explore this 
relationship. The paper, thus, performs what Yin calls a non-converging use of methods, where 
different methods are used in order to explore related but different questions. It is an execution 
of two sub-studies in order to perform an overarching study of a subject (2014, 120-121). 
However, since some of the dependent variables are identical in both sub-studies, i.e. trust the 
police and trust parliament, the paper will also employ what Yin refers to as a triangulation of 
methods, where the results from the one study will be discussed in connection with the part of 
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the research question to which it does not mainly belong. This triangulation is done, as 
mentioned above, in connection with the analysis of the theoretical framework, where the paper 
uses the results from both the sub-studies to shed light on the framework’s ability to explain the 
empirical relationship. Thus, two different methods will at times have been used to explore the 
same questions (Ibid).   
 
The paper’s overall design, in its study of the relationship between terrorism and political trust, 
can be visually illustrated as shown in figure 1.1: 
                      
Figure 1.1 illustrates the overall design of this paper, and it shows how the paper plans to shed 
light on the research question. 
 
It can be argued that the areas of focus in this paper, terrorism and political trust and their 
relationship, are relevant topics by nature. As discussed further below, political trust is a key 
phenomenon in society. It ensures the functionality and efficiency of the political system in 
itself, but also that of society in general. Trust is, according to many, the very essence that binds 
us together, citizens and politicians alike. It is the glue that holds the societal pieces together 
(Newton, 2008; Hardin, 2002, 113-120). Terrorism can, on the other hand, in many ways be 
considered the very antithesis to trust, or at least the essence of terrorism can: fear (Svendsen, 
2008). While this section is being written, a terrorist attack has taken place in New Zealand just 
days ago. An alleged right-wing extremist killed more than fifty people who had gathered to 
pray (Georg et al., 2019). The incident shocked both New Zealanders, and the rest of the world. 
Although seemingly united, the political actors, i.e. both politicians and representatives of 
different political institutions, are discussing what went wrong and who, if someone other than 
the terrorist, is to blame (Ibid). The terrorist pointed to the Norwegian right-wing terrorist 
Anders Behring Breivik as an inspiration (Ording et al., 2019), who, not many years ago, 
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himself executed a terror attack. An attack that shook the political climate in Norway (Stang et 
al., 2018). Breivik wanted to change the political attitudes and beliefs of Norwegians and 
Europeans, claiming that political actors on the left in the political spectrum were undermining 
Christian values (Ibid). These are two somewhat anecdotal examples of persons seeking to 
change the political system, two persons who have seemingly lost their trust in the political 
system and, as will be discussed further below, seek new means to change the system.  
Generally, there are some trends in society indicating that the political trust is in decline (Khan, 
2016), and that the political system is under pressure (Van der Meer, 2017). 
 
1.2 Trouble in paradise? 
Many people claim that we’ve never had it better than we do today. The world today is in many 
ways paradise if one compares the present with the past. This claim does not rule out the fact 
that many things could be significantly better for a significant amount of people, but the 
statistical fact of today’s societies’ relative high levels of prosperity, seen in a historical 
perspective, still remains (Rosling et al., 2018; Rosling, 2006; Rosling, 2014). 2 This claim is 
backed up by a comprehensive amount of statistical research. For instance, the renowned 
economist Thomas Piketty shows that the world economy, although it has gone through some 
non-optimal trends in recent years, have never in the entire human history been more productive 
(Piketty, 2014).  People generally have more resources available than ever before. Research led 
by the UN, especially in connection with their Human Development Index (HDI: used in this 
paper, and elaborated on in chapter 3), shows that since the relevant data collection began in 
the 1990’s, there’s been a massive increase in human wellbeing. Since 1990 the average global 
score on the HDI has increased by 21.7 percent (UNDPa, n.d.). One way to interpret this statistic 
is that while human beings has existed for millions of years and experienced a gradual increase 
in wellbeing over this period of time, in less than 30 years in a modern setting the wellbeing for 
the average global citizen has increased by one fifth.3 In addition, the ones experiencing the 
largest share of this increase in wellbeing in recent years are the ones who had the worst starting 
point in human wellbeing to begin with, i.e. citizens in different African and Asian countries 
(Ibid). 
                                                          
2 There are many ways to measure ‘wellbeing’ and similar subjective experiences, but the indicators discussed in 
this section are common indicators to use in such measurements (see e.g. Wilkinson and Pickett (2019)). 
3 This interpretation depends, of course, on the benchmark. I.e. how the levels of wellbeing was when the 
measurements of the HDI started and how this situation relates to the prior historic period. Nevertheless, the 
point of the overall increase in wellbeing in a historic perspective remains. 
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However, while those with the worst starting point has seen the biggest average increase in 
wellbeing in recent years, there’s still a huge gap between citizens in the more prosperous 
societies and the citizens in the not-so prosperous societies. Europe, and the ‘West’ in general, 
scores a lot better than the rest of the world on measurements of wellbeing (Ibid). If the world 
has become a paradise, then Europe along with the rest of the West is, statistically speaking, 
seventh heaven. Europe is paradise within paradise. Humans in general, but particularly humans 
in Europe, live longer than before, have better and longer educations, and have better living 
standards (Ibid). Approximately half of the (perhaps mainly Western) population, the women, 
has also experienced, in a historical perspective, a huge increase in their quality of life. This 
quality of life progression for the women has slowed down but continued at a moderate pace 
also in recent years (EIGE, 2019). Europe is also a quite peaceful place to live compared to 
other regions (Roser, 2019), and European citizens enjoy a level of political influence unheard 
of in many places of the world (Abramowitz, 2018). Studies, furthermore, show that citizens in 
Europe are very happy (Helliwell et al., 2019-2012). In general, Europe is a relatively good 
place to live, relatively both in space and in time.  
 
The European prosperity is also reflected in the relatively high levels of trust that Europeans 
have. Both towards each other, and towards political institutions (Zmerli and Van der Meer, 
2017). The national parliaments, legal systems, police, politicians, and other national political 
actors in Europe receive relatively high amounts of trust from their citizens, especially 
compared to other regions (Ibid). The high levels of political trust has many advantages, such 
as greasing the interaction between different societal systems (political, religious, economic, 
and social), giving the systems increased flexibility and efficiency (Hooghe and Zmerli, 2011, 
3), as well as reducing transactions costs between systems (Noteboom, 2012, 10; Newton, 2008, 
243). Studies have found that political trust is positively associated with democratic input, as 
well as macroeconomic output (Zmerli and van der Meer, 2017, 153-374), that citizens living 
in societies with relatively high amounts of political trust are less inclined to free ride, and that 
the citizens themselves become more trustworthy (Newton, 2008, 254). In addition, studies 
have found that citizens become more supportive of (the) legal order, are more altruistic, and 
that they live longer if they live in high-trust societies (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2019, 83). In 
addition, citizens not only live longer, their quality of life is in general better, and they have a 
healthier ageing (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2019, 322). In summary, trust affects both the 
individual and the society (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2019, 83). If the benefits of trust in 
themselves are not appealing enough, one could compare it to the usual alternative applied to 
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ensure the functionality of the political system: coercion (Warren, 2012, 33). Thus, trust is, both 
in itself and compared to its alternative,  something beneficial and desirable.  
 
  
Figure 1.2 shows on a scale from 0 to 10 the average trust that the parliaments, legal systems, 
politicians, and police, in the nineteen countries included in this paper combined have received, 
in the time period of 2002 to 2016.  
Source: ESS. 
 
In addition to being relatively high compared to other regions, the political trust in Europe has 
also been relatively stable over the last fifteen years, as shown by figure 1.1. On a scale from 0 
to 10, most of the institutions, in the nineteen European countries included in this paper 
combined, experience little variation in their average trust. In addition, while there are some 
curves in this illustrative macro perspective of political trust, most of the institutions seem to 
end up close to their starting point, when it comes to their score on the trust scale. This suggests, 
as discussed more in the sixth chapter after the results have been presented, that the levels of 
political trust is somewhat stable, which further implies that it requires a relatively large effort, 
so to say, to affect the trust that an individual experience. This latter remark is discussed more 
in the next chapter. The (biggest) exception is the police, which experience a stable and 
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relatively large increase in the average trust that they receive from the citizens, suggesting that 
the police, among the included institutions, have a distinct position in the eyes of the citizens. 
The results in this paper can be used to shed some light on this deviance among institutions, 
and it will be discussed more in the sixth chapter. 
 
All in all, the situation today, particularly in Europe, is relatively good. One could therefore 
assume that this prosperity would lead to satisfaction and stability. That European citizens 
generally would support and trust the political system that they live in. After all, it has produced 
some beneficial results. There are, however, some potential bumps in this so far optimistic 
statistical road. For instance, there seem to be a growing amount of hostility towards politicians 
and a growing discontent with the political system. Polarization and populism have become two 
common societal phenomena, as indicated by figure 1.2. It shows the term trends for 
‘populism’, ‘politician contempt’ and ‘polarization’ on an average yearly basis, in Norwegian 
newspaper media in the time period of 2000 to 2018.  Although there is some variation, there 
is also a clear increase in the average amount of term usage when it comes to these three terms. 
While the terms may not always be used in a negative manner or in a negative context, one 
could assume, given the news medias’ nature and their apparent tendency to focus on negative 
news (as it is probably more interesting to citizens), that the terms are mainly used in a negative 
manner and in a negative context. And while the Norwegian case may not be representative for 
other European countries or the European overall state when it comes to polarization, populism 
and contempt towards politicians, there are signs indicating that the Norwegian case may 
actually be a positive outlier in this regard. Analyses of election prognoses and election results 
across Europe shows that in Hungary, Poland, France, Germany, Netherland, Italy, Bulgaria, 
Austria, Switzerland, Finland, and Sweden, among others, the populistic and the seemingly 
system critic forces are growing (BBCa, 2018). In 2018 more than 25 percent of the electorate 
in Europe voted for a populistic party in their national election (Lewis et al., 2018). For the EU 
Parliament election, the populist parties are expected to receive a large proportion of the votes, 
probably achieving their highest proportion of EU Parliament representatives ever (Erlanger, 
2019).  The situation may thus be more dire for the political system elsewhere in Europe, than 
it is in Norway.  
 
So, the political system in Europe seem to be under pressure. Failing political trust is suggested 
as one of the explanations for Europe’s political challenges, at the same time as the growing 
political challenges may in return exacerbate the situation for the levels of political trust (Van 
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der Meer, 2017). On the other hand, considering the fact that the levels of political trust are on 
the rise in Europe in recent years, as shown in figure 1.1, reallocation of trust may be a more 
pertinent explanation. Nevertheless,  there are variation in the levels of political trust. 
 
 
Figure 1.3 shows a quantitative media analysis of Norwegian news media in the time period of 
2000 to 2018. The terms ‘populism’, ‘polarization’ and ‘politician contempt’ is becoming more 
common terms to use in the public discourse. 
Source: Atekst/Retriever.   
 
There are probably a lot of factors that have a potential for contributing towards the variation 
in the levels of political trust in Europe. One potential factor is terrorism. It can first of all be 
stated that Europe experiences very little terrorism compared to some other regions. The regions 
hardest hit by terrorism is without a doubt the Middle East and North-Afrika (MENA) (IEP, 
2017). Statistic from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that from 1996 to 2017 47 
percent of all terror incidents  happened in Afrika, 41 percent happened in Asia, while 7 percent 
happened in Europe. Thus, also this, in addition to the different indicators discussed above, 
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Figure 1.4 shows the distribution by region of all terror incidents worldwide in the period from 
1996 to 2017.  
Source: GTD. 
 
At the same time as showing that Europe has experienced relatively few terror incidents 
compared to Asia and Afrika, figure 1.3 also shows that among western regions Europe have 
experienced relatively many terror incidents. In fact, Europe by itself has experienced more 
terror incidents than what North America, South Amerika and Oceania have combined. In 
addition to this, and perhaps even more crucial for the citizens trust towards political 
institutions, Europe has experienced a massive increase in the amount of terror incidents in 
recent years. As shown by figure 1.4, the combined average score on the Global Terrorism 
Index (GTI: used in this paper and elaborated on in chapter 3) has increased markedly for the 
19 countries included in this paper (see appendix B for each country’s variation on the index 
over time). The average score in 2002 was 1.5, while in 2016 this average had increased to 2.2. 
The score is still low in absolute terms, given that the index varies from 0 to 10, yet this increase, 
and the score in itself for that matter, can still have a substantial impact on European citizens, 
the political institutions of the different European countries, and the relationship between them. 
That is, at least, one of the assumptions behind this paper. 
 
Europe, i.e. all the European countries and not just the 19 countries included in this paper, 
experienced 370 percent more terror incidents in 2016 than it did in 2002, and the amount of 
deaths in 2016 as a result of terrorism was 6000% higher than it was in 2002 (IEP, 2017). 
Compared to 2004 the increases in incidents and deaths are even greater. Again, in absolute 
terms and compared to other parts of the world the amount of terror incidents in Europe is 






















13 512 deaths, while Europe the same year experienced 630 terror incidents and 826 deaths 
(although accounting for population size and geographical territory may decrease the 
differences between Europe and the MENA regions, which could influence the societal effects 
of terrorism). Nevertheless, one terror incident and one death as a result of terrorism can be 
considered one terror incident and one death too many. It is not without reason that terrorism is 
high on the political agenda in Europe, represented by the EU and its firm stance against 
terrorism (Eurojust, 2019; Europol, 2019; ECFR, n.d.), as well as the stance taken by the 
different European countries (see e.g. PST, 2017).  
 
       
Figure 1.5 shows on a scale from 0 to 10 the combined average GTI-score for the 19 countries 
in this paper, in the time period 2002 to 2016. 
Source: QOG/IEP. 
 
A relevant question in connection with this paper is: why is terrorism a political matter? One 
pertinent reason is, as will be discussed in the next chapter, that terrorism is a reaction to a 
political environment or to actions that political actors are responsible for. Terrorists, by 
definition (as illustrated in the next chapter), have a political agenda. They want to achieve 
political change. Terrorism is in itself an indication of low political trust from the ones 
committing the act towards a political institution (‘institution’ here used in a widely manner, 
and thus encompassing institutions such as ‘democracy’, as will also be discussed in chapter 
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2). Terrorist don’t trust that political institutions are or will be in their favour, so they take 
matters into their own hands, employing fear as a tool to achieve political change. The goal: 
political change, justifies the means: terrorism. 
 
A different but related  and perhaps more pressing question, considering the paper’s exploration 
into the relationship between terrorism and citizens’ trust towards political institutions, is: why 
do citizens consider terrorism to be a political matter? This question is important to answer in 
order to understand the causal relationship between the two phenomena, which will be 
elaborated on in the next chapter. If citizens do not consider terrorism to be a political 
responsibility there are few obvious reasons to why terrorism should be connected, at least in a 
causal and non-spurious way, to political trust. One potential answer to this question derives 
from social contract theory (SCT). SCT is a dominating theoretical perspective in political 
theory and philosophy to explain the relationship between the citizens and the ‘rulers’, and to 
explain why citizens do, or should, accept political authorities (Boucher and Kelly, 2005, 11; 
Heywood, 2004, 43-45). There are, however, several SCTs (see e.g. Rosen and Wolff, 1992). 
At the same time, many, if not most, of the SCTs have a common denominator by arguing that 
political authorities should protect their citizens from harm, especially from external threats, 
i.e. other people, groups and other nations. If the political authorities fail to protect their citizens 
it is hard, or should be hard, for the citizens to accept and trust the political authorities (Rosen 
and Wolff, 1999, 54, 58, 62, 65, 68; Boucher and Kelly, 2005, 317; Mill, 2010, 140). 
Furthermore, citizens probably realise that the most efficient and probable way of ensuring their 
own safety is to have institutions that reflect the collective will to deal with terrorism. To sum 
up: citizens will look to the state for relief when terrorism threatens (Christensen and Aars, 
2018).  
 
It can be pointed out that there are many ways to gain political trust, and many sources of 
political trust, as will be discussed in the following chapter. Ensuring the safety of the citizens 
is just one of these ways. However, many of the SCTs referred to above assume that ensuring 
the citizens’ safety is the least political authorities should do in order for the citizens to be able 
to trust them. If the citizens fear for their life, or safety in general, it is difficult to trust the ones 
who should keep them safe, but do not. Studies conducted in the U.S. shows that the strongest 
indicator for political trust is the citizens’ impression of the state of the national security 
(Chanley, 2002, 469). While this study may have a limited transferability to some of the 
European countries, it is still an empirical finding that suggests that safety is a vital, although 
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not the exclusive, component for political trust. It is not without reason that political leaders all 
over the world has declared war on terrorism (Zimmerman, 2018).  
 
Considering what’s been discussed so far: the seemingly increasing contempt towards the 
political system and political institutions, the increase in terrorism in Europe the last two 
decades, that terrorism is a political matter, a summarizing question is: has terrorism affected 
the political trust in Europe? These were the founding observations and the basic question for 
this master thesis. 
 
1.3 The paper’s approach 
The following chapter, chapter 2: Theory, will discuss the theoretical aspects of this paper. The 
chapter starts by clarifying and discussing the two main concepts in the paper: terrorism and 
political trust. The chapter thereafter shifts its focus to the relationship between the two 
phenomena, and, building on relevant theory, suggests a theoretical framework that can be used 
to understand how the phenomena can be causally connected. The theoretical framework is also 
the framework that the causal mechanism that the survey experiment tests is implemented in. 
The chapter also discusses previous research regarding both political trust in general, and the 
concrete relationship between terrorism and political trust. Both the theoretical aspects of the 
concepts themselves and previous relevant research points to the different factors that will be 
included in the paper, either as dependent variables, independent variables of interest, or as 
control variables. These factors will be pointed to and discussed, before the chapter culminates 
with the presentation and discussion of the five hypotheses that are explored in this paper.  
 
Thereafter chapter 3, Data, will present and discuss the different data used in this paper. Many 
of the sections in chapter 3 has, in accordance with the research question, a two-parted layout: 
the first part of the sections presents and discusses the different dimensions of the data used in 
the MLR, while the second part of the sections does the same for the data that are produced and 
used in connection with the survey experiment. In addition, while all of the data will be 
presented, the discussion mainly focuses on the dependent variables, relating to trust, and the 
independent variable of interest in the MLR, relating to terrorism. The chapter starts by 
reviewing the three main data sources: The European Social Survey (ESS), Quality of 
Government Database (QOG), and The Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP). Next, the chapter 
presents and discusses the data, and thereafter how the data has been handled prior to, 
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and how it has been used in connection with, the different analyses. The chapter ends 
with a discussion of the data sources’ reliability, the data’ validity, and the MLR data’ 
equivalency.  
 
Next, chapter 4, Methods, explain the methods that are used in this paper: MLR and 
survey experiment, as well as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in connection with the 
latter. In order to enhance scientific probity and ensure verifiability, this chapter contain 
some technical details and descriptions that may be difficult to fully grasp, and thus risks 
being somewhat redundant. In order to counteract this risk of redundancy, the chapter 
will try to both elucidate sufficiently and in a plain manner. The chapter begins with a 
discussion of how the methods, concretely, will be applied in order to explore the 
different hypotheses. This discussion, in connection with the validity discussion that 
takes place at the end of the preceding chapter, will clarify exactly what the results of 
the analyses represents. Then the method explanations follows. The chapter first 
discusses MLR. Considering the fact that MLR is a methodological extension of 
standard regression, the discussion will be rooted in the subject of standard regression. 
This approach may also make it easier to understand MLR. The discussion includes the 
presentation of both the general statistical model, and the different specific models that 
are used in this paper, that derives from this general model. The explanation of the MLR 
method is ended by a discussion of the assumptions, sometimes referred to as 
prerequisites, that must be met in order to execute a well-founded MLR, and how these 
assumptions are handled in this paper. Thereafter the focus shifts to the survey 
experiment, and the discussion regarding this method subsequently ends the chapter. 
This discussion to a large extent copies the setup of the prior discussion, relating to 
MLR. The experiment’s purpose and its design are discussed,  as well as what an 
ANOVA is, and how ANOVA is executed in order to analyse the experiment result.   
 
The fifth chapter presents the Results. This chapter have a two-parted layout, in 
accordance with the research question. The first part focuses on the results from the 
MLR, and the second part focuses on the results from the survey experiment. Before the 
results from the MLR are presented, however, the variation in political trust in Europe 
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in the relevant time period, i.e. 2002 to 2016, is discussed. This discussion can be 
beneficial by putting the MLR result in context and clarifying how much overall 
variation is expected. The latter providing an indication of how much variation can be 
caused by terrorism. Thereafter the results from empty MLR models are presented and 
discussed. This is done mainly as a methodological step, in order to ensure that MLR is 
required instead of a standard (and less demanding) regression. However, it is also done 
as an epistemic step, in connection with the discussion of the overall variation in political 
trust, to get a better understanding of how much variation can be caused by terrorism. 
The chapter then presents and discusses the MLR results. The discussion first focuses 
on the main independent variables,  then the control variables on a micro level, and 
finally the control variable on a macro level. Thereafter the results from the survey 
experiment are presented and discussed. This is done first by an overall graphic 
inspection of the result, before the results from the ANOVA’s and the adhering 
Benferroni-analyses are presented in a more detailed tabular format, for each of the three 
dependent variables, which ends the fifth chapter. 
 
Chapter six: Analyses discusses the results in connection with the different hypotheses, 
as well as in connection with the theoretical framework. The setup of the chapter is 
according to the aforementioned structure: first the hypotheses are analysed, and then 
the theoretical framework is analysed. The chapter is somewhat brief but should be seen 
in connection with the discussions of the results, the difference being the explicit focus 
on the hypotheses and the theoretical framework. The chapter ends by pointing to an 
alternative and supplementing theoretical element, that has a potential for explaining 
large parts of the different divergencies and deviances that this chapter uncovers.  
 
The seventh and final chapter presents the Conclusion. The chapter summarizes what 
this paper have done, sums up some of the limitations in this paper, points to fruitful 
venues for future exploration, and, by pointing to the main findings, concludes by 





2     Theory 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the paper’s theoretical and empirical foundation. In a paper focusing 
on how terrorism affects political trust there are some questions that should be answered. First, 
what is terrorism, and what is political trust? The answers to these questions are the basis for 
understanding the phenomena in themselves, but also the relationship between them. Second, 
what kind of causal mechanisms is likely to exist in the relationship between the phenomena? 
The  answer to this question can help give a more explicit understanding of the causal 
relationship between the two phenomena, and at the same time it is a question that many forgets 
to ask and/or answer, as pointed out by Khan (2016). In addition, the existence of a causal 
relationship implicitly requires the existence of causal mechanisms in that relationship 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2019, 221), and it is probably more manageable in a paper like this to 
empirically explore a mechanism rather than the entire relationship. Third, is there an empirical 
relationship between the two phenomena? This last question can be answered by reviewing 
previous studies, as well as by the results in this paper. In this paper it is also this question and 
the answer to it that, arguably, adds the greatest value to the academic field. If there’s no 
empirical relationship between terrorism and political trust some of this paper’s value crumbles.   
 
This chapter will address all of these questions. This is done first by clarifying the concept of 
‘terrorism’. This clarification includes discussing what ‘terrorism’ is, who the terrorists are, 
what the terrorists do, and why the terrorists do what they do. Some of this discussion may seem 
a bit peripheral if seen in connection with the specific relationship between terrorism and 
political trust which is the main focus in this paper. However, it can be argued that in order to 
truly understand the concept in itself, but also how it could affect political trust, a somewhat 
thorough discussion can only be beneficial.  
 
After clarifying the concept of ‘terrorism’ the focus shifts to ‘political trust’. Some of the 
clarifications starts with a brief discussion of the concept of ‘general trust’, since a lot of the 
theoretical literature assumes, either implicitly or explicitly, that the concept of political trust 
derives from the general concept of trust. This gives the different types of trust several 
commonalities. General trust is in many ways the foundation for political trust. Despite this 
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occasional inclusion of the concept of ‘general trust’, the discussions mainly revolves around 
the concept of ‘political trust’. The clarification of ‘political trust’ begins with discussing what 
political trust is, and then moves to how political trust originates, and ends with how political 
trust is affected.  
 
After addressing the first questions posed in the beginning of this chapter, i.e. what ‘terrorism’ 
is and what ‘political trust’ is, the chapter moves on to the second question. In order to address 
this question, the chapter describes a theoretical framework that explains the causal relationship 
between the terrorism and political trust. The theoretical framework is rooted in what Mishler 
and Rose (2001) refers to as ‘institutional theories’ of trust, and combines macro theories with 
micro theories, to create a holistic causal theory. However, while the chapter presents a holistic 
theory, the paper only empirically tests one element, i.e. one causal mechanism, in this theory, 
as mentioned earlier. The paper chooses to test a causal mechanism and not an entire causal 
theory mainly because it is more manageable to test one mechanism, compared to an entire 
theory. However, as this section of the paper will discuss, some of the elements and relations 
in the theoretical framework have empirical backing from previous studies. Furthermore, as 
also mentioned earlier, while only one mechanism is specifically empirically tested, i.e. in the 
survey experiment, results from the MLR will also be used to discuss the potency of the entire 
theoretical framework. 
 
With the first two questions addressed, and the theoretical clarifications out of the way, the 
chapter moves on to address the third and final question, by discussing the paper’s empirical 
foundations. This discussion is performed by reviewing previous studies focusing on political 
trust, or studies focusing on the specific relationship between terrorism and political trust. 
There’s already been conducted a lot of research on this field that are quite informative when it 
comes to the relationship between terrorism and political trust. However, as the discussion will 
illustrate, a lot of the research has had a completely different research design than what 
employed in this paper, which may yield different results. This is one of the elements of this 
paper that contributes to the paper’s academic relevance and -value. Furthermore, previous 
research also contributes in the selection of variables to include in the MLR.  
 
Building on the theoretical and the empirical discussions, the chapter ends by presenting and 
discussing five hypotheses. As mentioned previously, four of these hypotheses are mainly 
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connected to the MLR and the first part of the research question, while the fifth hypothesis are 
mainly connected to the survey experiment and the second part of the research question.  
 
2.2 Terrorism 
2.2.1 What is it? 
Terrorism as a phenomenon has a long history. Law traces the first documented act of terrorism 
back to the year 647 B.C. when the Assyrian emperor Assurnasirpal II terrorized the village of 
Susa (2017, 1-13). The term “terrorism”, however, became more widely known during the 
French revolution, when the Jacobines, led by Robespierre, used the state’s apparatus to 
terrorize their political opponents. Today, however, the term is used in different contexts than 
previously. It is often claimed, usually by states and state representatives themselves, that states 
and representatives of states cannot be terrorists (McAllister and Schmid, 2011, 203-206; Law, 
2017, 338-339; Hoffman, 1998, 13-17; Norris, 2003, 285). This stance can, if not entirely then 
at least partially, be explained by the fact that a term such as “terrorism” has a large inherent 
definitional power, a power that many seek to use for their own advantage (Stampnitzky, 2013, 
3-4; Norris, 2003, 6). Many also claim that it is impossible to understand the concept of 
terrorism without considering the context, i.e. the phenomenon’s location in both space and 
time (Shanahan, 2016, 103-113). Terrorism as a concept is therefore essentially contested, value 
laden, and context dependent (Norris et al., 2003, 6; Jackson et al., 2011, 99). 
 
As a consequence of the challenges in understanding the concept, it’s not been possible to 
universally agree upon a definition. According to Norris, what constitutes as “terrorism” is, to 
some extent, in the eye of the beholder (2003, 6). Thus, there’s hundreds of definitions abound 
(Easson and Schmid, 2011, 99-157), each with their own strengths and weaknesses. This paper 
uses data on terrorism collected by the Institute of Economic and Peace (IEP), which in turn 
bases their data on terrorism on data collected by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The 
paper therefore commits to the definition created and used by the GTD, which is also used by 
the IEP (IEPa, n.d.). According to this definition, “terrorism” is:  
 
“an intentional act of violence or the threat of violence by a non-state actor.” 






In addition, two of the following three criteria also has to be met:  
 
“1) The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social 
goal;  
2) The violent act included an evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey 
some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims, 
and;  
3) The violent act was out of the precepts of international humanitarian law”.  
(Ibid).  
 
This definition, like most definitions, has its strengths and weaknesses. First, it can be noted 
that the definition excludes “state actors” as possible terrorists. A lot of people disagree with 
such an exclusion (McAllister and Schmid, 2011, 203-206; Law, 2017, 338-339; Hoffman, 
1998, 13-17; Norris, 2003, 285). On the other hand, the definition can be considered too 
inclusive, by including goals such as economic, religious or social, in addition to the more 
conventional political goal (see e.g. Easson and Schmid, 2011, 99-157). Despite these perhaps 
critique worthy inclusions and exclusion, GTD’s definition is also in line with a lot of the 
leading definitions in the field (see e.g. Hoffman, 1998, 15; Norris, 2003, 6; Shanahan, 2016, 
110; CIA, 2013; NATO, 2016; Kydd and Walter, 2006, 52; Nacos et al., 2011, 35). This 
enhances the conformity between the background concept, the systematized concept, and the 
operationalized concept (Adcock and Collier, 2001), and increases the definitional validity, as 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
2.2.2 Who, what and why? 
Simply put, “terrorists are those who employ the method of terrorism” (Norris, 2003, 6). If one 
excludes state actors, as GTD does and therefore this paper also, organizational actors and 
individuals remain as two possible categories of terrorists. Some infamous examples in the 
former category are ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the IRA. Freedman estimates that there in 2011 existed 
approximately 120 terrorist organizations around the globe (2011, 350-354), and according to 
statistics from the GTD terrorist organizations are responsible for 98.2 percent of all the terrorist 
incidents in the world in modern time (Gill, 2015, 16-17). Among the latter category of terrorists 
some infamous examples are Anders Behring Breivik and Theodore Kaczynski (the UNA-
bomber). There’s no good estimate of how many individual terrorists, often referred to as ‘lone 
wolfs’, that exists, partly because ‘lone wolfs’ are more difficult to detect than terrorist 
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organizations and their members (Gill, 2015). Nonetheless, using the same statistics from GTD, 
‘lone wolfs’ are responsible for 1.8 percent of all terrorist incidents.  
 
A terrorist is, thus, someone who employs terrorism as a method. Such a description could 
involve a large number of acts. According to the definition used in this paper, the defining 
characteristics of a terrorist act is that it includes violence, or the threat of violence. This also 
leaves, in theory, very few acts out as possible terrorist acts. And history shows that terrorists 
are inventive and resourceful when it comes to working towards their goals. Some common 
terrorist acts are plane high jacking and -crashing, crashing vehicles into crowds, deploying 
nerve gas in crowded areas, shooting into crowds, using knives to stab random innocents, 
assassinations, torture, and kidnapping (Hoffman, 1998, 157-184).   
 
The academic literature points to five categories of causes, five trigger groups, that explains 
why seemingly ordinary people become terrorists. The first category is political, which includes 
situations such as democratization (which can be both the desire for or opposition against 
democratization), state suppression, lack of state legitimacy, and a weak civil society. The 
second category is socioeconomic, which focuses on the economic dimensions of social  life, 
and includes situations such as inequality, rapid and/or uneven economic growth, 
modernization, and urbanization. The third category is social, which focuses on the 
demographic dimensions of social life, where youth waves in combination with high levels of 
unemployment, and migration are common triggers. The fourth category is geopolitical, and 
globalization, western foreign policies, immigration, and transnational crime are typical 
situations that triggers terrorism (Jackson et al., 2008, 211). The fifth category is religion, which 
is perhaps the most dominating trigger category in modern time. People and groups of people 
seem to become more prone, relative to previously and to other triggering categories, to commit 
acts of terrorism for religious reasons (Neumann, 2009). 
 
When someone first has become a terrorist, there’s a lot of different, often quite nuanced, 
theories that tries to explain the terrorists’ modus operandi (see e.g. McAllister and Schmid, 
2011, 214-255). Common for most of the theories, however, is that they assume that terrorists 
are utility maximizing beings, and rational choice is the dominating paradigm when it comes 
to explaining terrorists’ behaviour (Abrahms, 2008). According to this line of thought, terrorists 
have a political (and/or economic/religious/social) goal, assesses the available alternatives, 
execute a cost-benefit analysis, and chooses the alternative that gives the greatest achievement 
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of objective (Ibid, 78-81; Gill, 2015). It can, at the same time, be mentioned that some 
researchers suggest that a logic of appropriateness is more suited than the more common logic 
of consequences that is usually applied in rational choice theories, when it comes to explaining 
terrorists’ behaviour. Perhaps especially when it comes to the behaviour of ‘foot soldiers’ in 
terrorist organizations (Abrahms, 2008). According to this perspective, terrorists want to be 
member of a community, to feel adherence, and both the norms and values, in addition to the 
goal, affects their behaviour (Ibid). It can also be noted that although terrorists are usually 
considered to be rational actors, this does not exclude the possibility of the terrorists having 
mental illness or some sort of mental deficit, or from being socially abnormal in one way or 
another (Gill, 2015). 
 
One final remark can be made in this section of the chapter, in order to tie the discussion above 
even closer to the main topic at hand: the relationship between terrorism and political trust. It 
is not necessarily so that terrorists have as an explicit goal to affect the current patterns of trust 
in a society, thereunder the trust that citizens’ have in political institutions, although this could 
also be the case. Fear and fearmongering are often the focus of terrorists, i.e. their mean of 
achieving change. However, by applying fear as a tool for achieving political change it is from 
a theoretical standpoint logical to assume that the patterns of trust have to change. Citizens, i.e. 
the terrorists’ audience, have to be affected in a way that aligns their behaviour with the 
terrorists’ desire. This can, but does not exclusively, mean that the citizens have to lose trust in 
some (political) actors and gain trust in some other (political) actors. Hardin (2006, 119-134) 
also points out that terrorists themselves often feel strong trust towards a particular community, 
and that they want the rest of the society (local, regional or global) to align themselves more 
with that particular community, something which strongly implies a shifting of allegiance and, 
thus, most likely a reallocation of trust within or between societies.  In addition, as Svendsen 
points out, a culture of fear is a culture without trust (2008). Fear and trust are closely connected 
(Ibid), sometimes considered each other’s antithesis, as mentioned above.  
 
2.3 Political trust 
2.3.1 What is it? 
Trust is a cognitive function and a subjective experience (Hardin, 2006, 16-18; Hardin, 2002, 
68-69; Aaronsson, 2015, 23-24), which at the same time manifests itself in the interaction 
between two or more actors (Blackburn, 1998, 20). It is something that, when first instilled in 
a person, can be rigid (Hardin, 2002; 2006), like personal beliefs and attitudes often are 
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(Weinberg, 1994; Brody, 1994).  While the data from the GTD is based on a concrete definition, 
this is not the case with the data from the ESS. This means that the data regarding trust from 
the ESS is data on what Hardin refers to as ‘weak trust’ (2006, 26-27). It is difficult to make 
inferences regarding the ontological content of trust, based on the data. However, since it is not 
the objective of this paper to make inferences about the ontological content of trust, but rather 
its relationship with another phenomenon, this is a surmountable challenge. In lack of a concrete 
definition in the data, the paper therefore bases its understanding of political trust on the work 
of Norris, which in turn is based on that of Easton (1965). According to Norris, “political trust” 
is:  
 
 “the general belief in the performance capacity of political institutions and/or belief in 
the benevolent motivation and performance capacity of office-holders.” 
(Norris, 2017, 24).  
 
Some remarks can be made regarding the definition. First of all, Norris’s definition clearly 
points to how essential performance capacity is in the study of ‘political trust’. As mentioned 
previously, and elaborated later in this chapter, the second part of this paper’s research question 
focuses on citizens’ perception of the different political actors’ capacity to perform when it 
comes to dealing with terrorism. The definition thus highlights the relevance of the paper’s 
assumption of capacity perception as a causal mechanism in the causal relationship between 
terrorism and political trust.  
 
Furthermore, the paper treats all the dependent variables as ‘political trust’ data. As the 
definition above points out, political trust relates to both institutions and the individuals, ref. 
‘office-holders’, in these institutions. Therefore, the paper refers to political trust in connection 
with both the institutions included in the paper, as well as in connection with politicians. In 
addition, while some of the institutions included in this paper can be considered to be of a more 
political nature than others, i.e. the parliament and politicians as opposed to the legal system 
and the police, all institutions are, strictly speaking, strongly connected to the political system 
in democratic polities such as the European ones. In addition, Marien tests the data quality of 
the trust-data in ESS and finds, first of all, that they have high levels of quality, especially 
compared to other data sources. She also conducts a factor analysis and based on this analysis 
she argues that the respondents participating in the four survey rounds that she examines 
considers all the institutions in the survey to be political institutions. Respondents in the ESS 
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considers both the legal system as well as the police to be political institutions, in addition to 
the parliament. So, in summary, it can be argued that it is legitimate to refer to the data on the 
dependent variables in this paper as data on political trust. This includes the dependent variables 
in the survey experiment, considering that the similarities between the data sets, as discussed in 
the next chapter. 4 At the same time, this is a somewhat semantical note, and the denotation is 
mainly applied as a functional, but legitimate, shortcut. 
 
It can also be pointed out that a lot of scholars argue that it is impossible for citizens to actually 
trust institutions (Hardin, 2006; Hardin, 2002; Newton, 2008). Instead of using the term ‘trust’, 
they prefer terms such as ‘belief’, ‘support’, ‘confidence’ or ‘quasi trust’ when referring to 
political trust, especially in connection with institutions if not politicians (Hardin, 2002, 156; 
Svedin, 2012, 147; Norris, 2017). While this is, in many ways, an ontological debate that runs 
the risk of being superfluous in connection with this paper, it is important to address the subject 
ahead of the validity discussions in the upcoming chapter. At the same time, it can be pointed 
out that the disagreement in itself is rather redundant. It is redundant since the main argument 
behind using alternative terms instead of ‘trust’ is that the cognitive distance between citizens 
and institutions become too great for citizens to truly have knowledge of the institution, and 
considering that knowledge is, as will be discussed below, the foundation for trust, citizens 
therefore cannot truly trust institutions (Hardin, 2006). However, as Newton points out, it 
doesn’t matter if the knowledge that the citizens have of the institutions is true or not, all that 
matters is that the citizens believe in the knowledge that they have of the institutions (2008, 
246-248). Or as the definition proposed by Norris points out: “…the general belief…”. Askvik 
et al. remarks that the citizens’ perceptions (i.e. regardless of their correctness) of the 
institutions generate expectations that, in order for trust to flourish, should be met (2011). Thus, 
in connection with the discussions above, it is fair to refer to ‘political trust’ in this paper.  
 
2.3.2 The origins of trust, and how it is affected 
First of all, it can be pointed out that there’s a multitude of literature discussing trust, thereunder 
political trust. While there are some different perspectives, there’s also a lot of similarities 
between the different perspectives when it comes to how trust originates, and how it is affected. 
                                                          
4 With all this in mind, the references in this paper to ‘political institutions’ also includes politicians, if not explicitly 
stated otherwise. The inclusion of ‘politicians’ into the category of ‘institutions’ is also in line with the design of 




Some theories seem to dominate the field (see e.g. Grimen, 2009; Hardin, 2002; Hardin, 2006; 
Zmerli and Van der Meer, 2017; Blackburn, 1998; Luhmann, 1979; Newton, 2008; Rose and  
Mishler, 2001; Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2015). This section of the paper mainly 
discusses the commonalities and common denominators in the theories that seem to be 
dominating in the literature on ‘trust’. And while it is assumed to be differences regarding which 
and how everyday situations affect different types of trust, such as ‘general trust’, ‘social trust’ 
or ‘political trust’, meaning that different factors have a greater impact on one form of trust or 
another, the literature does not seem to differentiate in the assumptions regarding the overall 
elements that create and affects trust. Everything can be boiled down to a couple of concepts 
that illuminates trust’s origin and how it’s affected.  
 
Literature on trust assumes that the root source for trust is subjective experiences (Hardin, 2006, 
16-18; Hardin, 2002, 54-88; Nooteboom, 2012, 12). Subjective experiences generate knowledge 
and feelings. And knowledge and feelings, and the interplay between these two phenomena, 
generate trust (Grimen, 2009; Hardin 2002; Hardin 2006). This is the theoretical assumption 
behind how trust originates. An individual experience something, that generates feelings and 
knowledge, which affects trust. For instance, a pedestrian crossing the road gets hit by a car 
driven by a non-attentive driver. This experience generates, probably, bad feelings and affects 
the knowledge that the pedestrian has about traffic. This knowledge and these feelings would, 
likely, reduce the trust that the pedestrian has in, first and foremost, the non-attentive car driver. 
But the pedestrian would also probably have a reduced trust in every car driver, depending on 
the severity of his or her previous experience, especially in future situations where the 
pedestrian is planning on crossing the road.  
 
There are two competing schools within the study of political trust: one adhering to 
methodological individualism (MI) and one adhering to methodological collectivism (MC).5 
While there seems to be an either implicit or explicit agreement on the theoretical assumptions 
behind how trust originates, they disagree on the main factors that in everyday life affects trust. 
The former school mainly focuses on individual characteristics, and argues that these are the 
main, if not the exclusive, factors affecting trust (Grimen, 2012). The latter school, on the other 
hand, argues that while individual characteristics do matter, it is mainly structural 
                                                          
5 There are different ways of conceptualizing the two schools, see e.g. Mishler and Rose (2001). However, except 
from the different terms, there’s a large conceptual overlap between the different ways of conceptualization, 
and this paper employs terms that are more familiar to the author.   
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characteristics that affects trust (Ibid). The two directions are, in reality, when it comes to the 
study of political trust both competing with each other, as well as supplementing each other 
(Schoon and Scheng, 2011, 619-620; Rose and Mishler, 2011, 117). Most researchers seem to 
adhere to a standpoint between the two extremes and acknowledges that both individual and 
structural characteristics matter (Grimen, 2012, 285-287). This paper will combine the 
theoretical and the empirical insights from both schools, in its study of the relationship between 
terrorism and political trust.  
 
The focus among MI scholars is on inherent individual characteristics, and it is argued that the 
ability to trust is mainly influenced during socialization processes during childhood and the 
formative years. This implies two things. First, that individual characteristics, e.g. age, gender, 
education etc., is important to include in an analysis of political trust (Newton, 2008, 248-256; 
Schoon and Scheng, 2011, 619-620; Hooghe and Zmerli, 2011, 3). Second, that the level of 
trust that a citizen experience is, to some extent, fixed once they reach adolescence. There’s a 
limit to how much an event can influence the political trust that an individual has, something 
that implies that there’s little to no correlation in the levels of trust between different members 
of the same society vis-a-vis citizens from other but similar countries (e.g. the northern 
European countries, eastern European countries etc.) (Mishler and Rose, 2001, 33). This latter 
implication would in turn imply, first, that the use of MLR instead of standard regression is 
somewhat superfluous, and second, that terrorism has a limited effect on the political trust that 
members of the society that is exposed to terrorism has. The first implication is tested 
particularly by executing MLRs with empty models, while the ‘full’ MLR models checks the 
relevance of the second implication. It can, at the same time, be noted that the MI school has a 
lot of empirical backing when it comes to social trust, but not as much when it comes to political 
trust (Schoon and Scheng, 2011, 619-620). The validity of the MI assumptions and their 
implications for the study of political trust is therefore uncertain. 
 
Among MC scholars studying political trust system characteristics is the essential factor to take 
into consideration of how political trust is affected. Common characteristics that are explored 
is polity, regime transparency, welfare arrangements, and the economic structure. This paper 
utilizes the HDI in the MLR, as discussed later in this chapter, which encompasses some of 
these characteristics. Bovens and Wille, positioned in this tradition, argues that political trust is 
especially affected by the combination of long-term changes of the system characteristics and 
the performances of institutions in a short-term perspective (2011). This implies that terrorism, 
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when inflicted on a society, do affect the political trust that members of that society experience, 
and that citizens’ perception of the capacity that political institution have in dealing with 
terrorism do matter.  It can be noted that it is the MC oriented scholars that have the most 
empirical backing when it comes to political trust (Newton, 2008, 248-256; Schoon and Scheng, 
2011, 619-620; Hooghe and Zmerli, 2011, 3). 
 
2.4 The relationship between terrorism and political trust 
The discussions so far have already implied several aspects regarding the relationship between 
terrorism and political trust. These can, however, be made more explicit and coherent. As 
mentioned previously, this paper’s theoretical framework for explaining the relationship 
between the two phenomena can be placed in what Mishler and Rose (2001) refers to as an 
institutional framework. However, as also pointed out above, the paper includes elements not 
so firmly located in this institutional framework, i.e. individual factors. These elements are 
addressed in the next section of this chapter.  
 
The theoretical framework that this paper suggests is as followed: terrorism is something 
undesirable, that is manifested through occurrences that has an enormous potential for damage, 
something that is illustrated several times throughout history. It is something that is inflicted 
upon individuals directly afflicted by terrorist attacks, but also something that affects entire 
societies, i.e. the terrorists’ audience(s). Members of society not directly involved in a terrorist 
attack can be tremendously affected by it, as often illustrated in the aftermath of significant 
attacks, where entire populations come together to mourn, reflect and act. It is probably safe to 
assume that most citizens, if not all, agrees that terrorism is something that should be prevented. 
However, terrorism is not something that individuals in isolation can prevent. It requires some 
form of collective effort (Christensen and Aars, 2018). As discussed in the introductory chapter, 
in modern societies, and thus every country that is included in this paper, this collective effort 
is, at least mainly, left to the state and to political institutions. It is the political institutions’, as 
a reflection of the collective will, responsibility to prevent terrorism. With this as a backdrop, 
terrorism can be conceived as an occurrence that subject political institutions to what Oliver 
refers to as functional pressure. Functional pressure is situations induced by demanding 
situations, i.e. terrorism in this case, that, if not handled properly, can initialize 
deinstitutionalization processes (Scott, 2014, 167-168), entailing loss of trust. If, however, 
political institutions handle themselves well when dealing with terrorism and the functional 
pressure it induces, this could lead to increased trust, as suggested by Albertson and Gadarian 
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(2016a; 2016b; Gadarian, 2014). Terrorism can thus be considered a situation subjecting 
political institutions to functional pressure, forcing the institutions to act. How the political 
institutions act, in turn, affects the citizens’ perception of the institutions’ capacity to handle 
terrorism. In the phrasing of Geys and Qari: terrorism, as well as the political institutions’ 
handling of terrorism, functions as environmental cues, which are important factors for 
changing individuals’ beliefs (2017, 291).  An illustration of this causal relationship, of what 
the paper refers to as its theoretical framework (sometimes causal framework), is illustrated in 
figure 2.1: 
      ±    
   
   
    
 





Figure 2.1 illustrates the causal relationship between terrorism and political trust, as well as 
highlights in cursive the causal mechanism that the paper explores. Elements that the paper 
has data on is written in bold. 
 
In addition to illustrating the overall causal relationship, as suggested by the theoretical 
framework discussed above, figure 2.1 also shows the causal mechanism that’s tested in this 
paper, and its assumed role in this theoretical framework. The causal mechanism’s role in the 
overall causal theory is based on the theoretical clarifications regarding trust and how it is 
affected, as discussed in the previous section (its position in the overall framework is not tested 
empirically, but it is the only logical position for it to have in the relationship between terrorism 
and political trust, building on the different theories utilized in this paper). The key is to affect 
the individual’s knowledge and feelings, summed up as perception, regarding the institutions’ 
capacity to handle something (e.g. terrorism) in order to change the trust that the individual has 















that the individual has. Capacity perception is the mechanism, or the link if one prefer, between 
terrorism and (political) trust. 
 
So, to concretize the theoretical framework in the case of terrorism (even more than what is 
done prior to the presentation of figure 2.1): terrorism is inflicted upon both individuals and the 
society, and it is up to political institutions to deal with terrorism. How they deal with terrorism 
affects the citizens’ perception (i.e. it affects the feelings and knowledge that a person has) of 
the institutions’ capacity to handle terrorism. But, in line with the theoretical discussion in the 
previous section, so does factors on the individual level, such as age, education, gender, etc. If 
individuals perceive that the political institutions have enough capacity to deal with terrorism 
the trust that the individuals experience in relation to those political institutions may increase. 
If individuals perceive that the political institutions’ capacity to deal with terrorism is not 
sufficient, then the individuals’ trust in those political institutions may be reduced. It is, 
concretely, this assumption that is tested in the survey experiment. 
 
Some remarks can be made regarding the theoretical framework and the assumptions as well as 
an implication included in it. To begin with the latter, it can first be pointed out that following 
the line of thought which the framework suggests, it is implied that the fact that terrorism do 
happen can in itself be claimed to indicate to the citizens that the political institutions’ capacity 
to deal with terrorism is not enough. While the political trust probably is affected by the way 
political institutions deal with terrorism while it happens and after it has happened, the fact that 
it happens in the first place indicates that the political institutions failed to prevent it in the first 
place (although not necessarily in a deterministic manner and not necessarily to everyone). This 
implication is discussed further in the final section of this chapter, in connection with the first 
hypothesis. 
 
Regarding the assumptions, the theoretical clarifications discussed earlier in relation to trust 
shows that it is the knowledge and feelings that is generated on the basis of subjective 
experience that affects trust. How political institutions deal with terrorism is just one of the 
countless subjective experiences that affects citizens’ overall political trust. Trust is a many-
faceted phenomenon, and one can trust in someone regarding something, but not regarding 
something else. For instance, A trusts B to handle X1, but A do not trust B to handle X2 (Grimen, 
2009; Luhman, 1979; Hardin, 2006). The overall trust can, in a stylized manner, be considered 
the sum of A’s trust in B to handle all of Xn. Prior to, but in connection with, the next chapter 
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and the discussion therein of the data in this paper, it can be here be pointed out that the paper’s 
data measures the overall trust that the citizens has in the different institutions. While it can be 
assumed that terrorism mainly affects the amount of trust that the citizens have in political 
institutions when it comes to specifically dealing with terrorism, a further assumption is that 
terrorism affects the citizens’ overall trust as well. The quality of this assumption is, thus, one 
of many that is being tested in this paper. At the same time, it can be noted that this assumption, 
if correct, points to one of the methodological strengths of this paper. As discussed more 
thoroughly below, a lot of existing research only considers the impact that one (significant) 
terrorist attack have on the political trust that citizens experience. This impact is probably 
diluted over time, since citizens continually evaluates the capacity of the political institutions 
and uses a lot of different situations to do so. Not only one event. Accounting for several events 
(acts of terror) over time, where they exist, may be advantageous.   
 
Before moving on, some conceptual clarifications in connection with the theoretical framework 
can be made. First, the theoretical framework suggests that political institutions’ performance 
is important because it indicates to citizens to which degree the institutions have capacity to 
deal with terrorism. Or, using the phrasing of Geys and Qari (2017, 291), the performance 
provides environmental cues that affect citizens’ perception of the institutions’ capacity. This 
paper, unfortunately, does not include any data on political institutions performance in 
connection with terrorism or otherwise. But, in order to get a clearer understanding of the 
theoretical framework, a definition of performance can be beneficial to include. By 
“performance” this paper refers to: “how an actor handles a situation”, which concretely means 
how well political institutions handles terrorism. Furthermore, following crisis literature, 
handling a crisis such as terrorism includes: 1) prevention; 2) preparation; 3) mitigation, and; 
4) handling the aftermath (Christensen et al., 2011, 2). Also, while the paper includes data on 
capacity, i.e. capacity perception, these data does not contain a definition. The paper can 
therefore not make any conclusions regarding what “capacity” really is or is understood as in 
the minds of citizens, something that is also besides the purpose of the paper. But, again, a 
theoretical understanding may be beneficial. Following crisis literature here as well, “capacity” 
can be understood in relation to factors such as “…ability, competence, preparedness, 
organization…” (Ibid).  
 
So, to sum up the theoretical framework of this paper: terrorism is a traumatic phenomenon that 
political institutions should handle. Handling terrorism includes preventing it, preparing for it, 
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mitigating its effects, and handling the aftermath. How well political institutions do this affects 
the citizens’ perception of the institutions’ capacity, meaning that how the political institutions 
handle terrorism gives citizens cues about the political institutions’ abilities, competencies, 
preparedness and organization. If the citizens’ perception of the institutions’ capacity is 
enhanced, then the overall trust that the citizens have towards the political institutions is 
increased. If, however, the capacity perception worsens, then the overall trust is reduced.  
  
As a concluding part to this section of the chapter, it can be pointed out that different elements 
of the theoretical framework have received empirical backing in previous studies. Christensen 
et al. argues that “a valid approach is to look at how citizens assess the capacity of the authorities 
to handle tasks in specific public areas/policy fields, as a measurement of trust in and perceived 
legitimacy of the system” (2011, 5-6). This argument is very much in line with the theoretical 
framework proposed in this paper. The authors use a multivariat regression analysis to test the 
relationship between citizens’ perception of public authorities’ capacity and their trust towards 
these authorities. They find a significant relationship (Ibid, 14-15), and based on this study 
concludes that “countries that frequently face “real” threats or crisis have to react but may also 
face greater losses in confidence and trust at the same time” (Ibid, 23).  
 
A different study with a similar focus as the previously mentioned one, finds that satisfaction 
with specific public services have an impact on people’s overall trust in public sector 
institutions (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005, 506-507, own cursive). The study concludes by 
stating that: “one can firmly conclude that institutions’ function and performance have an effect 
on people’s trust in them” (Ibid, 505, own cursive).  
 
Thus, several of the theoretical assumptions included in the theoretical framework proposed in 
this paper have empirical backing from previous studies. First, there is a causal relationship 
between capacity and trust.6 Second, institutions’ handling of specific societal challenges can 
have an impact on the overall trust that the institutions receive. And third, how institutions 
perform do have an effect on the trust that they receive. Previous studies have, in addition to 
                                                          
6 The authors of the referred-to study operates with a reversed causal relationship compared to the one in this 
paper. Without going into an ontological debate, and also agreeing that increased trust may free more resources 
and increase capacity, as is a beneficial consequence of high levels of trust, this paper assumes, based on the 
discussed trust theories, that capacity perception affects trust and not the other way around. It can, at the same 
time, be noted that scholars have not reached an agreement in this debate (Hutchinson and Johnson, 2011, 742-
743), partly because there’s usually a high correlation between the two phenomena.  
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provide empirical backing for different assumptions in the theoretical framework, also provided 
a lot of knowledge regarding important factors affecting trust, factors that are worth including 
in a study of political trust.  
 
2.5 Existing research 
2.5.1 Political trust and control variables 
Before reviewing studies that explore the specific relationship between terrorism and political 
trust, it can be worth reviewing studies that includes different factors that are assumed to 
generally affect political trust. This is done in accordance with the theoretical clarifications 
discussed previously and will be a guidepost for the MLR.  
 
In their study of political trust7 Askvik et al. (2011, 422) use the following control variables on 
the individual level: gender, age, education and religiousness. These variables are also included 
in comparable studies by Christensen and Lægreid (2005) and Christensen et al. (2011). 
Regarding gender, it is assumed that women are more trusting towards political (i.e. public) 
institutions, because women are more often employed by these institutions than men are, 
because many public institutions has taken over a lot of the tasks previously handled by women 
(e.g. kindergartens and healthcare), and the fact that in many societies men still pay a lot more 
in taxes than women and may therefore have more negative predispositions towards political 
institutions (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005, 495). Regarding age, it is expected that the older 
one gets, the more trusting towards political institutions one becomes, since older people are 
more collectively oriented than younger people (Christensen et al., 2011, 6; Christensen and 
Lægreid, 2005, 495). Education is also expected to have a positive influence on political trust 
because knowledge and understanding, something that results from education, can improve 
trust. Knowledge opens the mind to nuances (Christensen and Lægreid, 2005, 494). Degree of 
religiousness is also expected to have a positive influence on trust, because religious citizens 
are often better integrated in their community, something that should provide higher levels of 
trust (Christensen et al., 2011, 7). 
 
In their study of individuals’ fear of terrorism (ref: the close conceptual relationship between 
trust and fear), Christensen and Aars (2018) use several of the variables mentioned above, but 
also includes social trust and income as two additional control variables on the individual level. 
                                                          
7 The authors use the term ‘institutional trust’ instead of ‘political trust’, but this has no implications for the 
knowledge that this paper can extract from their study.  
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Social trust is expected to be positively correlated with political trust, following the same logic 
as discussed in connection with degree of religiousness. Low social trust can entail a sceptical 
attitude towards political institutions (Christensen et al., 2011, 7). Regarding income, 
Christensen and Aars (2018) notes that citizens that are satisfied with their income are more 
satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. This satisfaction could indicate a 
higher degree of overall satisfaction with  public institutions, and therefore higher levels of 
political trust. The authors also remarks that one can expect a connection between fear and trust, 
suggesting a negative correlation. As mentioned earlier, a culture of fear is a no-trust culture 
(Svendsen, 2008). This paper incorporates this suggestion, and includes feeling of safety into 
the MLR, something that should give a positive connection between this control variable and 
the dependent variables. All of the variables mentioned so far are rather standard variables to 
include in studies of political trust (see e.g. Hutchinson and Johnson, 2017, 478-480; Torcal, 
2017, 430; Bargsted et al., 2017, 410; Dalton, 389; Mondak et al., 2017, 152).  
 
On the macro level it is common to include variables that contain information on societal 
characteristics. As already mentioned, this paper uses the HDI to do this, a move that is partially 
inspired by the study conducted by Christensen and Aars’ (2018). The content of this index will 
be elaborated on in the next chapter, but a brief summary of that elaboration is that the index 
contains information on system characteristics relating to life expectancy (health), the education 
system, and the economy. All these elements: the quality of the health system, the quality of 
the education system, and the economic prosperity in a society, is expected to be positively 
associated with political trust (Mayne and Hakhverdian, 2017; Kumlin and Hausgjerde, 2017; 
Uslaner, 2017). The same logic as discussed in connection with income can be used here: the 
more satisfied citizens are with the output produced by different societal institutions, the more 
they are prone to trust these institutions.  
 
2.5.2 Remarks on previous studies 
As mentioned, there’s already been carried out several studies on the relationship between 
terrorism and political trust. These studies can provide an immense amount of insight into the 
subject at hand. But before discussing their findings, some remarks can be made regarding the 
differences between the studies that are being discussed in this section and the studies that are 
conducted in this paper. The remarks made in this section are mainly related to methodology 
and therefore originally belongs in the method chapter. However, considering their influence 
on some of the hypotheses they are discussed here. The remarks will provide a better 
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understanding for the discrepancy between the hypotheses and the implications that is indicated 
by the results from the studies that are discussed in this section. The remarks also point out the 
relevance of this paper and its design in connection with the academic purpose of illuminating 
the relationship between terrorism and political trust even further.  
 
During the research in connection with this paper it was not possible to uncover any studies that 
explored the relationship between terrorism and political trust over a long period of time in a 
systematic way. There are studies that explore the connection between the levels of political 
trust measured prior to a significant terror attack, compare this measurement of the levels of 
political trust with the levels of political trust at a later time, and then draw inferences from this 
comparison (see e.g. Sander and Putnam (2010)). However, these studies do not control for the 
developments that happens in between the two measurements, and the comparison therefore 
does not have an optimal degree of certainty. Furthermore, it was also impossible to uncover 
any studies that systematically compares two or more countries in  a study of the relevant 
relationship. A lot of studies point to the findings from other studies exploring different terror 
attacks, extract knowledge from different studies (see e.g. Wollebæk et al., 2012; 2013), 
compare the findings from two or more countries, and so forth, but none seem to incorporate 
data from more than one country into their study of the relationship between terrorism and 
political trust.  
 
All the studies reviewed in connection with reviewing previous research relating to the 
relationship between terrorism and political trust in fact seem to have designs resembling 
natural experiments, focusing on significant terror events, e.g. 9/11 in the U.S. or 22nd of July 
in Norway. The studies use the significant terror event as a critical juncture, comparing trust 
measurements done prior to the event with measurements done some time after the event 
(sometimes close in time, other times further away in time, and sometimes both). This design 
has many benefits, and since they sometimes resemble natural experiments they can often draw 
quite solid inferences regarding the effects that one concrete terror attack has on political trust. 
Especially if the measurements of political trust are carried out shortly before and shortly after 
the terror attack. However, as the theoretical framework points out, a terror attack probably has 
an effect in the short run, but this effect is diluted over time, as it intermingles with countless 
experiences providing citizens with environmental cues about the institutions’ capacities. This 
paper, as will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter (Data), considers the overall 
average effect that terrorism have had in Europe in recent time. The average effect that n attacks, 
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both big and small ones, has over time may be different than the effect that one big attack has 
over time. Furthermore, and in relation to the abovementioned comment, existing studies focus 
on terror incidents and treats this as terrorism, while this paper studies terrorism as perceived 
by the IEP. The concrete difference between these two perspectives and its consequences is 
discussed in the next chapter.  It can also, as a final remark on previous studies, be noted that a 
lot of the previous studies has a rather limited inclusion of political institutions in their study. 
Previous studies primarily focus on the trust that citizens have in their government (Dinesen 
and Jæger, 2013, 918), while the MLR in this paper includes four political institutions, while 
the survey experiment considers three political institutions, with a partial overlap between the 
two different studies.  
 
2.5.3 Political trust and terrorism 
Previous studies find, across the board, an empirical relationship between a significant terror 
attack and citizens’ trust in political institutions that is positive. The different analyses show 
that when a comprehensive terror attack occur, the citizens’ trust in political institutions 
subsequently grows. This positive relationship is confirmed by studies conducted in connection 
with a terror attack in the U.S. (Chanley, 2002; Putnam, 2002; Sander and Putnam, 2010), in 
Spain (Dinesen and Jæger, 2013), in Sweden (Geys and Qari, 2017), and in Norway (Wollebæk 
et al., 2012). The positive relationship is considered to be a consequence of what is referred to 
as a rally around the flag effect, where citizens gather around political institutions and political 
leaders in response to significant terror attacks. As mentioned earlier, this is a logical response 
since political institutions probably represent the best option in the fight against terror 
(Christensen and Aars, 2018). At the same time the rally around the flag effect can also be 
considered a consequence of the shared identity that a society has, where citizens from that 
society increases their trust in institutions representing the citizens’ shared identity (Dinesen 
and Jæger, 2013, 918). This last statement can also be seen in connection with some theoretical 
remarks made earlier. When terrorist attacks do happen, they affect those directly involved, but 
also citizens in general of the same society that is struck. This happens, at least partially, because 
the attack leads to a collective loss of a sense of security (Ibid). If a terror attack could hit, let’s 
say, another Norwegian citizen, it could hit every other Norwegian citizen as well.  
 
The strength of the positive relationship varies, but in the short run the relationship is quite 
strong. Chanley (2002) uncovers a strong relationship, represented by the fact that two weeks 
after 9/11 the political trust had more than doubled compared to six months before 9/11. In 
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Norway 64 percent of the respondents reported having higher levels of trust in political 
authorities after the terror attacks that occurred on 22. July 2011 (Wollebæk et al., 2012). In 
Spain it was uncovered “…strong evidence of a rally effect since trust in most institutions 
increased dramatically in the wake of the 3/11 attack.” (Dinesen and Jæger, 2013, 921, own 
cursive).  
 
The relationship between terrorism and political trust thus seem to be positive and rather strong. 
If a terror attack occurs, the political trust increases markedly in the wake of the attack. 
However, the effect seems to be short lived. Geys and Qari find in their study of the Stockholm 
terror that took place 11/12/2010 that the terror had a significant effect (in a statistic manner) 
on citizens’ trust, but that the effect was limited and transitory (2017). Wollebæk et al. (2012; 
2013) find the same pattern in Norway, Putnam finds the same pattern in the U.S. (Putnam, 
2002; Sander and Putnam, 2010), and Dinesen and Jæger uncovers the same pattern in Spain 
(Dinesen and Jæger, 2013, 921). 
 
So, the effect that terrorism has on political trust seem to be rather limited in duration if one 
specifically focus on measurements of political trust. There are, however, some observations 
that confounds this impression. Firstly, Putnam finds that the social capital increases 
significantly in the aftermath of 9/11, and that this increase in social capital is long lasting 
(Sander and Putnam, 2010). Considering the close relationship between social capital and 
political trust (Hardin, 2006, 75-97; Castiglione et al., 2008), it is from a theoretical perspective 
difficult to imagine how the one phenomenon could last without the other phenomenon. In 
addition to long-lasting increases in the social capital there also seem to be long-lasting 
increases in the levels of fear that citizens experience in connection with terror attacks (Huddy 
and Feldman, 2011). Fear is also, from a theoretical perspective, closely associated with 
political trust (Svendsen, 2008; Geys and Qari, 2017, 292; Esser, 2008; Van Deth, 2008, 160), 
and again it is difficult, although not necessarily impossible, to see how one phenomenon could 
last without the other phenomenon lasting. Huddy and Feldman points to the possibility of the 
effects from a terror attack becoming latent (2011, 463), possibly staying dormant until another 
terror attack occurs. These observations can be seen in connection with the remarks made in 
the previous section. While designing studies around significant terror attacks has its benefits, 
one of them being the opportunity to capture a more detailed view of the effects of one concrete 
terror attack,  it also has its limitations, one of them being the loss of opportunity to capture the 
effects of more than one terror attack. In recent times a more extensive inclusion may be a 
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benefit considering that in the time period of 1997 to 2016 Germany, for instance, have 
experienced 287 terror attacks, France have experienced 902 terror attacks, and the UK have 
experienced 1314 terror attacks, according to statistics from the GTD. This may have 
consequences for the levels of political trust that are different from the consequences of one 
(major) terror attack.  
 
Moving on, in addition to seemingly being time dependent, the effects that a terror attack has 
on a citizen’s political trust also seem to be dependent on the citizen’s proximity to the terror 
attack. Studies conducted in connection with the 9/11 terror find that the geographical proximity 
to the terror attack was one of the major, sometimes the major, mediating factors in the 
relationship between terrorism and political trust. Citizens living in downtown New York was 
more affected than citizens living in the greater New York territory, which in turn was more 
affected than citizens living elsewhere in the U.S. (Nacos et al, 2011, 43-44; Huddy and 
Feldman, 2011, 455; Huddy et al., 2007; Norris et al., 2003, 284). Christensen and Aars (2017) 
finds the same pattern in a cross-national study exploring the relationship between (non-
)democracies and the fear of terrorism, but the pattern is not significant enough to reject the 
null hypothesis.  
 
Geographical proximity therefore seems to matter, and controlling for this factor thus becomes 
relevant, something that for instance Dinesen and Jæger (2013, 920) does.8 The relevance of 
controlling for residential area increases if seen in connection with the study and argumentation 
produced by Truc (2018). Based on a series of interviews as well as statistical analysis of social 
media network communication in the wake of the terror attack in Madrid 03/11/2004 and the 
terror attack in London 07/07/2005, Truc argues that while most citizens seem to be affected 
by major terror attacks, it is first and foremost the citizens living in the afflicted cities that are 
affected, and thereafter citizens elsewhere in the afflicted country. The shared collective identity 
is, in connection with terror attacks, markedly stronger for citizens residing in the inflicted city 
than it is for citizens residing elsewhere (2018, 142-158). 
 
The study conducted by Dinesen and Jæger (2013), which is different from a lot of the existing 
studies that explores the relationship between terrorism and political trust since they include 
more than one political institution in their study, uncovers that terrorism’s effect on political 
                                                          
8 Unfortunately, the authors do not report their findings regarding this control.  
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trust is different from institution to institution. Every institution experienced a significant, 
although short-lasting, increase in the levels of political trust that they received in the aftermath 
of the Madrid terror, but the level of increase varied markedly between the government, the 
parliament, the police, the legal system, political parties, and the other institutions they included 
in their study. In summary, terrorism’s effect on political trust seem to be time dependent, 
dependent on proximity, and dependent on the political institution. Terrorism’s effect on 
political trust varies along several dimensions. 
 
Before presenting and discussing the paper’s hypotheses, some of the observations made by the 
producer of the terrorism-data that is used in this paper, i.e. the IEP, can be noted. In countries 
experiencing a lot of terrorism, i.e. countries in the MENA-region, there’s a correlation of .73 
between terrorism and armed conflict. Considering that armed conflict can be perceived as 
politics by the use of different means (Clausewitz, 1997, 22), this may indicate, although not 
necessarily or exclusively mean, fragmented and/or low levels of political trust. And some 
studies confirm this indication, showing that countries in the MENA-region are among the 
countries in the world with the lowest levels of political trust (Zmerli and Van der Meer, 2017, 
375-508). Thus, countries in the MENA-region experiences low levels of political trust 
simultaneously with high levels of terrorism, while countries in the West experience high levels 
of political trust simultaneously with relatively low levels of terrorism. This may imply that the 
relationship between terrorism and political trust has a reversed U-shape, where terrorism first 
has a positive effect on political trust, before the  aggregate effect of terrorism becomes too 
much and turns negative in relation to political trust. Perhaps the rally around the flag effect 
functions as a temporary cushion.  
 
2.6 The hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical aspects of the two concepts, their theoretical relationship, and the 
empirical knowledge generated through relevant existing studies, as discussed in this chapter, 
one can extract several empirical expectations. This part of the chapter will present and discuss 
the expectations that are relevant in connection with the research question, and which at the 
same time can be answered by the data included and the methods employed in this paper. It 
can, again, be pointed out that the first four hypotheses are mainly connected to the first part of 
the research question, and will be answered through the MLR and the adhering data, while the 
fifth hypothesis is mainly connected to the second part of the research question, and will be 
answered through the survey experiment and the data produced in connection with that process. 
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It can also be mentioned that the hypotheses will be presented and discussed in relation to their 
theoretical foundation in this chapter, while the first part of the Methods-chapter will clarify 
exactly how the different methods can be applied to shed light on each of the hypotheses, and, 
thus, concretely how the paper will explore the hypotheses. 
 
When it comes to the empirical relationship between terrorism and political trust, the theoretical 
expectations leads to expecting this relationship to be negative. The fact that terrorism occurs 
and is successfully, i.e. that the incidents inflict either personal or economic damage, as is part 
of what the data in this paper actually measures, indicates that either the political institutions’ 
capacities are too low, or the aggregate of the resources involved in terrorism is too much, or 
both. Either way, the political institutions’ capacities is not sufficient enough to prevent 
terrorism from happening. The institutions cannot handle the functional pressure that they’re 
exposed to, as displayed by their actions or lack thereof when it comes to handling terrorism, 
and this provides the citizens with environmental cues signalling to the citizens that their trust 
is misplaced. Thus, terrorism has a negative effect on citizens’ political trust. 
 
However, the theoretical assumptions are the exact opposite to the expectations generated based 
on the empirical knowledge produced by existing research. As discussed, every previous study 
focusing specifically on the relationship between terrorism and political trust that was 
uncovered in the process of working with this paper, shows that in the aftermath of terror attacks 
the political trust increases significantly, in some cases “dramatically”. This increase in political 
trust is usually explained by referring to the rally around the flag effect, where citizens, both 
for rational reasons and due to their shared identities, gather around and increases their trust in 
their common institutions and their leaders. Thus, existing research leads to expectations of 
terrorism having a positive effect on citizens’ political trust.  
 
The first hypotheses therefore become a choice between the theoretical expectations and the 
empirical evidence. The empirical evidence would often be the safe choice. However, as 
discussed prior to discussing the existing research focusing on the relationship between 
terrorism and political trust, there are some elements that distinguishes this paper, its focus and 
its research, from existing studies. Crucial in this regard, the differences in the amount of 
terrorism included in the study. Previous studies tend to focus on one significant terror attack, 
while this paper focuses on the aggregate effect that all the terrorism in Europe in the time 
period of 2002 to 2016 have had. There are logical reasons to assume that a lot of terrorism, 
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consisting of both big and small incidents, will have a different wear and tear on, or bolstering 
of, the political trust than one significant large-scale attack will. This possibility is also 
implicitly pointed out by Huddy and Feldman (2011, 463) by the remark that the effects of 
terrorism can become latent. Perhaps the effects of terrorism on trust either lay dormant until 
another act of terrorism occurs or work through different mechanisms, such as social capital 
(Sander and Putnam, 2010) and fear (Huddy and Feldman, 2011; Svendsen, 2008). Therefore, 
considering the remarks on the differences between previous studies and the study conducted 
in this paper, i.e. the MLR, the paper chooses to prioritize the expectations generated by the 




In Europe in the time period of 2002 to 2016 terrorism have had a negative effect on the 
political trust that the parliament, the legal system, the police, and the politicians receive. 
 
 
The next hypothesis follows in the footsteps of Dinesen and Jæger (2013), by considering their  
finding that terrorism affects the political trust in different institutions differently. These 
differences in effect can also be argued to be logical, since the different institutions have 
different societal tasks to fulfil, something that give the citizens different expectations for each 
institution. In addition, following the theoretical discussion from earlier where it is assumed 
that the fact that terrorism occurs is in itself an indication of an institutional lack of capacity, 
another theoretical assumption is that the phase before the terrorism manifests itself in 
combination with the phase during an attack (since the attack itself is the manifested proof of 
too low capacity, while the phase before an attack is in itself not a manifested proof unless some 
actor makes it so, either by actually executing the attack or by informing the citizens of the 
thwarted attack) have a greater impact on the perceived capacity than the phase after an terror 
attack.9 It is the manifestation itself that probably gives the greatest amount of environmental 
cues. These theoretical aspects lead to expecting a hierarchy amongst the political institutions, 
in how much the trust vested in them is affected by terrorism.    
 
The police are tasked with the hands-on maintenance of law and order and is probably the 
institution that in the minds of the citizens is strongest associated with terrorism. The police is 
also directly involved in the phases before and during a terror attack, and as discussed above it 
                                                          
9 Here and later the phases in a crisis, discussed above, is referred to in a simplified manner. 
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is probably these phases, as opposed to the phase afterwards, that provide the citizens with the 
strongest environmental cues in connection with terrorism and the institutions’ capacities to 
handle it. Next, the parliament as a legislative institution is involved in creating laws regarding 
terrorism, and in general regulating the society, something that includes creating a regulative 
and cultural environment hostile and unfertile to terrorism. Its regulative work includes creating 
laws to prevent terrorism, providing resources for the police to prevent as well as to deal with 
terrorism when it occurs, and creating and adapting laws post-hoc. The parliament’s central role 
in every democratic polity in many ways make the other institutions dependent on it. These 
factors lead to expecting that the trust vested in the parliaments to be relatively strongly affected 
by terrorism. However, given that the police have a much more hands-on role in dealing with 
terrorism, the parliaments’ trust is not expected to be as affected as the police’s trust. The legal 
system can be assumed to mainly be associated with the phases after a terror event, and terrorism 
probably does not provide the citizens with many cues regarding its institutional capacity. An 
occurrence of terrorism does not necessarily indicate a lack of institutional capacity within the 
legal system. Therefore, the trust vested in this institution is probably the trust that is the least 
affected, among the different institutions included in this paper. The role of the politicians and 
how their overall trust is affected by terrorism, is perhaps the most complex role to discuss. On 
the one hand, politicians as an overall group have extremely diversified tasks and 
responsibilities, both on a horizontal dimension and on a vertical dimension. For instance, the 
role of the defence minister is very different from the role of health minister. At the same time 
the defence minister has completely different tasks and therefore responsibilities than a member 
on a city council dealing with city-security. Very few politicians are probably directly involved 
in dealing with terrorism, both in the phase before, during and after an event. The politicians’ 
overall trust should therefore not be very affected by terrorism, if this was the sole element to 
take into consideration. However, the politicians’ actual involvement in dealing with terrorism 
is not the sole element to take into consideration. Politicians are often the first actors to appear 
in the news and in different medias in connection with terrorism, something that could lead to 
citizens getting a strong cognitive association between politicians and terrorism. Also, as 
discussed in the introductory chapter, there seem to be a lot of resentment directed towards 
politicians in recent times. Politicians seem to be credited, for better or for worse, for a situation 
regardless of their actual involvement in or responsibility for a situation. Norris (2017, 28-29) 
points out that politicians as a group are the most specific indicator of support for the political 
system. It is the ‘institution’ that the citizens have the strongest opinion of. At the same time, it 
is questionable whether citizens associate politicians, as an overall grouping, stronger with 
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terrorism than the police. The second hypothesis, with the first hypothesis regarding the 
direction of the relationship between the two phenomena in mind, therefore becomes: 
 
H2: 
Terrorism affects the trust vested in the different institutions in a negative but different order. 
The trust vested in the police is most affected, followed by the trust vested in politicians, then 
the trust vested in the parliaments, and finally the trust vested in the legal system.  
 
 
The third hypothesis takes the observations from the MENA-region into consideration, in 
combination with empirical results generated by the studies reviewed and discussed in this 
chapter. Previous studies finds that one terror attack have a positive effect on political trust, 
while the observations made in, particularly, the MENA-region indicate that many terror attacks 
coexist with low levels of political trust. This could indicate that terrorism has a positive effect 
on political trust up until some point, before the terrorism becomes too much and the political 
trust is affected in a negative manner. The relationship between terrorism and political trust 
could be non-linear. This hypothesis can in some ways be considered a hypothesis that bridges 
the theoretical expectations (negative effect) with the empirical results that previous studies 
have generated (positive effect). The third hypothesis is: 
 
H3: 
Terrorism has a non-linear effect on terrorism, where the effect first is positive, and by an 
increasing amount of terrorism becomes negative. 
 
 
The fourth hypothesis is based on the studies and arguments that indicates that terrorism’s effect 
on the citizens’ beliefs, thereunder their trust, is dependent on the geographical proximity that 
the citizens’ area of residence has to areas exposed to terrorism. This is a logical assumption: 
exposure leads to change, and, as discussed in this chapter, there’s a lot of different studies 
conducted in somewhat different contexts that find this dependency, i.e. that geographical 
proximity to terrorism is a mediating factor. However, there are some elements in connection 
with the data included in this paper that limits the explorations that are possible to conduct, as 
will be discussed in the first part of the Methods-chapter, after having presented and discussed 
the data in the next chapter. The hypothesis has to take these limitations into account, and in 





The effect that terrorism has on citizens’ political trust is dependent on the geographical 
proximity that the citizens’ area of residence has to geographical areas that are statistically in 
danger of being exposed to terrorism. This means that citizens living in urban areas have, as a 
result of their country’s exposure to terrorism, less trust in political institutions compared to 
citizens living in non-urban areas.  
 
 
The fifth and final hypothesis focuses on the empirical causal relationship between terrorism 
and political trust, and asks if capacity perception, i.e. the citizens perception of the institutions’ 
capacity to deal with terrorism, functions as a causal mechanism between terrorism and political 
trust. The theoretical framework discussing the causal relationship between these two 
phenomena has already been discussed explicitly several times in this chapter, so an elaboration 
here risks being redundant. But the theoretical framework points to the plausibility of capacity 
perception being a causal mechanism, and several aspects of the suggested overall theoretical 
framework has already received empirical backing from previous studies. The last hypothesis 
is as follows: 
 
H5:  
The citizens’ perception of political institutions’ capacity to handle terrorism is a causal 
mechanism in the relationship between terrorism and political trust. This means that the 
political trust that citizens’ experience changes as the citizens’ perception of the institutions’ 




This chapter has discussed the theoretical foundations for the concepts of ‘terrorism’ and 
‘political trust’. Building on trust theories and rooted in an institutional framework the chapter 
suggests a causal framework that could explain how terrorism affects the citizens’ political 
trust, which is summed up in figure 2.1. The chapter also discussed previous research, which 
guided the selection of variables to include in this paper. Previous research has also been quite 
informative regarding the relationship between terrorism and political trust, despite having 
completely different research designs than the one employed in this paper.  Previous research 
along in combination or, as is the case with the first two hypotheses, in competition with 
previous research resulted in five hypotheses which will be explored in this paper. The next 











This chapter will discuss the data that is retrieved and used in the MLR, and the data that is 
produced and used in connection with the survey experiment. In accordance with the paper’s 
two-parted research question and its multiple method approach, several sections in this chapter 
have a two-parted layout. The first part of these sections discusses the data that is used in the 
MLR, and the second part focuses on the data produced in the survey experiment. In addition, 
in accordance with the differences in the scope of the data, the MLR data being far more 
comprehensive than the survey experiment data, some of the sections have an asymmetrical 
layout, in favour of the MLR data. 
 
The chapter starts by discussing the main data sources utilized in this paper: the European 
Social Survey (ESS), the Quality of Government database (QOG), and the Norwegian Citizen 
Panel (NCP). Thereafter the chapter discusses the data’ scope and its representativity and, in 
connection with the data’ representativity, discusses the possibility of generalizing from the 
samples to the population. After discussing data’ scope and representativity, the data and its 
content is described, before it is discussed how the data is treated in accordance with the 
different methods. The chapter ends by discussing the data’ reliability, validity, and 
equivalence. These elements are crucial for the soundness of the paper’s conclusions. Due to 
the data’ scope, both the number of variables as well as its scope in time and space, the 
reliability discussion centres on the reliability of the data sources, while the validity discussion 
focuses on the dependent variables as well as the independent variable of interest. The 
equivalence discussion only discusses the equivalence of the MLR data, since it is cross-
sectional and longitudinal while the experiment data is neither.  
 
3.2 Data sources 
3.2.1 The MLR 
The MLR uses data retrieved from ESS and QOG. ESS is a survey which gathers data on 
European citizens, and the data therefore mainly consist of data on the individual level (all data 
from the ESS utilized in this paper is on the individual level). The data gathering for the first 
data round (2002) started in 2001, and the process is repeated every second year on randomly 
selected respondents. The questionnaire that is used in the survey consists of hundreds of 
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questions, where some of the questions are permanent inclusions in the questionnaire (all of the 
data from the ESS utilized in this paper are permanent inclusions), some questions are included 
in the questionnaire on a rotating basis, and some questions are only included in one round. The 
questions, generally, cover several aspects of a citizen’s life, such as their satisfaction with 
different societal conditions (e.g. the economy, health care system, education system, etc.), their 
attitude towards immigration and migration, and their happiness. Common for most of the 
questions is that they deal with citizens’ attitudes, beliefs or satisfaction. The survey responses 
are then stored in the ESS database, and so far (10.10.2018) ESS has published eight survey 
rounds (ESS, n.d..; ESSa, n.d.). 
 
QOG is a database that consists of data both produced by the QOG employees as well as data 
compiled from other data sources (QOGa, n.d.). The data that this paper retrieves from the QOG 
database, the HDI and the GTI, are originally retrieved from other data sources. The HDI 
consists of register-data and is gathered from statistical reports from the UN (QOG, 2018). The 
UN in turn creates their reports based on data from a vast number of other sources (UNDPb, 
n.d.).  The GTI is gathered from IEP’s reports (QOG, 2018), which in turn gathers data from 
the GTD (IEP, n.d.). The GTD gathers data from all over the world spanning decades, and its 
main component is (terror) incident data. All the data retrieved from the QOG database that this 
paper utilizes is macro (country) data.  
 
3.2.2 The survey experiment 
NCP is a researcher-led internet- and panel-based questionnaire that is executed on a non-
regular basis, but at least more than once each year. Due to its panel-based nature the NCP seeks 
to retain the participants it recruits from one survey to the next. The content of the questionnaire 
varies, but often includes questions regarding economic, political and social attitudes and 
beliefs (UIBa, n.d.; UIBb, n.d.). Sometimes, as is the case with this paper, it is possible for 
external researchers to implement questions or experiments into the overall questionnaire.  
 
3.3 Data scope and representativity  
3.3.1 The MLR 
As mentioned earlier, the objective at the outset of this paper was to maximize both the amount 
of time to include in the study as well as the number of countries, in order to maximize 
representativity. However, this desire for maximization had to take into consideration the 
quality and the equivalence of the data. These elements are discussed later, but with these 
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considerations in mind the study ended up with nineteen European countries, 284 851 
individuals, and the time period of 2002 to 2016 (eight ESS data rounds) (see table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.1 Units included in the MLR 
Countries: Data rounds: Individuals: 
Austria 7 15,237 
Belgium 8 14,343 
Czech Republic 7 15,216 
Denmark 7 10,836 
Estonia 7 13,410 
Finland 8 16,200 
France 8 15,051 
Germany 8 23,342 
Hungary 8 13,132 
Ireland 8 18,247 
Netherland 8 15,186 
Norway 8 13,248 
Poland 8 14,124 
Portugal 8 14,988 
Slovenia 8 10,914 
Spain 8 15,501 
Sweden 8 14,390 
Switzerland 8 13,860 
United Kingdom 8 17,626 
Total: 19 148 284,851 
 
The paper focuses on and discusses political trust in a European context. How representative 
the data is for the European overall, depends on how representative the individuals are for their 
country, as well as how representative the countries are for Europe. The individuals’ 
representativity is mainly a statistical consideration, while the countries’ representativity is 
mainly a discretionary consideration.  
 
The ESS bases its selection process of individuals on random selection, and it is specified that 
the selection is based on “strict random probability methods at every stage” (ESSg, n.d.). The 
samples are intended to be representative of all persons aged fifteen and above (with no upper 
age limit) that reside within a private household in the participating country (i.e. usually, 
although not necessarily exclusively, national citizens). The selection requirements in 
themselves should therefore be satisfying in connection with the data representativity and 
generalizability. However, there are some potential biases in the ESS data (Häder and Lynn, 
2007), but the severity of these biases is hard to estimate. In order to minimize the effects of 
the biases ESS have developed design-weights. The inclusion of (design-)weights in a MLR is, 
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however, no straightforward task. The complexity of the task grows with the growing 
complexity of the MLR model, often because the original weights needs modification to fit the 
model and the specific data (see Gelman (2007) and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2006) for 
further discussions on the subject). Due to the methodological and statistical complexity of 
including weights in a proper manner, the paper excludes weights from its analyses. The 
aggregate consequences of this is hard to estimate but given the strictness of the procedures 
applied by the ESS they should not be too severe. In addition to the strict procedures, ESS  
requires that countries with more than two million citizens (thus every country included in this 
paper, except from Estonia and, at times, Slovenia) includes at least 1500 respondents in each 
survey round (ESSg, n.d.). From a purely statistical viewpoint Ringdal (2014, 269) recommends 
that a study should include at least 30 respondents from a given population in order to achieve 
representativeness. The extensive surplus of respondents combined with ESS strict procedures 
should provide reasonably representative data.  
 
As for how representative the countries are for Europe as a whole, the countries included in the 
MLR study are countries from the northern part of Europe (e.g. Norway and Finland), the 
southern part (e.g. Spain and Portugal), the western part (e.g. UK and Ireland), the eastern part 
(e.g. Poland and the Czech Republic) and the central part (e.g. Germany and France). The study 
includes relatively rich countries in Europe (e.g. Norway and Denmark) and relatively poor 
countries (e.g. Poland and Slovenia). Countries with relatively large populations (e.g. Germany 
and France) are represented, as well as countries with relatively small populations (e.g. Estonia 
and Slovenia). Furthermore, it can be claimed that these economic and sociodemographic 
differences entail cultural differences. The countries included also varies when it comes to the 
amount of terrorism that they have experienced, from none (Slovenia) to relatively (in a 
European context) much (e.g. France, Spain and the UK).  Due to data availability and -quality 
there are some absences that are worth mentioning. First, the south-eastern part of Europe (e.g. 
Romania, Greece and Turkey, the latter country being the country in Europe hardest hit by 
terrorism (IEP, 2017)) are not represented.  Furthermore, the smallest European states (e.g. the 
Vatican, Monaco and Luxembourg) are not represented. In addition, some vital European states 
(e.g. Italy, Ukraine and Russia) are not included. However, despite some shortcomings the 






3.3.2 The survey experiment 
The data produced in the survey experiment are gathered from one population (Norwegian) and 
is collected at one point in time (2019). A total of 2 287 people participated in the survey 
experiment, portioned into three roughly equal groups. All of the participants in the experiments 
had participated in at least one panel round prior to the panel round that the experiment was 
implemented in. The participants were selected randomly from the Norwegian tax registry, and 
the only selection requirement was that the participants had a permanent residence in Norway 
and had a phone or mailbox (Skjervheim et al., 2019, 4). Every participant is at least eighteen 
years old.  
 
The statistical requirements are therefore in place. Both the selection procedure and the number 
of participants (>30) is satisfactory. However, post-analyses of the samples showed that there 
was some response bias. For instance, those with little education are underrepresented, while 
those with a lot of education are overrepresented. Those responsible for the data gathering have 
developed sample weights to account for this response bias. These weights are, however, not 
possible to apply in ANOVAs (at least not in Stata). However, the validity of the theoretical 
framework and the causal mechanism per se do not depend on the sample being representative 
of the population. The theoretical framework argues that ‘capacity perception’ is a cognitive 
causal mechanism that exists in the interplay between the individual and actors external to the 
individual (other persons and institutions). A lot of trust theories (see e.g. Grimen, 2009; 
Hardin, 2002, Hardin, 2006; Luhmann, 1979; Schoon and Cheng, 2011, Noteboom, 2012) and 
a lot of institutional theory (see e.g. Scott, 2014; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2013; Askvik 
et al., 2011; Thelen, 1991; Mahoney and Thelen; 2010) assume, either implicitly or explicitly, 
that ‘capacity perception’ is a causal cognitive mechanism, as explicitly stated by Hutchinson 
and Johnson (2011,739).  As long as the experimental procedure is adhered to, as discussed in 
the next chapter, the conclusions regarding the causal mechanism should be valid and 
generalizable to similar scenarios as the one presented in the experiment. Either ‘capacity 
perception’ is a causal mechanism in the relationship between terrorism and political trust in 
the cognitive apparatus of individuals, or it is not. Strictly speaking, due to the exclusion of 
design weights, the requirements for statistical generalization is not met, but theoretical 







3.4.1 The MLR 
A total of 37 variables form the basis of the MLR, counting the treated macro variables (the 
two original macro variables, HDI and GTI, are each replaced by two treated variants) and the 
control indexes that are constructed. Four out of these 37 are dependent variables, and eleven 
are combined into three control indexes (how the data was treated prior to the MLR, including 
index construction, is discussed in the next section of the chapter). The dependent variables and 
all but one control variable are data located on the individual level and are collected from ESS, 
while the main independent variable and the control variable on the macro level are collected 
from QOG. Table 3.2 shows the 18 variables that are used in the MLR (not counting the treated 
versions of the HDI and the GTI, which is explained both below and in the next chapter).  
 
Table 3.2 Variables in the MLR 
Variable description: Type: values (original in 
parenthesis): 
1. Trust in parliament Dependent 0-10 
2. Trust in the legal system  Dependent 0-10   
3. Trust in the police Dependent 0-10 
4. Trust in politicians Dependent 0-10  
5. Political interest Control 0-1 (1-4) 
6. Feeling of safety Control 0-1 (1-4) 
7. Degree of religiousness Control 0-10 
8. Satisfied w/household income Control 0-1 (1-4) 
9. Area of residence Control 0-1 (1-5) 
10. Gender Control 0-1 (1-2) 
11. Age Control 15-123 
12. Years of education Control 0-56 
13. Social trust Index, control 0-10  
14. Individual wellbeing Index, control 0-10 (varies) 
15. Satisfaction w/societal institutions’ 
perf. 
Index, control 0-10  
16. HDI* Control (macro) 0-1**  
17. GTI* Independent variable of interest 0-10** 
18. i.year Controls for the time dimension 2002-2016 
* It is the treated variants of HDI and GTI that are used in the MLR, in accordance with 
statistical recommendations/requirements 
** has a decimal level variation   
 
The dependent variables measure the amount of trust that the respondents have in the different 
institutions. All the questions behind the dependent variables have the same formulation, except 
for how the question ends, i.e. which institution is in focus: “Using this card [the interviewer’s 
questionnaire sheet], please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of 
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the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have 
complete trust. Firstly…” and then the institutions are listed (ESS questionnaire 1-8).10  
 
As for the control variables from the ESS: Political interest is based on the question: “How 
interested would you say you are in politics – are you…” and the scoring goes from ‘1-very 
interested’ to ‘4-not at all interested’ (Ibid). Feeling of safety is based on the question: “How 
safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in this area [respondent’s local area or 
neighbourhood] after dark? Do – or would you – feel…” and the scoring goes from ‘1-very 
safe’ to ‘4-very unsafe’ (Ibid). Degree of religiousness is based on the question: “Regardless of 
whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?”, and the 
scoring goes from 0 to 10 (Ibid). Satisfaction with household income is based on the question: 
“Which of these descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s 
income nowadays?” and is scored from ‘1-living comfortably on present income’ to ‘4-finding 
it very difficult on present income’ (Ibid). Area of residence is based on the question: “Which 
phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?” and is scored from ‘1-a big city’ to 
‘5-a farm or home in the countryside’ (Ibid). Gender is scored 1 for male and 2 for female, age 
is continuous from 15 and above, and education is based on the question: “About how many 
years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part time? [Reported in full-time]” 
and is continuous from 0 and above (Ibid). Every question in the ESS also contains the option 
of answering “don’t know” and/or “refusal”. These responses are, as discussed below, coded as 
‘missing’ prior to the MLR.   
 
The index that the paper refers to as social trust consists of the questions: 1) “Using this card, 
generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?” which is scored from ‘0-You can’t be too careful’ to ’10-Most 
people can be trusted’; 2) “Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?” which is scored from ‘0-
Most people would try to take advantage of me’ to ’10-Most people would try to be fair’; and 
3) “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking 
out for themselves?” which is scored from ‘0-People mostly look out for them selves’ to ‘10-
People mostly try to be helpful’ (Ibid). 
 
                                                          
10 The scoring is reported in its original format, i.e. before the recoding (which is described further below).  
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The index referred to as individual wellbeing consists of the questions: 1) “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” which is scored from 
‘0-Extremely dissatisfied’ to ’10-Extremely satisfied’; 2) “Taking all things together, how 
happy would you say you are?” which is scored from ‘0-Extremely unhappy’ to ’10-Extremely 
happy’; and 3) “How is your health in general?” which is scored from ‘1-Very good’ to ‘5-Very 
bad’.  
 
The index called satisfaction with societal institutions’ performance consists of the questions: 
1) “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?”; 2) 
“Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing 
its job?”; 3) “And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
[country]?”; 4) “Now, using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of 
education in [country] nowadays?”; and 5) Still using this card, please say what you think 
overall about the state of health services in [country] nowadays?”. All of the questions are 
scored from ‘0-extremely dissatisfied [or bad]’ to  ’10-extremely satisfied [or good]’ (Ibid).  
 
The pre-constructed control index Human Development Index (HDI) is a control index on the 
macro level. The index is published on a yearly basis and consists of indicators that describes 
the average life expectancy in a country, average years of full-time education for citizens over 
25, and gross domestic product per capita (GDP/C). Regarding GDP/C, it is assumed that 
GDP/C have decreasing returns for the wellbeing of citizen’s, so the GDP/C score is modified 
by a logarithm accounting for this assumption. In total, the HDI is an index that measures and 
describes several key aspects of a society that an individual is located within, such as the 
average health of the citizens, the amount of knowledge that the citizens have, and the living 
standards (UN HDR, 2018). The value of the three indicators are aggregated together in a 
composite index based on their geometric average (Ibid). The index (as used in this paper) 
varies from 0 to 1 with a decimal variation.  
 
The second macro variable is the independent variable of interest: Global Terrorism Index 
(GTI). The GTI is an index constructed by the IEP, based om statistics mainly from the GTD. 
Before discussing its construction, some remarks can be made on the ontological and 
methodological assumptions behind the construction. This will, in turn, provide a better 
understanding of what exactly the GTI measures. First, it is assumed that terrorism has an equal 
effect on every citizen within a country. Thus, each country gets one score each year, which is 
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assumed to be valid for every citizen within that country. Some of the backing behind this 
assumption is that media ensures a full and equal distribution of the terrorism’s effect within a 
country (Hyslop and Morgan, 2014). Furthermore, it is assumed that the effect which a terror 
incident have on citizens decreases as the amount of terrorism increases, i.e. that terrorism has 
decreasing returns. Every new incident of terrorism has, ceteris paribus, less effect on the 
citizens than preceding attacks. It is not specified what this assumption involves for the index’s 
construction, i.e. how decreasing returns are calculated into the index. However, one logical 
inference is that the assumption is accounted for in the index’s standardization. In theory, a 
country’s raw-score can vary from 0 - ∞ (scoring described below), yet the index score only 
varies from 0 to 10. Thus, if a country gets a raw-score of ∞ this would give the country an 
index score of 10, which could function as the benchmark point of standardization for the rest 
of the countries’ scores (although this is not certain, as it is not discussed explicitly, neither in 
the IEP-reports nor in the discovered sources that review the GTI) (Ibid). Third, it is assumed 
that terrorism have a decreasing but a lasting effect over time (Ibid). 
 
With these assumptions in mind, the GTI is published on a yearly basis and is constructed by 
combining the values of four indicators, which results in the raw scores. Each of the indicators 
are also weighted by their assumed impact on individuals and societies, and thus according to 
their importance relative to each other. The indicators are: 1) the total amount of terror incidents 
that a country experiences a given year, which is weighted by a factor of 1; 2) the total number 
of casualties from terror attacks a given year, which is weighted by a factor of 3; 3) the total 
number of persons injured as a consequence of terror attacks a given year, which is measured 
by a factor of .5; and 4) the economic costs as a consequence of property damaged by terror 
attack, which is weighted by a factor of 2 (Hyslop and Morgan, 2014). As mentioned above, 
the index also takes into consideration the effects that terrorism have over time. The scores from 
previous years affects the scores of a current year. This is done by weighting the score of the 
current year with a factor of .52, the score from the previous year with a factor of .26, the score 
from the year before that with a factor of .13, and so on (Ibid). This procedure gives countries 
a raw-score which in (an unspecified) turn is transformed into the index-score. All in all, the 
GTI is a complex index. This complexity has consequences for the validity of the index, 
something that is discussed towards the end of this chapter.  
 
The two macro-variables, HDI and GTI, are not used in their original format, however. In 
compliance with the methodological requirements that have to be met, as discussed more 
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thoroughly in the next section, each of the two original variables are transformed into a 
longitudinal variant and a cross-sectional variant. This methodological modification makes it 
possible to identify the effects caused by variation within a country, as well as the effects of 
differences between countries (Fairbrother, 2014, 124).  
 
The MLR also includes a variable that measures and controls for time: i.year. This variable is 
a sequential dummy-variable, where one year (2002) is used as a benchmark that the following 
years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) in turn are measured against. This is a 
methodological move that has to be included in the statistical model in order to get correct 
estimates (Fairbrother, 2014, 124-125; Christensen et al., 2018).  
 
3.4.2 The survey experiment 
The data in the survey experiment consists of a total of five variables. There’s one independent 
variable (referred to as treatment or group(s) from here on) and four dependent variables, where 
three of the dependent variables are the dependent variables of interest, while the last dependent 
variable is used to control for the effect of the treatment. 
 
The treatment functions as a stimulus intended to affect the experiment participants’ capacity 
perception, i.e. their perception of the institutions capacity to deal with terrorism. The stimulus 
comes in the form of a vignette, informing the experiment participants of some (true) 
characteristics of the institutions’ capacity. The vignette comes in three almost identical 
variants, which means that the treatment has three groupings in which the experiment 
participants gets randomly placed (the experiment process is discussed more thoroughly in the 
next chapter): one ‘negative’ group, one neutral/control group, and one ‘positive’ group. All 
the groupings have the same ‘neutral’ basis, meaning that the content in the negative and the 
positive group are expansions of the content in the control group. The neutral basis, the vignette, 
that every group receives is this: “In the last couple of years there has been several terror 
incidents, including in Norway. Norwegian authorities considers terror one of the biggest 
threats to the Norwegian society.” (translated, see Appendix D for original version). The 
vignette is neutral in character by not containing any information regarding institutions’ 
capacity. The participants in the control group is therefore not stimulated in any way regarding 
their capacity perception and can therefore actually function as a control group. In addition, the 
neutral vignette also primes all the participants, since all participants receive this information, 
to have the perception that terrorism, at least according to Norwegian authorities, is a societal 
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threat (again, all the information presented in the experiment is true). The prime therefore helps 
setting the frame for the experiment and puts the participant in the right cognitive mindset. 
 
As mentioned, the negative and the positive group receives vignettes that to a large degree are  
identical to, but extensions of the neutral vignette. The negative group receives a vignette that 
in the extension of the neutral vignette adds: “…Norwegian authorities have for several years 
worked systematically to increase their capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, both prior 
to, during and after terror incidents. Several public reports and sources claim that the 
authorities’ capacities in several regards is still not sufficient.” (translated, Ibid, underscored 
only in this context). The positive vignette is identical to the negative vignette except from the 
ending. Instead of saying that the capacity  is still not sufficient, the ending of the positive 
vignette says that is has increased. The only element that varies between the three groups is 
therefore the description of Norwegian authorities’ capacity: the control group has no 
description of the capacity, the negative group has a negative description regarding the  
capacity, and the positive group has a positive description regarding the capacity.  
 
The three dependent variables of interest measure the amount of trust that the citizens have in 
the Norwegian 1) Government; 2) Parliament; and 3) police. They all have identical 
formulations, except for the institution that is included: “How much do you trust [institution]?” 
(translated, Ibid). The amount of trust is measured on an ordinal scale from ‘1-very much’ to 
‘5-not at all’ (translated, Ibid). 
 
The fourth dependent variable, the control variable, measures how much capacity the 
participants believe that Norwegian authorities have when it comes to dealing with terrorism, 
and thus controls for the effect of the vignettes. Its formulation is the following: “How much 
capacity to deal with terrorism, before, during and after terror incidents, do you believe the 
Norwegian authorities have?” (translated, Ibid). It is measured along the same scoring system 
as the other dependent variables. If the vignettes’ have had an effect, if the experiment is to be 
valid, there’s supposed to be systematic variation between the three groups. This element is 







3.5 Treatment of the data 
3.5.1 The MLR  
The data have gone through several steps of treatment in the computer program Stata™. First 
all of the 149 datasets were downloaded. These datasets were comprised of 148 ESS sets, one 
dataset for each country for each year, and one QOG set for all the countries for all the years. 
Then, all of the irrelevant variables were removed from the datasets, i.e. the variables that was 
not to be included one way or another in the MLR study. Thereafter the datasets were combined. 
This procedure included ‘appending’, i.e. vertically connecting, all the 148 ESS 
datasets/matrices, by first appending every year for each country together, and then all the 
countries together. This reduced the 148 ESS datasets to one dataset. After that the QOG dataset 
was ‘merged’, i.e. horizontally connected, into the ESS dataset, adding variables and 
observations to each unit (each country each year, giving every citizen in each country the same 
HDI- and GTI-score for each year). The merge was performed by the use of the id-variables 
country and year.  
 
After creating one combined dataset, the observations where respondents didn’t know or 
wouldn’t answer was coded as ‘missing’, ensuring that the MLR would ignore these 
observations. None of the variables, however, had more than 5 percent missing, eliminating the 
need for data imputation or similar data editing methods (Graham, 2009, 554; Little and Rubin, 
2015). The QOG-data had no missing observations, except for the HDI-score of 2016. Here, 
the HDI-score of 2015 was duplicated to 2016. Considering the fact that the HDI-scores 
changes very little from year to year, this shouldn’t have too detrimental consequences.  
 
After taking care of missing observations, some of the variables coding was reversed. The 
variables that had a ‘negative increase’, which many variables had, e.g. political interest where 
‘high interest’ had a low score and vice versa, got a reversed order. Furthermore, variables with 
few values (>7) were recoded as dummy variables. The dummy coding happened usually by 
splitting the variable in two, e.g. those who are ‘very interested in politics’ and those who are 
‘quite interested in politics’ were coded as 1, while the two groups not so interested in politics 
was coded as 0. The only exception from this symmetrical coding was the variable area of 
residence which had five original values. In this case the two most ‘central’ locations were 
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coded as 1, while the remaining three values was coded as 0.11 Gender was recoded to 0 and 1, 
instead of 1 and 2. 
 
The data had few ‘outliers’, i.e. few observations that markedly stood out from the rest. As the 
method chapter will discuss more thoroughly, the data does not have a normal distribution, but 
every value has a relatively large number of observations. Therefore, there’s little room for 
outliers to be present. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. Specifically, the continuous 
variables age and education. For instance, 22 respondents out of the respondents that had 
answered at least one of the questions used in the MLRs was at least 100 years old, while 26 
persons had more than 40 years of full-time education. These observations were not removed, 
in order to keep the dataset as similar as possible to the originals. Furthermore, the effect that 
48 observations that are, to different degrees, outliers will have in a dataset comprised of more 
than 284 000 observations will likely be negligible.  
 
As for the index variables that were constructed in connection with the MLR, all of these were 
constructed in the same manner. The scores on the different original variables was added 
together for each respondent, and then the total score was averaged by the numbers of original 
variables that the respondent had answered, which resulted in the index-score. In the few cases 
where respondents had opted not to answer a question, thus being coded as missing, this 
observation was left out of the equation.  
 
As mentioned earlier, in order to get correct estimates, the macro variables had to be 
transformed into what can be referred to as a longitudinal variant and a cross-sectional variant. 
This transformation ensures the correct attribution of the effects that the independent macro 
variables has on the dependent variables. The cross-sectional variant, ‘𝑋j’, is an expression of 
more lasting characteristics of a country (either exposure to terrorism or human development), 
and is created by use of the country’s overall average when it comes to these two variables 
(HDI and GTI). The longitudinal variant, ‘XtjM’, is created by centring the observations around 
their group average, i.e. group-centring. Meaning that the countries score for a given year, ‘Xtj’, 
                                                          
11 This 2/3 splitting had no consequences compared to a 3/2 splitting for the analyses, since neither splitting 




is subtracted from the country’s overall average, ‘𝑋j’, resulting in XtjM. Or 𝑋j - Xtj = XtjM.12 This 
variant is an expression of changes within a country (Fairbrother, 2014, 124-125).  
 
It was also constructed a new variable: country-year, which is simply a combination of country 
and year. This new variable is used to identify the intermediate level in the data structure, which 
is a methodological requirement, and it is not used as an independent or dependent variable. 
Furthermore, in order to achieve an optimal merge, i.e. a so-called 1:1 merge, between the QOG 
dataset and the ESS dataset, the two datasets should have the same id-variables as well as 
identical scoring on the id-variables. If they do not, Stata will not know which observations 
belong together. First, therefore, both datasets were recoded so that one of their country-
variables (they both had several country-variables identifying the countries in different ways) 
got a standardized ISO-coding. This ensured the same scoring on one of the id-variables. 
Second, ESS publishes data (for) every second year, e.g. 2002, 2004, etc., while the QOG 
publishes data (for) every year. Therefore, in order to ensure identical scoring, the GTI scores 
for two years was averaged into a score for one year (due to small changes in scores this was 
not necessary for the HDI variable). The data, thus, becomes less nuanced. However, it was a 
technical necessity. In addition, it could be argued that the average of two years is a truer 
expression of the effects of terrorism than the score for one year. This is also, as discussed 
earlier, one of the assumptions that the IEP makes considering they’re weighing the scores by 
time. 
 
3.5.2 The survey experiment 
There are especially two things that separates the experiment data from the MLR data: its scope 
and its (purposeful) design. The experiment data is far less comprehensive in its scope and is 
custom designed to fit the analysis. The experiment data therefore required far less treatment 
than the MLR data. But some steps were taken. While the participants could not opt to answer 
‘don’t know’ or ‘refuse’, they could choose not to answer by dropping out of the experiment. 
Very few chose to do this (.3 percent), but those who did were coded as missing observations. 
The final step was to reverse the coding on all the dependent variables, in order to get a ‘positive 
increase’.  
 
                                                          
12 The denotations in this section is related to the denotations in the method chapter and is used as a somewhat 




There are several ways to evaluate the reliability of a study. The optimal way is to assess the 
stability and the equivalency (not in the manner as discussed below) of the data. Assessment of 
stability involves exploring to what degree the same data generation procedure (DGP) provides 
the same data at different points in time, while assessment of equivalence involves exploring to 
what degree different DGP provides the same data at the same point in time (Grønmo, 2015, 
222-224). These assessments can be standardized and quantified, providing solid measurements 
of data quality (Ringdal, 2014, 355-356). However, due to data’ comprehensiveness these types 
of assessments are far beyond the reach of what is possible to perform in this paper. 
Assessments of reliability can, nonetheless, be done by reviewing the data sources and assessing 
their DGPs (Ringdal, 2014, 97; Grønmo, 2015, 218). 
 
3.6.1 The MLR 
The ESS data is generated based on a common questionnaire that is distributed to employees 
and partners of ESS. As discussed below, the ESS have an entire team dedicated to ensuring 
the quality and equivalence of these questionnaires (ESSb-f, n.d.). The questionnaire is used in 
face-to-face interviews with respondents (ESSa, n.d.). The sample procedure is already clarified 
above in connection with the discussion of representativity. ESS also specifies that they have 
detailed procedures in place to ensure and assess the data quality. The reliability of the data is 
also from time to time assessed by external actors (ESSh, n.d.). If ESS follows its data 
generation procedure they should be able to produce reliable data. The fact that ESS is a 
frequently used data source by a lot of researchers testifies to this reliability.  
 
The QOG data are, as discussed previously, collected from the UN and from the IEP. UN, in 
turn, gathers date from many sources to produce their reports (UNDP, n.d.; UNDP Technical 
notes, 2018, 2), which makes the reliability of the data sources hard to evaluate. Nevertheless, 
considering the UN reputation and the resources and competencies at its disposal, a plausible 
assumption is that they publish reliable data. Also, HDI is a common index to include in studies 
spanning several domains (see for instance Christensen and Aars, (2018), Lejins (2000, 89), 
and Hoeller et al. (2014)), which testifies to the index’s reliability.  
 
Regarding GTI, while QOG collects data from the IEP, the IEP in turn gathers data (mainly) 
from the GTD. GTD collects data from open accessible sources (often news media), and cross-
validates sources when possible. The database also modifies their data retrospectively if new 
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information surfaces (GTD, n.d.). This transparency, the cross-validation, and the retrospective 
modification contributes towards the data’ reliability. In addition, the database, both in itself 
and as a foundation for the GTI, is a frequently used database in the study of terrorism (see for 
instance Schmid (2011)). In conclusion, the data utilized in the MLR should be reliable, if the 
data sources are a valid indication. 
 
However, before concluding the reliability discussion of the MLR data, some remarks can be 
made regarding the indexes that are constructed in this study. Indexes should be constructed in 
the cases where their inclusion can help illuminate complex concepts and their effects, and the 
construction should be based on logical inferences and statistical evaluations (Ringdal, 2014, 
96 and 350-358; Tjønndal, 2018, 106-111). Regarding the logical inferences, it can, in short, be 
argued that the combination of the different variables into indexes should not be controversial. 
The variables are all, at least to a moderate degree, natural inclusions into their respective index. 
The index on social trust includes variables that sheds light on the respondent’s confidence in 
other individuals, while the index on individual wellbeing measures physical and psychological 
wellbeing, and the index on satisfaction with societal institutions’ performance asks about how 
satisfied the respondent is with different societal institutions and different societal situations. 
Every index providing a more comprehensive and complete understanding of their respective 
purpose, than each variable alone could.  
 
When it comes to the statistical evaluations, correlation analysis, factor analysis and Cronbach’s 
Alpha (a reliability test) are common evaluations to perform. The result from these three 
evaluations are shown in table 3.3. In summary, every index performs well in the evaluations. 
In every case the correlation was above .3 and below .75, the factor analysis showed an 
eigenvalue over 1, the score in Cronbach’s alpha was at least .6. These are all statistical 
indicators showing that the variables are suited to be combined into an index (Tjønndal, 2018, 
106-111). Table 3.3 also shows the same statistical evaluations of an index containing the 
dependent variables used in the MLR. As mentioned earlier, Marien (2017) analyses the 
different variables that is used in this study as dependent variables, and argues that they are all, 
in the eyes of the respondents, considered to be some sort of political institutions. The results 
here, especially the factor analysis, supports her conclusion (she builds her conclusion mainly 
on the results from the factor analysis, the different eigenvaules, and logical inferences). The 
factor analysis, as shown in table 3.3, resulted in an eigenvalue of 2.77, which is relatively high 
compared to two of the other indexes shown in table 3.3, and the strongest factor loading was 
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on the parliament. This indicates that the parliament and its political dimension is the dominant 
factor and dimension (Ringdal, 2014, 96). One way to interpret this is that the four institutions 
are, if anything, political institutions (Marien, 2017, 96). Again, it makes sense to use the term 
‘political trust’, since all the institutions to some extent are political institutions.  
 
Table 3.3 Statistical evaluations of indexes 
Index Correlation Eigenvalue Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Trust in political institutions 0.47-0.73 2.77 0.85 
Satisfaction w/ soc. Institutions’ perform. 0.41-0.63 2.90 0.82 
Social trust 0.48-0.57 2.03 0.76 
Individual wellbeing 0.34-0.70 1.95 0.71 
 
3.6.2 The survey experiment 
The data in the survey experiment is produced in collaboration with the NCP and the fourteenth 
panel round. The NCP is a collaborative organization, consisting of representatives from the 
seemingly highly esteemed research institutions NORCE and the University of Bergen (UIBa, 
n.d..; UIBb, n.d.). In general, the institutions and their representatives that is responsible for the 
overall survey designs seems to have long experience when it comes to research (Ibid). The 
researchers at NORCE claim to have extensive academic interests, as well as offering 
environments that promotes knowledge (NORCE, n.d.). The execution and the digital 
technicalities of the surveys is handled by the analytical company ‘ideas2evidence’. This 
company is regularly used by different institutions, both private and public (ideas2evicende, 
n.d.). In summary, the actors responsible for the DGP of the experiment data (disregarding the 
experiment design itself, which the author is liable for) seem competent and reliable, which 
should produce reliable data.  
 
3.7 Validity 
While reliability assessments focus on the confidence one can have in the data, validity 
assessments revolve around the applicability of the data in connection with their intended use, 
i.e. in connection with the research question and the hypotheses. Generally, one tries to assess 
how qualified the data are when it comes to shedding light on the question at hand. In 
quantitative studies it is especially the measurement validity that is evaluated (Grønmo, 2015, 
231-233). This entails exploring if the variables measure what they are supposed to measure. A 
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systematic way to do this is by exploring the relationship between the background concept and 
the systematized concept, between the systematized concept and the indicators, and between 
the indicators and their scores (Adcock and Collier, 2001, 531). In experiments it’s also 
relevant to assess the internal and the external validity, which can be considered to represent as 
to which degree the experiment participants environment is under control (i.e. how well isolated 
the participants are from unplanned interference) and to which degree the participants’ 
experiment environment coincides with the participants’ natural environment, respectively 
(Grønmo, 2015, 233). The internal validity has to be in place to some degree in order to be able 
to make valid inferences, while the external validity has to be in place to some degree in order 
to generalize the inferences made in the experiment (Ibid). 
 
3.7.1 The MLR 
The MLR consists of many variables, as shown in table 3.2, and in consideration of the available 
volume that a paper such as this has, the validity discussion of the MLR data is limited to the 
central concepts: political trust and terrorism. When it comes to terrorism, the discussion should 
start with the data produced by the GTD. The definitions, both the one utilized by the GTD and 
other leading definitions of terrorism, was demonstrated in the previous chapter. And as 
mentioned in that chapter, although there are some elements that are not universally agreed 
upon, there is to a large degree compliance between the definition provided and utilized by the 
GTD and other leading definitions. The leading definitions of terrorism are, arguably, the best 
expressions of the background concept. There is, thus, compliance between the background 
concept and the systematized concept, the latter being represented by GTD’s definition. 
Furthermore, GTD’s definition explicitly includes all the indicators that is used in the observing 
of cases. It is, therefore, compliance between the systematized concept and the indicators. When 
it comes to the scores and how these are actually set, this is somewhat harder to assess. 
However, considering the fact that GTD measures incidents and not attitudes or beliefs, the 
scores are set on a more objective footing. They should be more straightforward, relatively 
speaking. In addition, considering the procedure with cross-validity and retrospective 
modification, this increases the belief in the validity of the scores. Therefore, the GTD data 
should be valid data on terror incidents. 
 
There are, however, some elements to keep in mind when interpreting the results. As discussed 
above, the IEP constructs their own index of terrorism. This is done by using the definition of 
terrorism as well as the data produced by GTD. However, their construction includes combining 
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the original data on terror incidents with data on economic consequences, injuries and fatalities, 
and weighing the different elements with different factors. The data on terrorism in this paper 
is therefore different from the data on terror incidents that is produced by GTD. It is still the 
same incidents, but it is also more than just these incidents. The data from IEP measures 
terrorism in a way that encompasses different aspects of terrorism than just the incident in itself. 
The IEP data can therefore be considered as ‘terrorism with dimensions’, and the scores may 
be considered terrorism of ‘this magnitude’. An a priori interpretation of the results in 
connection with terrorism’s effect on political trust is that: given that terrorism of these 
dimensions, of this magnitude, occurs (instead of just the occurrence in itself), it has this effect 
on the political trust. Which kind of data that is preferable can be debated, but the IEP data is 
quite functional when it comes to longitudinal and cross-sectional comparisons. Mainly due to 
the fact that the IEP data are more functional when it comes to comparing similar scores with 
similar scores, since the scores contain more information than just the incident in itself. A score 
of 1 on the GTI in one country is more comparable with a score of 1 in another country than an 
incident (by itself) in one country is with an incident in another country.  
 
It is more complicated to discuss the measurement validity of political trust, since the ESS does 
not present the respondents with a definition. What is actually measured is “trust” as the 
respondent relates to the concept. A systematic evaluation of the measurement validity, akin to 
the one performed in connection with terrorism, is therefore impossible. It can, however, be 
argued that trust is a phenomenon everybody relates to. Citizens understands the confinements 
produced by trust (Hardin, 2002, 113-120). Trust is, as discussed earlier, the glue that holds 
society together. To function as a societal glue trust needs to entail predictability in social 
interaction, which presupposes a shared understanding. The inferences made should therefore 
be considered inferences regarding terrorism, as measured by the IEP, and its effect on trust, as 
understood by the respondents.  
 
3.7.2 The survey experiment 
To begin with, it can be pointed out that the survey experiment does not provide the experiment 
participants with any definitions. Therefore, in line with the ESS data, the data in the survey 
experiment relies on the participants own understanding of the different concepts. A systematic 
evaluation of the measurement validity is therefore precluded. However, the term “trust” is used 
in both the MLR and the experiment, and inferences from the previous discussion can be 
transferred to this discussion. The dependent variables in the survey experiments are formulated 
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similarly to the dependent variables in the MLR and measures the same phenomenon. “Trust”, 
as an actual existing phenomenon, requires a shared understanding in order to exist. The same 
can, to some extent, be argued in connection with the concept of “capacity”. It is a concept and 
a term that most citizens past their adolescence with basic verbal training and some life 
experience probably can relate to. It should therefore, to some extent, exist a shared 
understanding of the concept. Nevertheless, the inferences that are possible to make mirrors the 
one regarding political trust. The paper cannot make any conclusions regarding the ontological 
content of capacity but given that capacity is whatever the participants make of it, it has this 
[result] relation to trust. 
 
Before discussing the internal and the external validity of the experiments, some notes on the 
terms used in the prime and in the dependent variables can be made. First of all, the vignettes 
as well as the dependent variable controlling for the general effect of the treatment uses the 
term “authorities” as an encapsulating term for political institutions, one that probably is more 
common to use in the day-to-day language for most citizens, while the dependent variables of 
interests uses three concrete manifestations of political institutions. This difference in wording 
between the encapsulating term and the concrete manifestations did not seem to have any 
practical consequences, however, as indicated by the high response percentage (99.7 percent). 
Participants seem to have understood the connection between “authorities” and the concretized 
political institutions. Furthermore, the dependent variables measure the trust that the 
“Government” and the “Parliament”, i.e. with capital lettering, receive. This means, 
grammatically, that the two variables measure the trust that the current government and the 
current parliament receives. However, it is not certain to what degree this grammatical detail 
was picked up by the participants. Nevertheless, this is one difference between the ESS data 
and the NCP data, where the former measures the trust that the “parliament” receives while the 
latter measures the trust that the “Parliament” receives.13 The focus on the current parliament 
and the current government should not produce any politically biased results, since the 
randomization procedure, as explained in the next chapter, prevents this from happening. 
 
The experiment is conducted as an internet-based survey experiment, which means that the 
participants can participate from wherever they are located (as long as they have a computer, 
tablet or smart-phone nearby), whenever they want. This setup makes it impossible to control 
                                                          
13 The ESS does not measure trust in “Government/government”, and the term for the police is identical in the 
two datasets.  
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the participants’ environment, and therefore reduces the internal validity compared to the levels 
of lab experiments. However, the different elements that may interfere with the experiment and 
its internal validity will most likely not be vary systematically. For instance, some participants 
may be watching a movie showing terrorists and therefore be extra primed, but on the other 
hand some may be watching a comedy and be less primed than others. If the participants are 
randomized there should be no elements that systematically affects the participants, and the 
internal validity should therefore be more than sufficient for drawing solid inferences. A final 
note regarding the experiments internal validity can be made. The survey experiment is located 
in a larger survey which potentially could affect the participants in a systematic manner, if the 
participants were exposed to any systematic differences. However, every participant received 
the same line of questioning before (and after) the survey experiment. All in all, the participants 
have not been exposed to any systematic differences, so the internal validity should not be 
affected. 
 
While internet-based surveys can entail complications regarding the internal validity, they on 
the other hand can have advantages when it comes to the external validity (Grønmo, 2015, 233). 
While the participation in a survey can be a unique experience in itself, the fact that the 
participants participates through their phone (or similar device) ensures that they most likely 
are situated in an environment that is natural to them. In addition, the information that the 
participants receive, as illustrated earlier, is information that they could receive every day from 
every news media. The vignettes does not contain any obvious controversial information, and 
the information in them are information that have been published and discussed by several news 
media. In sum, the combination of (presumably) being located within their natural environment 
and receiving information that they could receive regardless of participation in the experiment, 
ensures a high level of external validity for the experiment. 
 
3.8 Equivalence 
A discussion of equivalence regarding the experiment data is, as mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, redundant considering that the data is gathered from one country and at one point 
in time. The MLR data, however, spans 19 countries and 15 years, and therefore requires a 
consideration of its equivalence. Equivalent data is a necessity that has to be in place in order 
to compare countries with each other, as well as countries (both with themselves as well as with 
others) over time. Comparisons should be made on a common ground (Grønmo, 2015, 388-
389). This discussion limits itself to concerning the ESS data, since the GTD and the UN use 
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either register data or incident data, and are therefore measured on a more objective and, 
probably, equivalent ground from country to country and year to year. 
 
First of all, as mentioned earlier, the selection of which units to include was made by taking 
equivalence into consideration. So, all the included countries have participated in the same 
amount of survey rounds and answered the same questions. The exceptions are Austria, 
Denmark, Estonia, and the Czech Republic, which, at least in the published data sets, lacks one 
round each. Furthermore, all the respondents in every country included have had the 
opportunity to answer the same questions every year. As mentioned briefly earlier, the ESS has 
a team dedicated to ensuring that the data quality is sufficient. This includes translating the 
questionnaire to different languages while keeping the questions intended meaning intact 
(ESSb-f, n.d.). The method employed, face-to-face interview, is also standardized both over 
time and between countries, ensuring methodological equivalency. To sum up, the ESS data 
consists of data that presumedly have the same meaning both over time and between countries, 
produced in the same manner, and the data should be equivalent.  
 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter have discussed the data sources, the data’ scope and representativity, described the 
content of the data and how the data is treated in compliance with its intended use, and discussed 
the data’ reliability, its validity, and its equivalence. While it would have been optimal to 
include design weights in both the MLRs and the ANOVAs, this is for different reasons not 
possible. Nevertheless, this exclusion of weights should not have too detrimental consequences, 
as discussed above. All in all, the data and its treatment can be claimed to be reliable, valid, and 
suitable to use in this paper. That is, provided that the methods are executed properly, and that 












4      Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will explain the methods that are used in this paper. The chapter will also discuss 
different characteristics of the data that, depending on the methods and the statistical models, 
has to be accounted for in order to get reliable results. As mentioned in the paper’s introduction, 
the chapter may be a bit demanding due to its relatively detailed methodological review, 
depending, of course, on readers’ prior knowledge of MLR and regression. As a counterbalance 
to this somewhat technical review, the chapter will expound the topics at hand as extensively 
as the scope of the paper allows, and in a clear as possible manner. The chapter’s  layout is two-
parted (and not the sections, as is the case with the preceding chapter), in accordance with the 
research question: the first part focuses on the MLR, while the second part focuses on the survey 
experiment.  
 
The chapter starts, however, by discussing explicitly how the methods can be used to shed light 
on the different hypotheses, and thus contribute toward falsifying or verifying them. After this 
initial discussion, the chapter explains what multilevel regression (MLR) is. Considering that 
MLR is an extension of the more comprehendible standard regression, the explanation of MLR 
and how it is performed in this paper uses standard regression as a starting point. After clarifying 
what MLR is, the statistical models is discussed and demonstrated. The MLR part ends with a 
discussion of the MLR data characteristics. As the discussion will show, there are some 
assumptions, some prerequisites, of the data that are not met, and the chapter explains how these 
breaches of assumptions are dealt with. Thereafter the focus shifts to the survey experiment, 
and it is explained how this was executed. Then it is discussed how the analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), the method employed to analyse the experiment data, is performed. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of the experiment data’ characteristics, and how these characteristics do 
fit the assumptions of ANOVAs.   
 
4.2 How to explore the hypotheses  
The research question is divided into two parts, and these two parts are, in turn, concretized into 
five hypotheses. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the first part of the research question 
has a large array of possible directions to explore, and it has therefore been concretized into 
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four different directions of exploration, four hypotheses, while the second part of the research 
question has a much more limited array of possible directions, and is therefore operationalized 
into one hypothesis. Following this division, four of the hypotheses will be explored through 
use of MLR, while the fifth hypothesis will be explored through the survey experiment. As 
mentioned earlier, some of the dependent variables in the MLR and in the survey experiment 
are (nearly) identical, i.e. trust the police and trust P/parliament, and the results from each of 
the processes can therefore, to some degree, be used to shed light on hypotheses mainly 
belonging to the other process.  
 
The first hypothesis derives insights from theories on trust and is rooted in institutional theory, 
and assumes that terrorism has had a negative effect on the political trust in Europe in the time 
period of 2002 to 2016. This hypothesis can be explored by running a MLR and inspecting the 
direction of the resulting (beta)coefficients and their level of significance. If the coefficients 
have a negative direction, i.e. they are less than 0, and are also significant, the result verifies 
the hypothesis. However, the interpretation of the result also has to take into account the nature 
of the variables and what they represent. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the variables 
located on the macro level are each treated and transformed into two different variants. One 
variant represents the longitudinal aspect of terrorism (and HDI) and another represents lasting 
cross-sectional differences. Both variable-variants can be used to illuminate this hypothesis, as 
well as the others, in different ways.14 
 
The second hypothesis builds on previous studies as well as on logical inferences, and assumes 
that terrorism has a negative, in accordance with the first hypothesis and its theoretical 
foundation, but different effect on the trust that the different institutions receives. This 
hypothesis can be explored by running four MLRs that are identical except from their dependent 
variable, i.e. the institution, and compare the results from the different regressions. Keeping the 
MLRs identical except from their dependent variable maintains the ceteris paribus assumption, 
which is needed to perform valid comparisons. The comparisons can revolve around the 
coefficients, the level of significance, and their combination. Greater coefficients signify greater 
effect from terrorism, while lower p-values signifies a higher certainty.  
 
                                                          
14 The different ways will be demonstrated in the actual analysis.  
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The third hypothesis takes the situation with low levels of political trust and high levels of 
terrorism in (particularly) the MENA-region into consideration, and it assumes that the 
relationship between terrorism and political trust is a non-linear one. This hypothesis can be 
explored by creating a polynomial variant of GTI. This means, simply, multiplying the GTI-
variables with themselves (X2). If the relationship between terrorism and political trust is non-
linear, the polynomial variables will be significant. Inferences can also be made on the basis of 
the differences in the levels of significance between the polynomial variants and their original 
variants. However, one complication to keep in mind, especially if the polynomial variant do 
achieve significance, is that the GTI is constructed in a manner that accounts for decreasing 
returns from terrorism, as discussed in the previous chapter. While it, unfortunately, has been 
difficult to uncover exactly what this entails, one logical inference is that the IEP uses a 
logarithm in their construction of the GTI.15 Therefore, if this inference is correct, the GTI score 
can be perceived as an already ‘curbed score’, a curbed representation of terrorism. The 
polynomial variables thus, if this is correct, represents a ‘curbed score’ multiplied with a 
‘curbed score’, and one ends up with a variable that is an exponential representation (i.e. greater 
than the intended quadratic function which creates the polynomial variable) of terrorism. To 
sum up in plainer words, the interpretation of the results regarding the polynomial variables in 
this study are complicated to do properly, and any significant findings should be considered 
soberly.  
 
The fourth hypothesis builds on the results from studies of terrorism that occurred in the U.S., 
Madrid, and London, and assumes that geographical proximity to terrorism mediates the effect 
that terrorism has on citizens’ beliefs. I.e. the closer geographical proximity a citizen has to an 
act of terror, the greater effect that act of terror has on that citizen. This hypothesis can be 
explored by implementing an interaction-variable in the MLR, combining (multiplying) GTI 
with area of residence. If the results show that the interaction-variable is significant one can 
infer that geographical proximity do mediate the effect that terrorism has. However, it should 
be pointed out that the characteristics of the variable area of residence, its actual content, limits 
the inferences that are possible to make. While the variable is a good indication of where the 
respondents spend most of their time, i.e. in urban or rural areas, it is not a solid indication of 
actual exposure to terrorism. Nevertheless, while not being a solid indicator of actual exposure 
to terrorism, it is, at least, a rough indicator of geographical proximity to terrorism, if terrorism 
                                                          
15 This is a logical assumption since, as explained in the previous chapter, the GTI raw-scores are transformed 
into index-scores: a potential raw-score of ∞ becomes an index-score of maximum 10.  
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has taken place in the respondents’ country. Statistics from the GTD shows that in the period 
of 1996 to 2017 in the 19 countries that this paper includes, 97.89 percent of all terror incidents 
occurred in urban areas. Therefore, a citizen living in an urban area have had a far greater chance 
of being exposed to terrorism, if terrorism has taken place in that country. The interaction-
variable is, thus, a faint expression of the relationship between terrorism and geographical 
proximity to terrorism. Given the faintness of this expression, the results in connection with  the 
interaction-variable should be interpreted soberly. They can, even more than usual, only be 
considered as indications of falsification or verification of this hypothesis.16 
 
The fifth hypothesis builds on particularly theories on trust, but also institutional theory, and 
assumes that capacity perception is a causal mechanism in the relationship between terrorism 
and political trust. Given experiments exceptional ability to isolate and explore causal 
relationships, it is by nature a suited method to explore this hypothesis. While the procedure 
will be discussed later in this chapter, it can be noted here that if the procedure is executed 
properly, it will isolate the causal relationship sufficiently to determine if capacity perception 
is a causal mechanism in the relationship between the two phenomena. It can also be pointed 
out that the experiment itself will only determine whether or not capacity perception has a 
causal effect on political trust, and the experiment does therefore not shed light on capacity 
perception place in the causal chain, i.e. if it’s a causal mechanism in the relationship between 
terrorism and political trust. However, if capacity perception does not have a causal effect in 
the survey experiment, the result rules out capacity perception as both a causal element, 
thereunder a causal mechanism. If capacity perception do have an effect it is at least a causal 
element. And building on trust theories and institutional theory it can be assumed to be a causal 
mechanism, i.e. a factor that the effects of terrorism on political trust is filtrated through.  
 
4.3 Regression 
In this paper it is executed (to be exact) longitudinal multilevel regressions to explore the 
empirical relationship between terrorism and political trust. This is a methodological extension 
to standard regression (Robson and Pevalin, 2016, 8). Regression is a suitable method to 
explore, strictly speaking, covariation between two or more phenomena. The application of 
regression results in quantified expressions of the empirical relationship between two or more 
                                                          
16 It can be noted that the IEP data do not include any details about location, beyond countries. The GTD data 
do, however, but to use the GTD data instead of, or as a supplement to the IEP data would require a tremendous 
amount of work, far beyond the resources available in connection with this paper.  
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phenomena (Thrane, 2017, 16-17), and it is possible to estimate the degree of certainty 
associated with the results. It is this quantified expression (i.e. the beta coefficient) and the 
degree of certainty (i.e. the p-value) that will be used to verify or falsify the first four 
hypotheses, through the procedure explained in the previous section. The general statistical 
equation for a (multiple) regression is (Ringdal, 2014, 394): 
 
1. 
 𝑌 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑛 + 𝑒𝑖.  
 
In this equation, ‘Y’ represents the independent variable, ‘𝑏0’ represents the constant, ‘𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑛’ 
represents the independent variables and their beta-coefficients, and ‘𝑒𝑖’ represents the error-
term (Ringdal, 2014, 390-402). There are, however, some assumptions that has to be met in 
order to produce reliable and valid results from a regression. Most of these will be discussed 
later in this chapter, but one of the most important assumptions is that the residuals are 
uncorrelated with each other (Thrane, 2017, 102-103), meaning that the observed score of one 
unit should not be dependent on an observed score of a different unit. Standard regression and 
how it calculates estimates do not take into consideration units that are somehow clustered 
together, e.g. citizens in countries, which leads to non-optimal estimates. Usually the standard 
error gets estimated too low, which gives too low p-values, and one risks committing type-I 
errors where the  null-hypothesis is rejected on a faulty basis (Ibid, Ringdal, 2014, 416, Grønmo, 
2004, 327). Regressions therefore have to account for clustered observations. 
 
The observations in this study are located in different clusters. There are 284 851 individuals in 
total, that are divided into 19 countries, in a total of 8 survey rounds. This means that the data 
are clustered as well as hierarchical, and that one of the assumptions for standard regressions 
are breached. However, MLR can account for this breach. MLR models, often referred to as 
variance component models, consist of one fixed part and one random part (Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal, 2008, 51). These models account for clusters by ensuring that estimates takes the 
clusters into consideration. This is done by having a fixed part of the regression model revolve 
around a random part of the regression model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008, 51-62), 
which means that, for instance, the citizens in Germany and the adhering observations (as the 




This entails statistical modifications, which will make the estimates more optimal and reliable 
(Robson and Pevalin, 2016, 7 and 16). The equation of a general MLR model, in this case a 
general random intercept MLR model (Robson and Pevalin, 2008), with two levels can be 
described as such (Fairbrother, 2014, 123) 
 
2. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏0 +  𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑛 + 𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑗𝑛 + 𝑈𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 
 
 
                                                                    Fixed              Random 
 
The difference between the first equation and the second equation is, firstly, that a random part 
has been added, represented by ‘𝑈𝑗’. There’s also been added a second variable-level to 
equation 2, represented by ‘𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑗𝑛’, in addition to the original variable-level represented by 
‘𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑛’. The study in this paper requires, however, a statistical model that accounts for three, 
not two, levels in the data structure. Following the advices from Fairbrother (2014; Fairbrother 
and Schmidt-Catran, 2016) the observations included in the MLR gets structured into level 1) 
individuals; that are clustered together into 2) country-years; that are clustered into 3) countries. 
This hierarchical cluster structure is illustrated in figure 3.1 (a more correct illustration would 
have depicted 19 identical figures as this one, side by side):  
 
            Country 
 
   
     Country-year                 Country-year             Country-year  
 
 
 i i i  i i i  i i i 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrate the structure of the MLR data. 
 
By structuring the data into three levels as is done here, the dimension of time is accounted for. 
This statistical model is based on the work by Fairbrother (Ibid) and complies with what he 
refers to as model D in his article (Fairbrother and Schmidt-Catran, 2016). One element that 
this model does not account for is that it ignores the fact that citizens from every country in the 
same year will have more likeness with each other than they’ll have with citizens from  every 
country in a different year. Thus, the model does not account for same-year inter-country 
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correlation. On the other hand, the model does account for the fact citizens from the same 
country are more alike each other than citizens from different countries, i.e. the general intra-
country correlation, in addition to accounting for the fact that citizens from the same country 
for the same year will be more alike each other than citizens from the same country but a 
different year would be, i.e. same-year intra-country correlation (Schmidt-Catran and 
Fairbrother, 2016, 25). All in all, the model is a step forward when it comes to providing correct 
estimates in MLR models, compared to a lot of previous MLR models (Schmidt-Catran and 
Fairbrother, 2016; Fairbrother, 2013). 
 
A statistical model that has this structure: individuals within country-years within countries, 
can be expressed like so (Fairbrother, 2014, 124): 
 
3. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑡𝑗𝑀 +  𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑗 +  𝑏𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑗 +  𝑈𝑗 + 𝑈𝑡𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑗 
 
This is the statistical equation that functions as the foundation for the regressions executed in 
this study. In this equation, ‘Yitj’ represents the dependent variable’s value for an individual in 
a country for a given year. The constant is still represented by ‘𝑏0’, while ‘Xitj’ represents a 
dependent variable located at the lowest level, i.e. for an individual in a country for a year. As 
mentioned earlier, the macro levels have to be treated, i.e. transformed, in a certain manner. 
This transformation has to be done in order to get correct estimations of the effects, as well as 
correct attribution of these effects (Fairbrother; 2013; Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother, 2016). 
One way of understanding the reason for the transformation is that citizens can be affected by 
living in a country that has relatively permanent characteristics, relatively long-long lasting 
traits, but citizens can also be affected by the changes that occur in these country’ traits. Many 
statistical models do not account for this difference and are therefore unable to attribute effects 
correctly (or at least not as specific). In this third equation, ‘XtjM’ represents the centred GTI 
version, i.e. the longitudinal component and the changing aspect of a country’s exposure to 
terrorism, while ‘𝑋j’ represent the averaged GTI version, i.e. the cross-sectional component and 
the more permanent aspect of a country’s exposure to terrorism. The equation also contains an 
expression for time, ‘timetj’, which is used to control for simultaneous but separated trends in 
the data (Fairbrother, 2014, 124). Furthermore, ‘Uj’ represents the random part of the equation 
that the country-years varies around, and thus represents the third level in the data structure, 
while ‘Utj’ represents the random part of the equation that the individuals vary around, and thus 
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represents the second level in the data structure. The last expression in the equation is ‘eitj’, 
which represent the error-term of the equation.  
 
It can be noted that the random part of the model can together with intra-class correlation (ICC) 
be used to estimate how much of the variance which is located at the different levels of the data 
structure (Christensen et al., 2018; Robson and Pevalin, 2016, 35). One of the prerequisites to 
use MLR instead of a standard regression is that more than one level contributes in explaining 
the variance. The ICC provides a solid quantified measure, indicating how much variance can 
be explained by factors at the different levels. ICC varies between 0 and 1, where 0 means that 
none of the variance can be explained by factors at a given level, while 1 means that all of the 
variance can be explained by factors at a given level. There’s no formal limit or universal rule 
for when a MLR is to be preferred instead of a standard regression, but one rule of thumb is 
that an ICC of .10 is a non-trivial ICC (Robson and Pevalin, 2016, 35). Therefore, each level in 
the structure should provide an ICC of at least .10. The levels which do not meet this standard 
can be dropped from the statistical model, most likely resulting in a simpler statistical model.  
 
4.4 The models 
The statistical model (equation) as recommended by Fairbrother, described and discussed 
above, functions as the basis for the different regression models that are run in this study. In 
accordance with the four hypotheses connected to the MLR, it is developed three different 
regression models. They all have an identical basis, where the second model extends the first 
model, and the third model extends the second model. In addition, each of the dependent 
variables are implemented into each of the three models, creating a total of twelve MLRs to 
run. The first model focuses on hypothesis 1, which speculates on the direction of the effect 
that terrorism has on political trust, and it includes one dependent variable (trust in [institution]), 
all of the control variables located on the individual level, the two (i.e. the treated/transformed) 
control variables located on the macro level, and the two independent variables of interest (the 
longitudinal variant of GTI and the cross-sectional variant of GTI), which is also located on the 
macro level.  
 
The second model extends the first model, in order to shed light on the third hypothesis. The 
third hypothesis draws on findings from the MENA-region (particularly) and assumes that the 
relationship between terrorism and political trust is non-linear. As mentioned in the beginning 
of this chapter, this can be explored by including a polynomial variable (X2), and model 2 
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therefore includes a polynomial variable for each of the two GTI variants. It can be pointed out 
that the statistical model is still a linear model, but the inclusion of polynomial variables and 
interaction variables enables the exploration of non-linear relationships (Tjønndal, 2018, 99 and 
119-124; Thrane, 2017, 108-111).  
 
Model 3, in turn, extends the second model in order to explore the fourth hypothesis. In order 
to check if the combination of a citizen’s area of residence with the country’s exposure to 
terrorism (GTI) have a different effect on political trust than just terrorism alone, an interaction 
variable consisting of the two aforementioned variables  is included in the third model. Table 
4.1 illustrates the setup for the models, and their purpose.  
 
Table 4.1 Regression models and their purpose 
Dependent variable: Model: pertinent question (hypotheses) 
Trust parliament M1: Do terrorism affect the trust that this 
institution receives in a negative manner? (H1 
and H2) 
M2: Is the relationship between terrorism and 
political trust non-linear? (H3) 
M3: Does area of residence affect the 
relationship between terrorism and political 
trust? (H4) 
Trust legal system M1: Do terrorism affect the trust that this 
institution receives in a negative manner? (H1 
and H2) 
M2 Is the relationship between terrorism and 
political trust non-linear? (H3) 
M3: Does area of residence affect the 
relationship between terrorism and political 
trust? (H4) 
Trust police M1: Do terrorism affect the trust that this 
institution receives in a negative manner? (H1 
and H2) 
M2: Is the relationship between terrorism and 
political trust non-linear? (H3) 
M3: Does area of residence affect the 
relationship between terrorism and political 
trust? (H4) 
Trust politicians M1: Do terrorism affect the trust that this 
institution receives in a negative manner? (H1 
and H2) 
M2: Is the relationship between terrorism and 
political trust non-linear? (H3) 
M3: Does area of residence affect the 




Statistical illustration of the three models: 
Yitj = (model 1 ->) b0 + 𝑏1𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  + 𝑏2𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  +  𝑏3𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  +  𝑏4𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  +  𝑏5𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  +  𝑏6𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  +  𝑏7𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  +
 𝑏8𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  +  𝑏9𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  +  𝑏10𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗  +  𝑏11𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗 +𝑏12𝑋𝑡𝑗𝑀 +  𝑏13𝑋𝑗 + +𝑏14𝑋𝑡𝑗𝑀 +  𝑏15𝑋𝑗 +
𝑏16𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑗 (model 2 ->) + 𝑏17𝑋𝑡𝑗𝑀 ∗ 𝑏18𝑋𝑡𝑗𝑀 + 𝑏19𝑋𝑗 ∗ 𝑏20𝑋𝑗 (model 3 ->) + 𝑏21𝑋𝑡𝑗𝑀 ∗ 𝑏22𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗 
+ 𝑏23𝑋𝑗 ∗ 𝑏24𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑗 
Concretized illustration of the three models: 
Trust [institution] = (model 1 ->) (constant) + political interest + feeling of safety + degree of 
religiousness + area of residence + satisfied w/ household income + social trust + individual 
wellbeing + satisfied w/ societal institution’s performance + gender + age + years of education + 
HDI-centered + HDI-averaged + GTI-centered + GTI-averaged + i.year (model 2 ->) + GTI-
centered*GTI-centered + GTI-averaged*GTI-averaged (model 3 ->) + GTI-centered*area of 
residence + GTI-averaged*area of residence 
 
Before continuing to the other assumptions of regression analysis besides non-correlated 
observations, two remarks can be made. First, each of the hypotheses related to the MLR have 
a regression model specifically adapted to explore it, except from the second hypothesis. 
However, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the exploration of the second 
hypothesis will be performed by comparing the results from the same model for each of the 
dependent variables. Second, a technical and methodological note that so far has gone 
unmentioned is worth making after having discussed the regression models. In addition to 
accounting for correlation between observations, MLR is a beneficial regression method since 
it by design handles the statistical requirements needed to avoid ecological as well as atomistic 
fallacies. While many theoretical assumptions have been made explicit in the theory chapter, 
one further assumption employed in this paper, which has methodological implications, is that 
a characteristic at one level (i.e. a country’s exposure to terrorism)  can affect the characteristic 
at a different level  (i.e. the trust that citizens have). Such assumptions and adhering explorations 
could lead to committing ecological fallacies, where inferences on the bottom-level (regarding 
individuals) are made based on results from the top-level (regarding a country’s exposure to 
terrorism). However, MLR enables the combination of data from different levels so that 
ecological and atomistic fallacies can be avoided (Robson and Pevalin, 2008, 4-8). 
 
4.5 Assumptions of regression 
There are several assumptions that need to be met in order to execute reliable and valid 
regressions. Non-correlated observations, or in statistical terms: non-correlated residuals, is one 
of these assumptions, which MLR handles if it is not met. The residuals should also be 
homoscedastic, meaning that the variance of each residual should be equal for different values 
of the same X variable. In somewhat plainer words, the residuals’ (the actual observations) 
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distribution on every variable, i.e. every relationship between Xn and Y, should have an 
approximately equal distance to the estimated relationship represented by the regression line. 
If the observations do not have a somewhat equal distance to this line, the residuals are 
heteroscedastic (Ringdal, 2014, 422; Thrane, 2017, 97). Heteroscedasticity affects the 
estimate’s degree of certainty (Ibid). To check for heteroscedasticity the study conducts a post-
estimation control, i.e. a control that is conducted in connection with but after each of the 
different regressions are run. In this case a ‘Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg’-test is conducted. 
The result of this shows that the residuals most likely are heteroscedastic (see Appendix E).   
 
Furthermore, the residuals should not only be non-correlated and not heteroscedastic, they 
should also be approximately normally distributed (Ringdal, 2014, 422). The normality of the 
residuals’ distribution can be explored graphically, which is done in this case through 
histograms and QQ-plots. The results (see Appendix F) shows that the residuals on the second 
and the third level in the regression model is not normally distributed. However, the importance 
of the normality assumption is contested. Some describe it as the least important assumption of 
regression (Tjønndal, 2017, 162). Others point to the fact that this assumption, if important to 
begin with, loses its significance in studies with many observations. An informal limit is set at 
100 observations (Thrane, 2017, 101-104). This study has more than 284 000 units, with each 
of them generating observations on most of the variables. However, the second level only has 
148 observations while the third level only has 19 observations, which could lead to 
complications.  
 
So far, three of the assumptions of regression are breached: there is correlation between the 
residuals, there is heteroskedasticity, and the residuals do not have a normal distribution. MLR 
handles the correlation between observations. That leaves heteroscedasticity and the non-
normal distribution of residuals. These two breaches of assumptions can be handled by 
employing a Huber-White estimator. The Huber-White estimator, often referred to as a 
‘sandwich-estimator’ due to the visual appearance of its statistical formula, is an estimator that 
accounts for these breaches of assumptions and produces robust standard-errors (Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal, 2008, 20, 39 and 74). It is an  estimator that is frequently used since it is one of 
relatively few alternatives that in many cases, perhaps particularly in cases involving MLR, 
produces reliable estimates (StataCorpLLC, n.d., 48-50). The downside, depending on the 
perspective, is that by producing robust standard-errors these are often higher compared to non-
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robust standard-errors, and thus make it harder to achieve statistical significance (Ibid).17 In 
addition to producing robust standard-errors, the sandwich-estimator also produces quasi-
likelihood estimates instead of ordinary likelihood estimates. However, provided that the 
sample selection procedure is done in accordance with principles of generalizability, as random 
selection is, this shouldn’t have any consequences (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008, 393).  
 
The three assumptions discussed so far are assumptions that need to be met or handled, in order 
to generalize regression results from sample to population (Thrane, 2017, 97 and 103). There 
are, in addition, some assumptions that should be met regardless of generalizability. One of 
these is the absence of multi-collinearity, i.e. that the independent variables used in the same 
regression model should not be too strongly correlated with each other. One way of exploring 
if multi-collinearity is present or not, is to perform a VIF-test of the regression model. The 
results from the test of each model (see Appendix G) shows that some of the scores are above 
10, which could be problematic (Tjønndal, 2018, 166-168; Thrane, 2017, 90). The somewhat 
high scores are caused mainly by the interaction variables, the macro variables, and the 
polynomial variables (Thrane, 2017, 132). At the same time, the polynomial variables’ high 
VIF-scores can be ignored since the polynomial variable cannot be linearly connected to its two 
original variables (Thrane, 2017, 111). The presence of multi-collinearity requires linear 
relations. This reduces the severity of the somewhat high VIF-scores. Furthermore, variables 
with too high VIF-scores leads to, if anything, the inflation of the standard-error estimates 
(Ringdal, 2014, 426). This in turn leads to too high p-values, which in turn could lead to a faulty 
retention of the null-hypothesis. Although this type-II error is undesirable, it is preferable to 
type-I errors. In addition, the potentially troublesome variables, i.e. the macro variables, has to 
remain intact in their present state, in accordance with the methodological advices from 
Fairbrother. With all this in mind, the study ignores the somewhat high VIF-scores. 
 
Furthermore, there should be no significant ‘outliers’, the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables should be linear, and all relevant variables should be 
included in the model and all irrelevant variables should be excluded from the model (Thrane, 
2017, 87-97). Regarding the first recently aforementioned assumption, the previous chapter 
clarified the number of outliers, and concluded that they would likely not markedly impact the 
estimates. Regarding the second assumption, the shape of the relationship between terrorism 
                                                          
17 This is of course an advantage if one considers the goal of producing ‘true’ estimates. 
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and political trust, if its linear or not, can be explored in several ways. The best way is perhaps 
to do post-hoc assessments of the MLR results (Thrane, 2017, 95; Tjønndal, 2018, 166, Ringdal, 
2014, 417). As mentioned previously, the MLR is executed as a linear regression. However, the 
models include non-linear expressions, and if these turn out to be significant that would indicate 
that the MLR should be executed non-linearly. As the next chapter will show, the Results, the 
MLR seem to  have the correct functional form.  The evaluations regarding inclusion and 
exclusion of variables, the third and fourth recently aforementioned assumptions, should be 
done based on theoretical grounds and in accordance with previous research, as well as post-
hoc assessments (Thrane, 2017, 95-97 and 103). Regarding the variables included in the 
models, their selection are based on previous research and theoretical evaluations, as explained 
in the theory chapter. The variables included have both a theoretical value and has shown 
empirical relevance. The inclusion is also backed up by the results, as demonstrated in the next 
chapter. The evaluation of omitted variables and the avoidance of omitted variable bias is harder 
to perform, and the evaluation can never be complete in its scope. However, by basing this 
study on previous studies as well as theoretical insights, the risk of excluding relevant variables 
and producing omitted variable bias is much reduced (Ibid). There is, thus, a theoretical chance 
of having excluded relevant variables in this study. This chance is, however, relatively small.  
 
One final note can be made regarding the assumptions of regression. As briefly mentioned 
earlier, while there are some regression types that come close to the ‘experiment standard’ 
(Moses and Knutsen, 2012, 52) of uncovering causality (e.g. instrumental variable analysis 
(Thrane, 2017, 227)), most regressions, including MLR, do not in themselves prove causality. 
Regressions quantify the co-variation between two or more phenomena, while controlling for 
influencing factors, and can indicate causality (Ringdal, 2014, 390-391; Thrane, 2017, 225-227; 
Grønmo, 2015, 361-363). However, the indications of causality that regression analyses provide 
can be significantly strengthened by including a causal theory which explains the empirical 
relationship that the regressions uncover (Ringdal, 2014, 390-391). That is one of the chief 
reasons for including a theoretical framework in this paper, in addition to gaining a greater 
understanding for the phenomena in themselves. Claims about causality and effects that the 
paper presents later may because of this theoretical inclusion have a sounder backing. The 
combination of empirical results and a theoretical framework, and foremost their potential 





4.6 Survey experiments 
Experiments are often considered the holy grail of methods, particularly due to their ability to 
uncover causal relationships. If experiments are conducted in a reliable manner with reasonable 
theoretical backing, in line with the discussion in the preceding section, they are great at 
mapping causality (Moses and Knutsen, 2012, 52). The fundamental logic behind experiments 
is to show that when X is present so is Y, while at the same time controlling the environment 
in a way that demonstrates that variation in X leads to variation in Y (Ringdal, 2014, 128-129). 
Survey experiments tries to transfer this ability at uncovering causality to larger samples, and 
thus combines the goal of uncovering causality with the desire for generalizability (Krupnikov 
and Findley, 2016, 2).   
 
The survey experiment conducted in this paper can be described as what Ringdal refers to as a 
genuine field experiment with a post-test (2014, 131-132). This means that the participants are 
randomized into their groups, that they participate through surveys which they respond to in 
their natural environment, and that the estimations of effects is based on comparisons between 
groups at the same time, and not (also) within groups over time (which would require a pre-test 
as well as a post-test, i.e. measurements before and after exposure to treatment) (Ibid). In 
connection with the validity discussion in the previous chapter, it can again be pointed out that 
this process can be claimed to produce high levels of both internal and external validity. Field 
experiments are generally, arguably, suited at exploring the relationship between individuals 
and institutions. 
 
The survey experiment has a design where the participants are randomly selected from the NCP, 
which in turn randomly selects its participants, and randomized into the three experiment groups 
(i.e. the ‘negative’ group, the control group, and the ‘positive’ group). The selection procedures 
enable generalization, while the randomization procedure enables the making of causal 
inferences. Every experiment group receive the same vignette, i.e. the neutral one. This vignette 
also functions as a prime, inducing the participants to perceive terrorism as a societal threat, or 
at least to think about terrorism. Thereafter, the negative group receives the negative treatment, 
while the positive group receives the positive treatment, where the treatments are the two 
different extensions of the neutral vignette. The treatments are, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, formulated in a way that ensures that the only thing that varies between them, and thus 
that the only element that systematically varies between the three randomized experiment 
groups, are the capacity perception that they’re introduced to. After the participants receive 
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their treatment, they answer questions that measures how much they trust 1) the Government; 
2) the Parliament; and 3) the police. These questions are introduced in a random order, ensuring 
that no systematic variation in the line of questioning is present. The experiments end by 
measuring, in the same way as with the preceding variables, how much capacity the participants 
believe that the authorities (as an overall term for the three governing institutions, although this 
is not specified in the survey that the participants receive) have when it comes to dealing with 
terrorism. This control variable, thus, investigates whether or not the treatment has had an 
effect. An effect from the treatment is a prerequisite for solid causal inferences in experiments. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the survey experiment’s design. 
 
Table 4.2 The survey experiment’s design 
Gruppe: Vignette: Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Independent 
variables 
Control variable 
Control X - - X X 
Group 1 X X - X X 
Group 2 X - X X X 
 
4.7 ANOVA 
If the survey experiment is conducted properly, there’ll be only one thing that varies between 
the three groups: their capacity perception. This is then the only causal factor that can explain 
the differences in political trust between the three groups (Ringdal, 2014, 140). The fifth 
hypotheses assume that capacity perception is a causal mechanism in the relationship between 
terrorism and political trust, and in line with the theoretical framework further assumes that 
reduced capacity perception, ceteris paribus, will result in reduced trust. This assumption can 
be tested by performing an analysis of variance of the experiment result (Ringdal, 2014, 377; 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008, 8-10). ANOVA’s is a common way to analyse experiment 
outcomes.  
 
To analyse the outcome of the experiment study, the paper employs a one-way ANOVA 
(referred to simply as ANOVA from here on). ANOVAs can be considered a generalization of 
the t-test that is common in connection with regression analysis, modified in order to account 
for multiple groupings (Ringdal, 2014, 377; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008, 8-10). An 
ANOVA involves running a F-test, which is based on the F-distribution developed by Fischer 
(Ringdal, 2014, 378). The F-tests uses the averages of the different groupings to explore how 
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much variation exists between the groups, at the same time as it considers how much variation 
exists within the groups, i.e. deviation from the overall mean between groups and deviation 
from the group mean within groups (Ibid). The statistical formula can be expressed like this:  
 
𝐹 =
𝑆𝑆𝑀 / 𝐾 − 1
𝑆𝑆𝑅 / 𝑛 − 𝐾
 
 
In this equation ‘𝑆𝑆𝑀’ represents sum of squares deriving from the statistical model representing 
the data, i.e. variation from the overall mean between groups. The variation within groups is 
represented by ‘𝑆𝑆𝑅’, which is the sum of squares derived from each observation’s deviation 
from the group mean. ‘K’ represents the number of experiment groups, while ‘𝑛’ represents the 
number of experiment participants (Ibid).  
 
If the null-hypothesis is true, and there is no variation between the groups, this will result in an 
F-score of 1.0. However, the critical F-score, how large the F-score should be in order to reject 
the null-hypothesis, depends on the number of degrees of freedom in both the numerator and 
the denominator, and on the preferred p-value (Ringdal, 2014, 380; Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal, 2008, 8-10). In this case, where there’s two degrees of freedom in the numerator and 
more than 120 degrees of freedom in the denominator, and with a preferred p-value of .05, the 
critical F-score is 3.07 (Ringdal, 2014, 524-526). 
 
The analysis will also include a Bonferroni test, post-hoc to the ANOVA. A Bonferroni test 
includes conducting multiple-pairwise comparisons, which also takes the multiple comparison 
into consideration when estimating the p-value (Ringdal, 2014, 380-382). The multiple 
comparison gives a more nuanced result than the result from the ANOVA alone, and it can 
contribute towards determining where and to what degree there are differences between the 
experiment groups. The ANOVA performs an overall general analysis, and will therefore be 
used in the overall conclusion, i.e. determining if the treatment has worked and if capacity 
perception is a causal mechanism, while the Benferroni-analysis will provide more statistical 
details which can help understand which of the experiment groups was more affected, and then 
perhaps why some was more affected. 
 
The assumptions of an ANOVA are mainly the same as for a regression (Shaw, n.d.). Given the 
experiment’s design, and experiments ability to uncover causal relationships, some of the 
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aforementioned assumptions are left out of the discussion in this section. Furthermore, since 
there’s only one independent variable, i.e. the vignette, multi-collinearity is out of the question. 
That leaves the assumptions of non-correlation between residuals (i.e. observations), 
homoskedasticity, and normally distributed residuals (Ibid). At the same time, as discussed 
previously, the relevance of the latter assumption is debatable. Especially considering the fact 
that the experiment has more than 2000 observations. Generally, the integrity of ANOVA’s is 
intact even in the cases where the residuals do not have a normal distribution (Ibid).  
  
So, first of all, the participants are, as explained earlier, randomly selected from all over 
Norway, and the experiment itself includes randomization. The observations, and thus the 
residuals, should therefore not be correlated to each other in a manner that could affect the 
reliability of the results. Second, a Levene’s test is performed in order to check for 
heteroskedasticity. Levene’s test tests the null hypothesis that assumes that the residuals are 
homoscedastic, versus the alternative hypothesis which assumes heteroscedasticity. The result 
(see Appendix H) show that the p-value for all the ANOVA’s are above .05, and therefore the 
null-hypothesis cannot be rejected. The residuals can therefore be assumed to be homoscedastic, 
as they should be. To check if the residuals are normally distributed the paper performs a 
Shapiro-Wilk’s test, in addition to inspecting the residuals graphically. The result (see 
Appendix I) indicate that the residuals are not normally distributed, but as the graphic 
illustrations show, they are not too far from a normal distribution. Given this assumption’s 
contested nature, this relatively small breach of assumption is ignored. All in all, the 
assumptions that needs to be in place in order to execute reliable ANOVA’s are met.  
 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter started by explaining how, concretely, the different hypotheses will be explored. 
Next, rooted in standard regression, the chapter discussed how the MLR will be performed, 
and, building on Fairbrother’s work, discussed and illustrated the statistical models that is used. 
After having discussed the assumptions of regression, the chapter shifted its focus to the survey 
experiment’s design and how the ANOVAs would be performed. While the breaches of the 
assumptions of regressions are handled, the assumptions of ANOVAs are in order, ignoring the 
somewhat non-normally distributed residuals. All in all, the methods are suited to the 





5       Results 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present and discuss the results from the MLR and the survey experiment. This 
chapter also have a two-parted layout in accordance with the research question, where the first 
part of the chapter focuses on the results from the MLR and the second part focuses on the result 
from the survey experiment. The chapter starts by discussing the overall variation in political 
trust in Europe in the time period of 2002 to 2016. By exploring how much variation there is in 
the level of political trust, one obtains a general impression of how much variation could 
possibly be explained by variation in terrorism. After this overall discussion, the result from 
MLRs’ empty regression models, i.e. the models containing only the dependent variable, is 
presented. This result shows how much variation there is between individuals, how much 
variation there is between countries, and, in the hybrid-model (encompassing time as part of a 
level), how much variation there is within and between countries over time. The empty model 
can also contribute in evaluating how much variation in political trust can explained by factors 
at different levels (and thus also indicate how much variation can possibly be explained by 
terrorism), and also shows whether or not MLR is to be preferred instead of  standard regression. 
After presenting and discussing the result from the empty models, the same is done for the 
complete models, i.e. the models containing independent variables as well. Thereafter, the result 
from the survey experiment is presented, first graphically and then in more detailed tabular 
formats, and discussed. The discussions in this chapter will be general in their form, while the 
next chapter, Analyses, discusses the results and their relation to the hypotheses and the 
theoretical framework that the paper suggests.  
 
5.2 Variation in political trust 
Figure 5.1 shows the variation in the level of political trust that all the 19 countries in the paper 
experiences through the time period in question. Political trust is in this case measured by an 
index consisting of the four dependent variables used in the MLR, and the scores are the average 
of the total of the four scores of the dependent variables. It can, therefore, be pointed out that 
figure 5.1 actually shows the minimal variation in the level of political trust as indicated by the 
ESS data, since one institution may gain trust over time while another loses trust over time, and 
they can thus cancel each other out when it comes to how much of the true variation is 
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represented in the total score and in the average. In the spirit of parsimony, in considering the 
paper’s scope and its presentability, more detailed tables describing the variation in political 
trust for each institution for each country for each year is relegated to Appendix A.  
 
To start with the within-country variation: despite being an underestimation, figure 5.1 shows 
that there is variation in political trust in Europe in the relevant time period. Every country seem 
to experience at least some variation. To use Norway as an example, figure 5.1 shows that 
Norway for a long time had an average score of about 6.0, but from 2010 and onwards Norway 
continually had a score above 6.0. and from 2014 Norway had the highest average score in 
political trust amongst all the 19 countries. Norway’s overall score was 6.7 in 2016, up from 
5.9 in 2002 and 5.8 in 2004. On a scale from 0 to 10, measuring trust which is assumed to be 
somewhat stable, a variation of .9 (6.7-5.8) is notable. The biggest variation in political trust is 
experienced by Hungary, both when it comes to the overall average (1.8), but also for each of 
the four institutions (see Appendix A). However, figure 5.1 in combination with Appendix A 
also shows that while there is some within-country variation over the entire time period, the 
variation is somewhat limited for several countries. The more detailed numeric tables in 
Appendix A shows that the (overall) within-country variation for several country is close to 
non-existent. For instance, France has a maximum overall variation of .2, and Finland and 
Denmark experiences a maximum overall variation of .3. In total, many countries experiences 
a notable overall maximum variation in the levels of political trust, while other countries have 
quite stable levels of political trust. This, in turn, indicates between-country variation. 
 
The between-country variation also somewhat limited in some respects. Denmark, for instance, 
is the country that usually experience the highest levels of trust. This goes for each of the 
included institutions, except for the legal system where it’s usually Finland that has the highest 
scores (see Appendix A). At the other end of the scale is Poland. Poland is, usually, the country 
that experiences the lowest levels of trust in most political institutions (Ibid). In general, the 
Northern countries usually scores at the top of ‘their class’, while the East-European countries 
usually scores at the bottom of the same class. Central-European and the UK usually scores in-
between the bottom and the top. However, both figure 5.1 and Appendix A shows that while 
the between-country variation is limited in some respects, there is also some variation. For 
instance, none of the countries keep their original ranking for the entire time period. Every 








Figure 5.1 illustrates the overall variation in political trust for each country for each survey 
round. 
 
Overall, there is some variation in the levels of political trust, both within countries and between 
countries. Every country experience a within-country variation in the levels of political trust, 
as well as a between-country variation. The variation is, however, somewhat limited. Hungary 
can be used as an illustrative example. As mentioned, Hungary is the country that experiences 
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the largest variation in the level of political trust over time. However, the score varies from 3.2 
to 5.0, which is a total maximum variation of 1.8 for the entire time period. Considering the 
fact that the index varies from 0 to 10, a maximum variation of 1.8 is notable considering the 
assumed rigidity of trust, but it is not, statistically speaking, extra-ordinary. Furthermore, the 
within-country maximum variation is often far below 1.8. In fact, most of the countries 
experience a maximum variation well below 1.0 (both in the overall level of political trust and 
for each of the institutions, in the entire time period). Again, this is in line with the theoretical 
assumption of trust as being somewhat rigid once first instilled. Furthermore, as discussed in 
the introductory- and in the theory chapter, terrorism can logically be assumed to have an effect 
on political trust. There are however, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, reason to 
expect that a lot of other factors, e.g. education, income, gender, etc., contributes in affecting 
the levels of political trust. In other words, while there is some variation, and thus an opening 
for different factors to explain this variation, the total variation probably leaves a rather small 
portion of variation to be explained by terrorism. Since terrorism is measured on the country 
level, thus being an explanatory factor located on the macro-level, the results from the empty 
MLR models can help further nuance this impression.  
 
5.3 Empty models 
The result from a statistical analysis with an empty MLR model is shown in table 5.1. For 
similar reasons as discussed in the previous section regarding the scope and presentability of 
the paper, table 5.1 only shows the result from empty models containing the dependent variable 
trust parliament. The results relating to the other dependent variables are relegated to Appendix 
J. However, it can be noted here that the pattern that surfaces from the results related to the 
different dependent variables is quite similar, and the discussion below can be considered as a 
discussion that encompasses the results in connection with all the dependent variables. The 
conclusions therefore pertain to all the models. Also, before discussing the result some technical 
details from the two previous chapter can be repeated: the two-level model contains factors 
located on the individual level and on a country level, while what is here referred to as the 
hybrid model contains factors located on the individual level as the bottom level, on country-
years as the intermediate level, and on country as the top level. The two-level model therefore 
checks the relevance of using a two-level model instead of a standard regression model, while 






Table 5.1 The result from the empty two-level and three-level models 
 Two-level model: country 
(s.e) 
Hybrid model: country-year 
(s.e.) 
Constant 4.629019    (.214751)*** 4.635715   (.2155008)*** 
Individual level variance 5.446557    (.014627) 5.299441   (.0142353) 
Country level variance .8758578   (.2842761) .8591736   (.2862895) 
Country-year level variance  .1772364   (.0224565) 
ICC country .1385322   (.0387357) .1356051   (.0390672) 
ICC country-year  .1635787   (.0378822) 
BIC 1257269 1250222*** 
N, individuals 277,327 277,327 
N, countries 19 19 
N, country-years  148 
*** 1%-level (Change in variance tested against the two-level model) Chi=7060.08, p<0.0000 
 
Table 5.1 and the result from the two-level model shows that most of the variation is located on 
the individual level, i.e. among all the individuals in the 19 countries included, which is 
expected (Christensen et al., 2018).18 Nevertheless, there is also some variation on the country-
level. The ICC indicates that 13.8 percent (.138 X 100) of the variance can be explained by 
factors located on the country-level, i.e. between-country differences (Robson and Pevalin, 
2008, 35). At the same time, the ICC indicates that roughly 86 percent of the variance in 
political trust can be explained by something else than factors that varies between countries.  
The result from the empty three-level model backs the result from the empty two-level model. 
Most of the variation is located at the bottom-level, with markedly less variation on the top-
level, and even less variation at the intermediate level represented by country-years. There is, 
thus, most variation between all the individuals from all the included countries, and then 
between countries, and least variation within (and therefore also between) countries from year 
to year. Again, this is as expected in such data (Christensen et al., 2018). The result from the 
three-level model also shows that roughly 13 percent of the variance can be explained by factors 
located at the top-level, as in the two-level model. However, 16.3 percent of the variance can 
be expected to be explained by factors located on the intermediate-level, i.e. country-years. In 
other words, approximately 70 percent of the variation can be expected to be explained by 
factors located at the individual level, 13.5 percent of the variation can be explained by factors 
                                                          
18 The paper often alternates between the term ‘variation’ and the term ‘variance’, since both concepts are 
different ways of expressing the same phenomenon. Variance is a particular expression of variation and can be 




) (Midtbø, 2010, 41). 
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that varies between countries, and 16.3 percent of the variance can be explained by factors that 
varies within countries over time. The increase in variance is significant, as shown by the Chi-
estimate and p-value (which in the case of Trust parliament as the dependent variable is 
Chi=7060.08 and p<0.0000).  
So, first of all, considering that the ICCs should be above 10 percent in order to correctly utilize 
a MLR instead of a standard regression, the results indicate that both the second level and the 
third level in the data structure should be included, and therefore that MLR is preferable to 
standard regression. Furthermore, in addition to having an ICC of more than 10 percent at the 
intermediate level, the hybrid model has a BIC-score that is lower than the BIC-score in the 
two-level model. In general, a lower BIC-score is preferable (Robson and Pevalin, 2008, 58). 
Therefore, the hybrid model is the preferable model, both compared to a two-level model and 
therefore compared to a standard regression model. Second, the variance-estimates show that 
most of the variation in political trust can be explained by factors located at the individual level. 
So, while the discussion in the previous section showed that there is a relatively small, 
statistically speaking on a scale from 0 to 10, variation in political trust in Europe from 2002 to 
2016, the result in this section indicates that only some of this variation can be explained by 
terrorism, which is located at the non-individual levels. On the other hand, this also means that 
there actually is some variation in the levels of political trust, and that some of this variation 
can be explained by factors located on the non-individual levels. To sum up, although terrorism 
can be expected to have a limited impact on the variation in political trust, there is room for it. 
The results of the MLR will show if terrorism actually have had an impact.19 
 
5.4 The MLR 
The next step is filling in the empty hybrid models. This is done in three steps, as explained in 
the previous chapter. Table 5.2 shows the result from the third and most comprehensive model 
for each of the dependent variables. Here too are the other results (from model 1 and 2) relegated 
to the appendix (J). The patterns discussed here are, however, valid for all the models, and 
conclusions are therefore made in a manner encompassing all the models. These encompassing 
conclusions are also made possible since no variables move loses their significance (p < .5)  or 
                                                          
19 The results from the empty models also shows that an intermediate position between the two extremes of the 
MI school and the MC school is wise, since variation in the levels of political trust probably can be explained by 
both individual and by structural factors. The result from the empty models also show that there is some within-
country correlation, as expressed by the ICC, which at least modifies the MI school’s assumption (if interpreted 
to its extreme) that there’s no more correlation between citizens within the same country than there are 
between citizens from different but similar countries. 
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vice versa between the different models. It can also be noted that the results are statistically 
robust, since the MLR employs a Huber-White estimator which produces robust standard errors. 
All of the estimates therefore have a high degree of certainty.  
 
Table 5.2 The MLR result 
 Parliament Legal system Police Politicians 
Constant -1.263983   
(2.502738) 
-5.776835    
(3.38027)* 
-2.363525     
(2.1094) 
-4.527088    
(2.18994)** 
Year     
2004 -.251747    
(.069381)*** 
.0277891    
(.062934) 
-.0489093   
(.0725267) 
-.2047002   
.(0428874)*** 
2006 -.2296633     
(.10354)** 
.2046509   
(.0898462)** 
-.0525208   
(.0762098) 
-.2138589   
(.0806311)*** 
2008 -.0890956   
(.1372696) 
.4176425   
(.1225043)*** 
.0980643   
(.1158655) 
-.0526179   
(.1016213) 
2010 -.2202167    
(.132483) 
.4923431   
(.1503133)*** 
.1796089   
(.1360016) 
-.1272503   
(.0983286) 
2012 -.2665146   
(.1665416) 
.5768286   
(.1703659)*** 
.2895931   
(.1565467)* 
-.1682555   
(.1306146) 
2014 -.0492124   
(.2168049) 
.7943007   
(.1968259)*** 
.379869   
(.1779096)** 
-.0691447   
(.1580205) 
2016 -.0014714   
(.2116924) 
.8861133   
(.2036179)*** 
.5488127   
(.1971499)*** 
-.0379509   
(.1473628) 
Individual level      
Political Interest .5236903   
(.0265534)*** 
.2055874   
(.0202604)*** 
.0577129     
(.02051)*** 
.5590483   
(.0282075)*** 
Feeling of safety .0604371   
(.0167272)*** 
.1592306   
(.0180037)*** 
.0604947   
(.0312432)* 




.0339864   
(.0032162)*** 
.0239109   
(.0048929)*** 
.0329049   
(.0057495)*** 




.0742459   
(.0201813)*** 
.0364185   
(.0170898)** 
.0419049   
(.0174769)** 
.0819143   
(.0173382)*** 
Education .0404745   
(.0049353)*** 
.040732   
(.0050463)*** 
.0050116   
(.0024473)** 
.0063374   
(.0027275)** 
Social trust .1724568   
(.0085069)*** 
.1954764   
(.0104445)*** 
.1874679   
(.0086942)*** 




-.0443164   
(.0098657)*** 
.0223835   
(.0114007)** 
.1105438    
(.009772)*** 
-.0679599   
(.0087647)*** 
Satisfied w/ 
societal inst. Perf. 
.7244031   
(.0133651)*** 
.6203231   
(.0142412)*** 
.471354   
(.0155576)*** 
.6741157   
(.0129248)*** 
Area of residence 
(AOR) 
.1265065    
(.036375)*** 
.0754438   
(.0354666)** 
-.0510042   
(.0358403) 
.0532314   
(.0262524)** 
Age -.0035624   
(.0010477)*** 
-.0053984   
(.0013391)*** 
.0062014   
(.0012962)*** 
-.0027871   
(.0010492)*** 
Gender -.0091424    
(.016331) 
.0320241   
(.0293386) 
.1487685   
(.0210443)*** 
.1464728   
(.0181775)*** 
Macro level     
HDI-centered .0860022   
(.0533682) 
.1867981   
(.0443483)*** 
.0318299   
(.0392898) 




HDI-average .0060771   
(.0298471) 
.0638511    
(.041063) 
.0411411   
(.0266692) 
.0401163   
(.0265002) 
GTI-centered -.0466589   
(.0181292)*** 
-.0189699   
(.0347162) 
.1028139   
(.0344938)*** 
-.0538557   
(.0156666)*** 
GTI-average .1459465   
(.1939661) 
-.0848444   
(.3806849) 
-.1368071   
(.3006131) 
.0631676    
(.165281) 
GTI-centered^2 -.0115463   
(.0073219) 
-.0242353   
(.019794) 
-.0226222   
(.0221596) 
-.0100099   
(.0113228) 
GTI-average^2 -.0244414   
(.0384256) 
.011373      
(.0673119) 
.0318185   
(.0538582) 




.0152745   
(.0129091) 
.0303239    
(.0200512) 
.0078311   
(.0127113) 




.0020811   
(.0154917) 
.002698      
(.0132525) 
.0031409    
(.011133) 
0004161   
(.0060213) 
Random effects (Variance components)   
Individual level 
variance 
3.457605   
(.1136834) 
3.977583   
(.1445106) 
3.986024   
(.2035173) 




.1056196   
(.0271582) 
.198476   
(.0551829) 
.1400631   
(.0429612) 




.0383141   
(.0088907) 
.0413967   
(.0079361) 
.0567539   
(.0116665) 
.027398   
(.0055267) 
BIC 1075689 1116345 1130978 1052066 
N, individuals 263,535 264,420 267,746 265,968 
N, countries 19 19 19 19 
N, country-years 146 146 146 146 
*** = 1%-level, ** = 5%-level and * = 10%-level  
 
To start with the subject at hand: terrorism. First, none of the polynomial variants (X2) nor the 
interaction variables (X1*X2) have a significant relationship with any of the dependent 
variables. Not even at a 10 percent significance level. This is also the case with GTI-average, 
the cross-sectional and more permanent variant of the original GTI variable. On the other hand, 
GTI-centered, the longitudinal version of the original GTI variable, have a strong significant 
relationship (p<.01) to every dependent variable, except for the variable trust legal system 
where it does not even achieve a 10 percent significance level. Table 5.2 further shows that 
among the significant GTI variables, both the coefficients and the level of significance varies 
(as indicated by the ratio between the beta-coefficient and the standard error (Midtbø, 2010, 
93)). The coefficient of GTI-centered in its relation to trust police is more than twice as large 
as the combined coefficients of the same variable related to trust parliament and trust 
politicians. Furthermore, the former coefficient is positive while the two latter coefficients are 
negative. So to temporarily summarize in advance of the upcoming discussion in the next 
chapter, 1) the relationship between terrorism and political trust seem to be linear, as 
represented by the non-significant relationship between the dependent variables and the 
polynomial variables (the models therefore seem to have the correct functional form, as 
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discussed in the Methods-chapter); 2) the relationship between a country’s exposure to terrorism 
and citizens political trust does not seem to be affected by area of residence, as represented by 
the interaction variables; 3) citizens’ political trust does not seem to be affected by their 
countries’ long-lasting levels of exposure to terrorism, as represented by GTI-average but; 4) 
the trust that citizens have in their parliaments, police and politicians do seem to be affected by 
variation in their countries’ exposure to terrorism over time, as represented by GTI-centered. A 
preliminary overall conclusion is, thus, that the remark made in the introductory chapter was 
correct: citizens in Europe seem to be more affected by the relatively large increase in the 
amount of terrorism, than they are affected by the relatively lasting levels of terrorism in 
themselves. 
 
As for the size of the coefficients, the effects that the significant GTI-variables have, this varies 
markedly between dependent variables, as mentioned earlier. The overall effect that terrorism 
seem to have had on the levels of political trust is rather limited. Using the largest coefficient, 
related to the police, as an example. When the GTI increases with 1 score, which is a marked 
increase which indicates a rather large increase in a society’s exposure to terrorism, the levels 
of trust in the police is shifted .1, on a scale from 0 to 10. A large increase in exposure to 
terrorism has a weak effect on trust that citizens vest in the police. And, as mentioned above, 
the police is more than twice as affected than the other two significant institutions. The 
significant GTI-variables effect relatively to the other variables are discussed below. 
 
When it comes to the control variables there are several significant relationships. Citizens’ trust 
in every political institution increases the more interested they are in politics, the more religious 
they are, the more satisfied they are with their household’s income, the more educated they are, 
the more social trust they have, and the more satisfied they are with societal institutions’ 
performance.  These results are as expected. 
 
There are, however, some deviances from the expectations discussed in the Theory chapter. 
First, citizens’ trust in the parliament, the legal system and in politicians decrease with age, 
contrary to expectations, while their trust in the police increases, as expected. Furthermore, 
citizens’ trust in parliament and the legal system seem to be independent of gender, while 
women, as expected, have more trust in the police and in politicians compared to men. Although 
no assumptions was discussed explicitly in the Theory chapter regarding the variable area of 
residence, the relationship between area of residence and trust in the different institutions 
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follows no obvious pattern prima facie. Citizens living in urban areas have higher levels of trust 
in the parliament, the legal system, and politicians, but there’s no difference when it comes to 
trust vested in the police. This can be a bit confounding, but as hinted to in the discussion above 
and as the discussions below will show, the police are often the ‘odd institution out’. Moving 
on, when it comes to individual wellbeing, it seems that the better perception individuals have 
of their own wellbeing, the less they trust their parliaments and their politicians, while their 
trust in the legal system and the police increases. Feeling of safety does not seem to affect 
citizens’ trust in their police nor their trust in politicians, but it does have a significant impact 
on their trust in their parliaments and their legal system. This also can be a bit confounding, 
considering that it is the police’s responsibility in every-day life to ensure the citizens’ feeling 
of safety. 
 
Overall, the results in connection with the control variables located on the individual level are 
mainly as expected. But there are some deviancies from the expected result. Some of these 
deviancies are related to non-significant relationships, but a lot of the deviancies are related to 
variables having a significant relationship to some of the dependent variables but not others, 
while some deviancies is related to variables having a positive relationship with some of the 
dependent variables and negative relationships to others. While there seem to be no permanent 
or obvious pattern in the deviancies, a lot of the deviances revolves around citizens’ trust in the 
police. The deviancies, and the discrepancies between this study and previous studies (i.e. the 
results both relating to terrorism as well as the control variables, although the latter is not 
explicitly discussed previously in this paper beyond the expectations that are discussed in the 
Theory chapter), also shows that trust is not a clear-cut matter, and that it does not have a 
deterministic relationship to other phenomena. An element that can function as a theoretical 
supplement to the theoretical framework discussed in this paper, and possibly explain parts of 
the deviances between institutions, is discussed at the end of the Analyses.  
 
When it comes to the control variables located on the macro level, HDI-average and HDI-
centered, it can first be pointed out that the former is not significant in any of the analyses. The 
latter is only significant in its relationship to the trust that citizens have in their legal system. 
This indicates, first, that the levels of political trust are not affected by living in societies with 
relatively high or high but relatively lower levels of human development. However, changes in 
the societies’ levels of human development do affect the political trust, but only the trust that 
citizens vest in their legal system. The lack of significant relationships is, perhaps, a paradoxical 
91 
 
finding. However, one potential explanation may be that citizens care more about their own 
education, own income, and own health, than they do about the country average, as represented 
by HDI. Living in a country where your co-citizens have high levels of education, for instance, 
may not affect you in the same manner as your own education. At least not as strongly. Many 
of the factors that the HDI controls for on the macro level, may already be accounted for on the 
individual level. And, as discussed in the two previous sections of this chapter, it is mainly 
factors located at the individual level that explain variation in political trust, leaving relatively 
little room for both the HDI and the GTI. Furthermore, relatively few observations on the macro 
level combined with relatively little variation (19 observations each year that varies relatively 
little from year to year) makes it difficult to get statistical significance (suggesting, of course, 
that there is no or a weak empirical relationship) (Thrane, 2017, 80; Midtbø, 2010, 67; Wheelan, 
2013, 195-198). One important remark, however, is that terrorism seem to matter more for 
political trust than a society’s ‘capital of human development. At least among the countries 
included in this study. This remark can be seen in connection with the remark made in the 
introductory chapter, where a previous study finds that the main factor determining political 
trust in the U.S. is national security, and not e.g. the economy, health care or education (without 
excluding these factors as relevant).   
 
Some notes can be made regarding the two different academic schools within the study of 
(political) trust, referred to in the Theory-chapter, in connection with the size of the coefficients, 
i.e. the strength of the explanatory factors. The MI-school focuses on individual explanatory 
factors, while the MC-school focuses on societal (i.e. structural) explanatory factors, as already 
discussed. The results from the MLRs may indicate that a compromise between the two schools 
may be most advantageous, at least when it comes to the study of political trust. It is factors 
located at the lower level that, generally, has the largest explanatory power, as indicated by the 
beta-coefficients and their level of significance, as well as by the empty models discussed 
above. At the same time, a lot of the factors located on the individual level is in reality hard to 
separate from structural factors. For instance, the factor with the strongest effect on political 
trust is the individuals’ satisfaction with societal institutions’ performance, i.e. the state of the 
country’s economy, satisfaction with how the government performs its job, how democracy 
works in their country, the state of education in the country, and the state of the country’s health-
services. These are individual factors that presumedly are quite dependent on structural factors. 
In real life there are close connections between individual and structural factors in many 
respects. If comparing the significant GTI-variables with age and gender, two factors that are 
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not connected with structural factors, the results shows that terrorism have a stronger effect on 
the levels of political trust in some cases, and in other cases not (keeping in mind the different 
variables’ range of variation, e.g. age can vary from 15 to over 100). Overall, the results show 
that variation in terrorism and its effect over time (GTI-centered) is on par with several factors 
on the individual level. In many cases, however, factors on the individual level have a stronger 
effect on political trust. 
 
As for the models themselves, table 5.2 shows that most of the variation is located at the lowest 
level in the model, and then at the country level, and that least of the variation is located at the 
country-year level, in line with the previous results. Furthermore, the BIC is reduced in model 
3 compared to both the empty models, as well as compared to model 1 and model 2 (see table 
5.2, Appendix J and Appendix K). Since the BIC increases with the amount of include variables, 
as mentioned above, a reduced BIC score is a positive sign for model 3. 
 
5.5 The survey experiment 
Figure 5.2 is a graphic display of the results from the survey experiment. More concrete, the 
figure shows the average scores of each of the three experiment groups, for each of the 
dependent trust variables as well as their average score on the variable measuring the impact of 
the treatment. From the figure one can see that the result generally matches the theoretical 
expectations, where the group that receives the negative vignette has the lowest average trust 
in the different institutions, the control group has an average score between the negative group 
and the positive group, and the group that receives the positive vignette has the highest average 
trust in the three institutions. The exception from this pattern is the result pertaining to the 
police. In this case, the group that received the positive vignette still has the highest average 
score, as expected, but the group that received the negative vignette has a higher average score 
than the control group. Overall, the graphic result indicates that capacity perception does matter 
in the relationship between terrorism and citizens’ trust. Furthermore, figure 5.2 also indicate 
that the treatment have worked as expected, since the aforementioned validating pattern is 
present also in this case. The treatment does seem, however, to have had a limited impact on 
the participants, considering the relatively small differences between the three groups. The 




Figure 5.2 show a graphic illustration of the average score for each of the experiment groups 




First of all, it is relevant to investigate if the treatment had an effect, and if the effect was as 
intended, before exploring in a concrete manner to what degree the average levels of trust was 
affected by the treatment. This investigation can help strengthen the reliability of the causal 
inferences, as well as provide an indication of the strength of the treatment, which in turn 
provides an indication of how much variation in trust can be expected. Table 5.3 shows 
descriptive statistics of the result pertaining to the dependent variable that measures the 
participants’ perception of the authorities’ capacity to deal with terrorism.  
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of the groups’ average capacity perception 
 Average score sd Skewness Kurtosis  
Control group 2.978202 .7004688 -.0416002 2.780887 
Larger capacity 3.060484 .6982753 .0834629 2.743305 
Not large 
enough capacity 
2.973783 .671239 .1048997 3.046652 
Overall 
average 




First of all, it can be noted that table 5.3 (as well as table 5.6, 5.9, and 5.12) contains descriptive 
statistics relating to data diagnostics (sd, skewness, and kurtosis), i.e. statistics used to check, 
among other things, if the statistical assumptions are met. Each table containing descriptive 
statistics for each of the dependent variables will contain such diagnostic statistics, but as 
discussed at the end of the previous chapter, all assumptions relating to diagnostics are met. 
These results, although included in the descriptive tables, will therefore not be discussed further. 
 
As one can see from table 5.3, there is a difference between the three groups, and the difference 
is as expected. The negative group has the lowest average score, i.e. the lowest average 
perception of the authorities’ capacity to deal with terrorism, while the positive group has the 
highest average score. However, the effect of the treatment variable seems to be rather small, 
as indicated by figure 5.2. On a scale from 1 to 5, the difference in the average score between 
the negative group and the positive group is .09. The treatment, i.e. the vignettes, have therefore 
had an effect on the participants capacity perception, but the effect was limited. Next, an 
ANOVA is used to explore if the differences in effect was large enough to be significant. 
 
Table 5.4 The result from the ANOVA of the participants’ capacity perception 
 SS df MS F-score p-value 
Between-
group var. 
3.55769235 2 1.77884618 3.75 0.0238 
Within-
group var. 
1080.77184 2276 .474855816   
Total 1084.32953 2278 .476000671   
Eta/‘effect size’: 0.003281 chi2(2) =   2.3477   Prob>chi2 = 0.997  
 
Table 5.4 shows the result from the ANOVA of the dependent variable measuring capacity 
perception. In this table, ‘df’ refers to ‘degrees of freedom’, ‘SS’ refers to ‘Sum of Squares’, 
and ‘MS’ refers to ‘Mean sum of Squares’ (=SS/df). SS and MS are two different ways of 
demonstrating the variance, which is done for the between-group variance and within-group 
variance. These elements, df, SS and MS, are however, as discussed in the Method chapter 
when noting the statistical formula, what leads to the F-score. And it is the F-score and the p-
value that are the main elements to consider in this regard. Therefore, the discussions will focus 
on these two scores. As also mentioned in the Method chapter, the critical F-score for the 
ANOVAs in this study is 3.07. As table 5.4 shows, the ANOVA of the dependent variable 
measuring capacity perception provides an F-score of 3.57, and the p-value is .0238. One can 
therefore conclude with a significance level of 5 percent, that the treatment has worked. The 
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treatment has altered the participants capacity perception, and the direction of the effect have 
been as intended. The Eta-score has no straightforward interpretation but can be considered as 
a measurement of the strength that the effect of the treatment has had (Ringdal, 2014, 382). The 
Eta-score therefore indicates that the treatment, i.e. the vignette, explains .3 percent (0.003 X 
100) of the variation (Ibid). Overall, the ANOVA supports the impression one gets from the 
descriptive statistics. The treatment has had a significant effect on the participants as intended, 
but the effect is limited. A Benferroni-analysis can provide a more nuanced image of which 
groups was more and less affected by the treatment.  
 
Table 5.5 The result from the Benferroni-analysis of participants’ capacity perception 
Benferroni comparisons Control group (p-value) Larger capacity (p-value) 
Larger capacity .082282 (0.065)*  
Not large enough capacity -.004419 (1.0000) -.086701 (0.041)** 
*** = 1%-level, ** = 5%-level and * = 10%-level, p-value modified to account for multiple 
pairwise comparisons 
 
Table 5.5 shows the result of the Benferroni multiple pairwise comparison of the dependent 
variable measuring capacity perception. In the comparison between the control group and the 
positive group one sees that there is a difference, but that the difference between the two groups 
is not large enough to reach a significance level of 5 percent. If one compares the control group 
with the negative group one sees that the difference is very small between the two groups, and 
the difference is not nearly significant. On the other hand, the comparison between the positive 
group and the negative group shows that there is a difference, a slightly larger difference than 
the one between the control group and the positive group, and that the difference is significant 
with a p-value of .04. 
 
Overall, the results from the ANOVA of the relationship between the vignettes and the variable 
measuring the participants capacity perception shows that the vignettes have worked as 
intended. The effect, however, seems rather limited as indicated (particularly) by the Eta-score. 
This impression is backed up by both the descriptive statistics as well as the Benferroni-
analysis, where the latter shows that the largest difference is between the positive group and the 
negative group, as could logically assume. The descriptive statistics in table 5.3 shows that it 
was the positive vignette that had the strongest effect and the trust that the groups exhibit 
towards the different institutions should therefore, ceteris paribus, be more positively affected 




It can also be pointed out that the limited effect that the treatment apparently have had was 
expected. As discussed in the Theory chapter, citizens (represented here by the experiment 
participants) continually throughout their entire lifespan receive cognitive ‘updates’, 
environmental cues, that provide them with information regarding political institutions 
capacities. Both when it comes to dealing with terrorism and in general. Citizens therefore 
probably have a perception of the political institutions’ capacities that are somewhat fixed. This 
paper assumes that terrorism is an event that can function as both a critical juncture that can 
stir, as well as an element that wear and tear on this fixed image. It was, however, at the outset 
questionable whether a vignette in the form of a couple of written lines would be able to affect 
the participants’ capacity perception when it comes to institutions’ capacity to deal with 
terrorism. Merolla and Zechmeister (2009, 49-74), for instance, recommends that experiments 
that wants to explore how terrorism affects citizens use video clips and similar graphical 
elements as treamtents, in order to ensure a treatment effect. This approach, although perhaps 
more effective, involves some ethical complications. Terrorism is by nature traumatic. To 
simulate something relating to terrorism may affect the participants too much or in an 
undesirable manner. The approach is also more resource demanding, especially  if one is to 
tailor the treatment to the experiment, as is done in this case. An additional potential downside 
is that it is more difficult to infer exactly what it is (about the video/graphical element) that 
affects the participants, since some elements may affect some participants and other elements 
may affect other participants. These complications are limited by using text. So, the fact that 
the treatment actually has had an effect, and that the effect has been as intended is good news. 
This provides a stronger certainty for the causal inferences regarding the remaining dependent 
variables.  
 
5.6.2 The Parliament 
Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics of the groups’ average response to trust Parliament 
 Average score sd Skewness Kurtosis  
Control group 3.33015 .7979685 -.3875091 3.005073 
Larger capacity 3.413978 .7504997 -.5942856 3.392934 
Not large 
enough capacity 
3.310861 .7395907 -.343671 2.94489 
Overall 
average 




Table 5.6 shows the descriptive statistics for the relationship between the treatment and the 
dependent variable measuring how much the participants trust Parliament. The table supports 
the impression from the graphic illustration in figure 5.2, where the positive group has the 
highest average degree of trust in the Parliament, while the negative group has the lowest 
average degree of trust in the Parliament. The descriptive statistics also show that the group that 
received the positive treatment has a markedly difference from the two other groups in how 
much it trusts the parliament, while the other two groups has a smaller difference between them. 
This indicates, in line with the expectation pointed out above, that the trust that the parliament 
receives is, ceteris paribus, more affected by the positive capacity perception, i.e. an improved 
capacity, than it is by the negative capacity perception, i.e. not large enough capacity.  
 
Table 5.7 The result from the ANOVA of how much participants trust Parliament 
 SS df MS F-score p-value 
Between-
group var. 
4.54528409 2 2.27264205 3.92 0.0200 
Within-
group var. 
1319.72811 2275 .580100268   
Total 1324.27339 2277 .581586909   
Eta/‘effect size’: 0.003432  chi2(2) =   2.3477  Prob>chi2 = 0.309  
 
Table 5.7 shows the result from the ANOVA of the dependent variable that measures how much 
the participants trust Parliament. First of all, the F-score of 3.75 is above the critical value of 
3.07, and the p-value of .02 is significant. One can therefore with a large degree of certainty 
conclude that capacity perception affects citizens’ trust in Parliament, and, thus, functions as a 
causal mechanism in the relationship between terrorism and political trust. The Eta-scores of 
.003 shows, as in the case with the variable measuring capacity perception, that the treatment 
has had a relatively weak effect, where it is estimated that the treatment can explain .3 percent 
of the variance. This is in line with the discussion above, where it is assumed that citizens’ 
political trust is a relatively fixed ‘property’. The fact that a couple of written lines have had an 
effect of .3 percent actually becomes somewhat remarkable if seen through this lens.  
 
Table 5.8 The result from the Benferroni-analysis of participants’ trust in Parliament 
Benferroni comparisons Control group (p-value) Larger capacity (p-value) 
Larger capacity .083828  (0.104)  
Not large enough capacity -.019289  (1.000) -.103117  (0.024)** 





Table 5.8 shows the result from the Benferroni-analysis of the dependent variable measuring 
how much the participants trust Parliament. This result is quite similar to the Benferroni-
analysis of the dependent variable measuring the participants’ capacity perception, in that it is 
only the difference between the positive group and the negative group that reaches a 
significance level lower than 5 percent, with a p-value of .02. This can probably, as is the case 
above as well as below, be seen as a consequence of a relatively weak treatment. The treatment 
barely affects the participants away from their original position, as represented by the control 
group, but the total effect that the treatment has on the two groups are significant.  
 
5.6.3 The Government 
Table 5.9 Descriptive statistics of the groups’ average response to trust Government 
 Average score sd Skewness Kurtosis  
Control group 3.119728 .8477121 -.2433075 2.80177 
Larger capacity 3.123656 .843488 -.4253012 2.771768 
Not large 
enough capacity 
3.0025 .8446215 -.2167297 2.676615 
Overall 
average 
3.077697 .8468138 -.2891765 2.732535 
 
Table 5.9 shows the descriptive statistics of the variable measuring how much the participants 
trust Government. Here too is the impression from the graphical display in figure 5.2 backed 
up. The positive group has the highest average trust in the Government, while the negative 
group has the lowest average trust in the Government. However, in contrast to the case with the 
Parliament, here it is the negative group that stands out markedly from the other two groups. 
This could indicate that the citizens’ trust in the Government, at least in a Norwegian context, 
is more affected by a negative capacity perception than it is by a positive one. This is in spite 
of the fact that the positive treatment seems to have had a stronger effect than the negative 
treatment, something which further indicates that the trust in Government (at least the current 









Table 5.10 The result from the ANOVA of how much participants trust Government 
 SS df MS F-score p-value 
Between-
group var. 
7.54896458 2 3.77448229 5.28 0.0051 
Within-
group var. 
1625.99026 2276 .714406968   
Total 1633.53922 2278 .717093601   
Eta/‘effect size’: 0.004621 chi2(2) =   1.5360  Prob>chi2 = 0.464  
 
Table 5.10 shows the result from the ANOVA of the dependent variable measuring how much 
the participants trust Government. The F-score of 5.28 is above the critical value of 3.07, and 
the p-value is .005, which makes the relationship significant at a significance level of below 1 
percent. One can therefor conclude with a large degree of certainty that the citizens’ perception 
of how much capacity the authorities have when it comes to dealing with terrorism affects how 
much trust the citizens vest in the Government. The Eta-score indicates that the treatment 
explains .4 percent of the variance. This is not much but it is still some, at least seen through 
the lens mentioned earlier. It is also more than the case with the Parliament, indicating that the 
Government is more affected by changes in capacity perception than the Parliament is. This 
could be because the trust vested in the Government is more affected in a negative manner than 
the trust vested in the Parliament. 
 
Table 5.11 The result from the Benferroni-analysis of participants’ trust in Government 
Benferroni comparisons Control group (p-value) Larger capacity (p-value) 
Larger capacity .003928 (1.000)  
Not large enough capacity -.117228 (0.020)** -.121156 (0.015)** 
*** = 1%-level, ** = 5%-level and * = 10%-level, p-value modified to account for multiple 
pairwise comparisons 
 
Table 5.11 shows the result from a Benferroni-analysis of how much the participants trust 
Government. The analysis is in line with the graphic display in figure 5.2, as well as with the 
ANOVA above. One sees that the largest difference lies between the positive group and the 
negative group (p-value of .015), still, but that the difference between the negative group and 
the control group is significant (p-value of .02), while the difference between the positive group 
and the control group is not significant. The Benferroni-analysis therefore backs up the 
impression that the trust vested in the Government is more affected by negative capacity 





5.6.4 The police 
Table 5.12 Descriptive statistics of the groups’ average response to trust police 
 Average score sd Skewness Kurtosis  
Control group 3.65625 .7577547 -.7631443 4.099906 
Larger capacity 3.724462 .7080719 -.6658474 3.997436 
Not large 
enough capacity 
3.664581 .7168817 -.7119263 4.239482 
Overall 
average 
3.681083 .727435 -.7204899 4.142101 
 
Table 5.12 shows the descriptive statistics of the variable measuring how much the participants 
trust police. The statistics shows, firstly, that after the treatment has been introduced the police 
have the highest amount of average trust, with an overall average of 3.68, while the Parliament 
and the Government has an overall average of 3.35 and 3.01, respectively. This difference in 
average trust probably has many explanations, but the two latter institutions have a more 
political nature, thus probably being more contested, than the former institution, something 
which can affect the overall trust that they receive (Norris, 2017). Table 5.12 also shows that 
the positive group has the highest amount of average trust in the police, as expected. However, 
contrary to expectations, the negative group have a higher average amount of trust in the police 
than the control group. The negative vignette therefore seems to have had a positive effect when 
it comes to the trust that the participants have in the police. The table further shows that the 
positive group markedly stands out from the two other groups, suggesting that the participants’ 
trust in the police is more affected by a relatively positive capacity perception than it is by a 
negative perception. Although this is not as easy to determine as with the previous institutions, 
since the negative treatment also had a positive effect despite its negative intention.  
 
Table 5.13 The result from the ANOVA of how much participants trust police 
 SS df MS F-score p-value 
Between-
group var. 
2.03577342 2 1.01788671 1.93 0.1416 
Within-
group var. 
1203.39443 2276 .528732177   
Total 1205.43021 2278 .529161637   
Eta/‘effect size’: 0.0030331 chi2(2) =   3.1828  Prob>chi2 = 0.204 
 
Table 5.13 shows the result from the ANOVA of the dependent variable measuring how much 
the participants trust police. The table shows that the F-score of 1.93 is below the critical value 
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of 3.07, and that the p-value is .1416. So, capacity perception does not seem to be a causal 
mechanism in the relationship between terrorism and citizens’ trust in the police since the 
variation is too small, but this cannot be stated with sufficient certainty since the p-value is too 
high. Furthermore, the table shows that the treatment has an explained effect of approximately 
.3 percent, which is roughly the same as in the previous cases, something which again indicates 
a (relatively) weak treatment.  
 
It can, however, be pointed out that the difference between the control group and the positive 
group is roughly the same size as in the case with the Parliament, and that it is bigger than the 
difference in the case with the variable measuring the participants capacity perception, both of 
which produced significant ANOVAs (table 5.6, 5.9 and 5.12). The difference in the F-score 
and the p-value can be ascribed to the somewhat puzzling fact that the group that receive a 
negative treatment actually experience an increase in their trust. This increase, as opposed to a 
decrease as in the other cases, leads to a reduced overall variance. This reduced overall variance, 
in turn, leads to a low and not sufficient F-score, which can be derived from the F-score formula 
presented in the previous chapter (overall variance representing the numerator in the Fischer 
equation). Furthermore, reduced between-group variation reduces the p-value, as can be derived 
from the statistical formula behind the p-value (one way of expressing the effect of the 
treatment, referred to as beta-coefficient in regressions, is by the between-group variation) 
(Midtbø, 2010, 93). This explains, at least partially, the statistical outcome (but not the 
empirical relationship). 
 
Table 5.14 The result from the Benferroni-analysis of participants’ trust in police 
Benferroni comparisons Control group (p-value) Larger capacity (p-value) 
Larger capacity .068212 (0.214)  
Not large enough capacity .008331 (1.000) -.059882 (0.318) 
*** = 1%-level, ** = 5%-level and * = 10%-level, p-value modified to account for multiple 
pairwise comparisons 
 
Table 5.14 shows the result from the Benferroni-analysis of the dependent variable measuring 
how much the participants trust the police. This backs up the impression from the graphic 
display in figure 5.2, and the statistics presented above. The differences in trust are largest 
between the control group and the positive group, and smallest between the control group and 
the negative group. None of the differences are, however, significant. Overall, the trust vested 
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in the police stands out from the trust vested in the Government and the trust vested in the 
Parliament in how it is affected.  
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter have presented and discussed the results from the MLR and the survey 
experiment. Generally, the results was as expected. There were, however, some deviations 
from the theoretical expectations discussed earlier in the paper. Both in the MLR results and 
in the survey experiment results. How the results relate to the hypotheses and the theoretical 
framework is the topic for the next chapter, which also at the end suggests a theoretical 
element that could supplement the theoretical framework suggested in this paper. This 
element could explain at least some of the deviances from the expectations and increase the 

























6            Analyses 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the result from the MLR and the survey experiment. This is done, 
first, by discussing the results implications for the hypotheses, and then how the results fit the 
theoretical framework. In accordance with this sequential discussion, some of the theoretical 
implications stemming from the results that are connected to the analysis of the hypotheses will 
be reserved for the discussion of the theoretical framework, in order to avoid redundant 
repetition. This mainly regards the first and the fifth hypothesis, since these two are tightly 
connected to the framework.  The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of an alternative, 
or perhaps best envisioned as a supplementing, theoretical element. This could element could 
help explain the deviancies between the results and the expectations derived from the paper’s 
theoretical framework.   
 
6.2 Hypothesis 1 
 In Europe in the time period of 2002 to 2016 terrorism have had a negative effect on the 
political trust that the parliament, the legal system, the police, and the politicians receive. 
 
The results from the MLRs showed two major trends. First, that a country’s relatively long-
lasting exposure to terrorism do not have a significant effect on political trust. The variable 
GTI-average did not have a significant relationship with the trust that parliaments, legal 
systems, police, and politicians receive. This means that citizens in France, a country that has 
experienced a considerable amount of terrorism over time, compared to, for instance, citizens 
in Norway, a country that has experienced a small amount of terrorism, do not have less trust 
in political institutions as a result of living in a country which have been more permanently 
exposed to terrorism. This trend can be in line with previous empirical studies which suggest 
that the effects of terrorism are relatively short-lived. And while it at first glance might seem 
like the result does not fit the theoretical framework, this is not necessarily so. The framework, 
which will be discussed more in detail later, assumes that changes in capacity perception lead 
to changes in the levels of trust. Changes in capacity perception, in turn, requires new 
information, information that alters the perception. Persistent levels of terrorism as is measured 
by this variable could, perhaps, usually confirm already existing information, i.e. the 
information that already influences the capacity perception, thus confirming the capacity 
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perception and fortifying the levels of trust. This is only speculation but, considering the second 
resulting trend, it is a plausible speculation.   
 
The second trend that appears in the result is that changes in the amount of terrorism that a 
country experiences do affect the levels of political trust in that country. At least the trust that 
the parliaments, the police and the politicians receive from the citizens. The variable GTI-
centered had a significant relationship to all of the dependent variables, except for how much 
citizens trust their legal system (the differences between institutions will be discussed below in 
connection with the second hypothesis). Citizens, therefore, seem to reduce or increase their 
trust in the different institutions when hit by a new terror attack. One implication of this result 
is that the it is the citizens in Spain, Norway and Sweden, in that order, that have had their 
political trust most affected by terrorism during the relevant time period out of the citizens in 
the 19 included countries, since it is these countries whom in the same time period experience 
the largest overall variation in the GTI-score/terrorism (see Appendix B).20 By resulting in two 
negative relations (the parliaments and politicians) and one positive relation (the police), the 
results are in line (and not in line) with both the theoretical expectation and previous empirical 
studies. The negative relations are in line with the theoretical framework, while the positive 
relation is in line with previous empirical studies. This discrepancy between institutions and a 
possible reason for it is discussed more later.  
 
The first hypothesis, as it is formulated, is falsified. Variation in terrorism within a country over 
time has had a negative effect on the political trust in Europe in the time period of 2002 to 2016, 
but it has only contributed toward a reduction in the trust that the parliaments and the politicians 
received. The legal systems seem to be unaffected, while the trust that the police received was 
improved as a consequence of increasing amounts of terrorism.  
 
6.3 Hypothesis 2 
Terrorism affects the trust vested in the different institutions in a negative but different order. 
The trust vested in the police is most affected, followed by the trust vested in politicians, then 
the trust vested in the parliaments, and finally the trust vested in the legal system.  
 
This hypothesis has two dimensions. The first is the direction of the effect that terrorism has, 
and the second is the ranked order of the effect that terrorism has on the trust that the different 
                                                          
20 This is a prediction that can increase the reliability of the result, but a prediction that nonetheless is left 
untested in this paper. 
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institutions receive. The first dimension was a continuation of the first hypothesis and has 
already been discussed and falsified. When considering the significant variable GTI-centered, 
changing amounts of terrorism do affect the trust that three of the institutions receive, but the 
trust in the police is affected in a positive manner, while the trust in the legal system is not 
affected. As for the second dimension, the ranking, also considering the significant result, this 
is correct. The citizens’ trust in the police was more than twice as affected than the trust in the 
parliament and the politicians combined, while the trust that the politicians receive was slightly 
more affected than the trust that the parliaments receive, and the legal systems seem unaffected 
by changes in the amount of terrorism.   
 
These institutional differences may have several causes, which perhaps works from different 
directions. The differences is discussed more thoroughly in the section on the theoretical 
framework, but a preliminary discussion is in order. First, it can be caused by the fact that the 
more specifically political institutions such as the parliament and politicians are often used as 
scapegoats. When something goes wrong, e.g. a terror attack, they are often the first actors that 
come to the citizens’ mind and, thus, are blamed (Norris, 2017; Norris, 2003). Terrorism can of 
course function as a critical juncture, which politicians can exploit for their own benefit 
(Albertson and Gadarian, 2016a; 2016b; Gadarian, 2014). And some politicians, perhaps 
especially conservative ones (Huddy and Feldman, 2011; Huddy et al., 2007), could of course 
come out on top.  However, this probably demands a rather skilful handling of the aftermath by 
the politicians and the parliament, and it is doubtful that parliaments and politicians overall (as 
measured by the ESS, and the focus in this paper) can do this skilfully enough to come out on 
top. This could explain why the more specifically political institutions receive reduced trust 
following a terrorist attack. At the opposite end of this effect-distribution is the police. The 
police may receive increased trust following a terrorist attack because it is they who in every-
day life are supposed to protect the citizens. Citizens, in most cases, do not have an alternative 
to the police when it comes to combating terrorism. They therefore not only could, but also 
should rally around the police. It is their last resort. Increased trust in the police (perhaps 
reallocating it from other institutions, e.g. the parliament and politicians) is a rational outcome, 
since it can increase the police’ capacity. Increased police capacity could manifest itself through 
more authorizations, increased legal room to manoeuvre in, and different anti-liberal legislation 
(as is often the case in the aftermath of large-scaled terror attacks), in order to get increased 
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protection against terrorism. 21 As for the citizens’ trust in their legal system, which is 
unaffected, this may be because the citizens do not associate terrorism strongly enough with the 
legal system, so terrorism do not affect the citizens’ overall trust in the system. There could of 
course be individual special cases which do affect the citizens’ overall trust in the legal system, 
but these are, if present, too rare to produce a statistical connection in this case. 
 
A second reason, one that is connected to both the first reason and the theoretical framework, 
but more concretized than the first more general reason, is that it is both the quantity of 
information and the type of information that determines how trust (and beliefs in general) is 
affected (Kahneman, 2013, 129-137). If the scapegoats, the strictly political institutions, 
somehow gets portrayed as having (too) low capacity to deal with terrorism, and this is 
sufficiently repeated in order to get the message through to the audience (the citizens actually 
absorbs the information), then the audience will probably reduce their trust in these institutions. 
And, perhaps, vice versa for the police. The point being that it is the information that is 
associated with the different institutions that probably matters to how the capacity perception 
is influenced. This is discussed further in the section focusing on the theoretical framework. 
 
To sum up the discussion relating to the second hypothesis, the hypothesis as it stands is 
falsified, since not all the institutions’ trust was negatively affected. The ranking was, however,  
correct. There could be several reasons for this result, but a logical assumption is that it is the 
type and quantity of information associated with each of the institutions when it comes to 
terrorism that affects the trust that each of the institutions receive. Since political institutions 
are often used as scapegoats they may, perhaps regardless of their actual performance, receive 
reduced trust from the citizens. The police, on the other hand, may be the hero in the eyes of 
the citizens, thus having beneficial information associated with them, thus increasing the 
capacity perception and, in turn, increasing trust. 
 
6.4 Hypothesis 3 
Terrorism has a non-linear effect on terrorism, where the effect first is positive and by an 
increasing amount of terrorism becomes negative. 
 
                                                          
21 A common response to large-scaled terror attacks are often the implementation of a state of emergency 
(UNODC, n.d.), giving the police a vast room of manoeuvring and increased capacity to ‘serve and protect’.   
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The results from the MLR shows that neither the polynomial GTI-average nor the GTI-centered 
variant reached a relevant level of significance. This indicates that changes in the amount of 
exposure to terrorism (keeping in mind the non-significant, and thus irrelevant, GTI-average 
variables) operates in one direction when it comes to the effect that it has on the citizens’ trust 
in the parliaments, the police, and the politicians (considering the previous results connected to 
the two first hypotheses, it would also be somewhat paradoxical if the variables connected to 
the parliament and the politicians had a reversed U-relation to terrorism).  It is at the same time 
important to keep in mind the limitations in the data that is used to test this hypothesis. The 
included countries in the MLR have experienced a relatively small amount of terrorism 
compared to the countries which inspired the hypothesis, with the highest GTI-score being 5.87 
in Spain in 2004 and the highest overall average score being France’s 4.73 (see Appendix B). 
The upper end of the GTI-scale (5<) is therefore largely unexplored. Furthermore, as discussed 
in the Method chapter, the GTI seem to already be curved in its construction, somehow. This 
may not be optimal but as pointed out in the validity discussion, the GTI is still one of the best, 
if not the best, measurements applicable to cross-sectional as well as longitudinal comparisons 
in the case of terrorism.  In sum, while the result may have a limited transferability, for instance 
to the MENA-region, it is still valid for Europe for the relevant time period using the GTI as a 
measurement of terrorism. The hypothesis is therefore falsified.  
 
One explanation for this result may be that Europe has not experienced an amount of terrorism 
that is sufficient to ‘flatten the temporary cushion’ that the rally around the flag effect may be. 
If the European overall exposure to terrorism increases, perhaps then will the effects be non-
linear. Another explanation may be that citizens’ perceptions (which shape their beliefs) is quite 
fixed, at least when it comes to terrorism. The ‘strictly’ political institutions may suffer from a 
relatively poor perception in the minds of the citizens, while the police in Europe may generally 
have a high standing in the minds of the citizens, as discussed above. An indication of this is 
found in figure 1.1., which shows the high levels of trust that the police generally and 
persistently seem to receive. Perceptions can in general and for better or worse be hard to 
change, and there seem to be a growing amount of general animosity towards politicians and 
‘strictly’ political institutions, as discussed in the introductory chapter. These general persistent 
perceptions may therefore generally, and particularly when it comes to the effects of terrorism, 
shape the citizens’ attribution of trust. As long as the perception of who is the ‘good guys’ and 
who is the ‘bad guys’ remain fixed when it comes to terrorism, so does perhaps the (direction 




6.5 Hypothesis 4 
The effect that terrorism has on citizens’ political trust is dependent on the geographical 
proximity that the citizens’ area of residence has to geographical areas that are statistically in 
danger of exposure to terrorism. This means that citizens living in urban areas have, as a result 
of a country’s exposure to terrorism, less trust in political institutions compared to citizens 
living in non-urban areas.  
 
This hypothesis, using residential area as a suggestive proxy to citizens’ exposure to terrorism 
(given that the country has experienced terrorism), is falsified. Neither of the two interaction 
variables, GTI-variables in combination with the variable measuring residential area, was 
significant. Therefore, the trust that the citizens vest in the different institutions is not dependent 
on the citizens’ residential areas statistical chance of exposure to terrorism, and it can be 
claimed that citizens living in urban areas do not trust political institutions less than citizens 
living in rural areas, as a consequence of their country’s exposure to terrorism.  
 
However, the result should perhaps be interpreted as a finding suggesting that citizens living in 
central areas are not markedly more worried about terrorism, at least not in a sufficient manner 
enough to affect their responses to how much they trust political institutions, than citizens living 
in less central areas. Therefore, the combination of residential area and the citizens’ country’s 
exposure to terrorism do not have an additional effect on citizens in urban residential areas and 
their levels of trust, and vice versa. This is a somewhat logical interpretation considering that 
extremely few citizens are directly affected, and thus perhaps rarely consciously worried about 
terrorism.22 The information regarding terrorism that is associated with the institutions 
capacities probably do not differ between citizens living in rural areas compared to those living 
in urban areas, in the same country. 
 
It can as a concluding remark be pointed out that the connection between citizens’ residential 
area and its exposure to terrorism on the one hand, and a country’s exposure to terrorism on the 
other hand, probably is quite weak. This finding, although only suggestive by nature at its 
outset, is not qualified to refute or otherwise contest previous empirical studies that do find a 
                                                          
22 Although many surveys shows that ‘terrorism’ frequently is one of the major concerns for citizens when citizens 
are asked to rank their concerns (see e.g. DSB (2016)), surveys seldom, if ever, explore how often citizens actually 
think or worry about terrorism. It is therefore hard to estimate how worried they generally are in their every-day 
life of being struck by terrorism.  
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significant relationship between actual exposure, instead of statistical chance of exposure, to 
terrorism and political trust.  
 
6.6 Hypothesis 5 
The citizens’ perception of political institutions’ capacity to handle terrorism is a causal 
mechanism in the relationship between terrorism and political trust. This means that the 
political trust that citizens’ experience changes as the citizens’ perception of the institutions’ 
capacity to deal with terrorism changes.  
 
Overall, the survey experiment produced mixed results regarding the different institutions. 
Capacity perception was not a causal mechanism in the relationship between terrorism and the 
trust that the police receives from the citizens, but this result was not significant and can 
therefore not be included in the same manner as with the remaining cases. On the other hand, 
capacity perception was a causal mechanism in the case of the Parliament and the Government, 
and these two results was significant. It can therefore be claimed that the hypothesis is 
confirmed. The trust that political institutions receive changes as the citizens’ perception of the 
institutions capacity to deal with terrorism changes. Capacity perception is a causal mechanism, 
and the significant results showed that a reduced capacity perception will reduce the trust that 
the institutions receive, and vice versa. The mechanism at the same time has a varying degree 
of influence and, as indicated by the differences between the three institutions, where the 
Parliament was more prone to be affected by a positive capacity perception, while the 
Government was more prone to be affected by a negative capacity perception. Furthermore, the 
non-significant result regarding the police was somewhat confounding, showing that the police 
receives increased trust from both the positive experiment group as well as the negative group. 
As has already been mentioned and as will be discussed further below, the police is for some 
reason the ‘odd institution out’ in this paper.   
 
A supplementing conclusion to this hypothesis could be, as briefly touched upon in the 
theoretical chapter, that the new information that the participants was introduced to (regarding 
the authorities’ capacity to deal with terrorism) was coalesced with all the old information that 
they had. And that the overall effect that the new information had in the experiment was, to put 
it in a stylistic and illustrative form, the total sum of the old and the new information. The old 
knowledge may have mediated the effect that the new information had. This could also explain 
why the Eta-estimates showed that the treatment explained relatively little of the variance, 
where one possible explanation is that the old knowledge (in addition to the emotions generated 
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by countless experiences, as assumed by the trust theories elucidated on in the Theory-chapter) 
explains the rest of the variance. Before moving on to the theoretical framework (which also 
partially analyses this hypothesis, considering the mechanisms’ key role in the framework) it is 
worth repeating that the survey experiment itself do not prove that capacity perception is a 
causal mechanism, but building on the suggested theoretical framework it is conceived as a 
mechanism in the relationship. To sum up, the fifth hypothesis is verified.  
 
6.7 Theoretical framework 
So, what does the results imply for the theoretical framework that this paper suggest? Before 
discussing how the results relate to the framework, a brief repetition of the framework may be 
in order. Building on trust theories and institutional theory, this paper argues that terrorism can 
expose political institutions (including politicians) to functional pressure. How the institutions 
deals with this pressure provides the citizens with an experience, which in turn gives the citizens 
knowledge (information) about (and emotions relating to) the institutions. The new knowledge 
influences the citizens’ perception of the capacity that the institutions have when it comes to 
dealing with terrorism, where capacity together with motivations are considered to be the two 
determinants of trust. If altered, the citizens’ capacity perception will alter the amount of trust 
that the citizens vest in the institutions. 
 
One can use figure 2.1 as a concrete reference point for a discussion of the results’ implications 
for the theoretical framework. In connection with this discussion it is first, however, beneficial 
to summarize some of the discussions made so far in this paper that contains elements that do 
support the framework, but elements that remain untested in this paper. First, there can be little 
doubt that terrorism do affect society, therein both institutions and citizens. Second, political 
institutions should, according to many SCTs, and do try to prevent terrorism. Both the terrorism 
in itself and the political institutions handling of it, both prior to, during, and after it has struck, 
probably/logically affects citizens and their’ impression.  
 
Next, regarding the elements of the theoretical framework that are tested in this paper, the paper 
have shown that variation in individuals’ perception of institutions’ capacity do affect the trust 
that the citizens vest in the institutions, although the effect is not always present (depending, 
probably, on the  type and strength of the treatment/knowledge/information). The paper has 
also shown that variation in terrorism leads to variation in the levels of political trust, depending 
on which political institution one considers (the legal system seem to be unaffected by 
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terrorism). Considering the fact that somewhat permanent exposure to terrorism seem to not 
have had an effect on political trust, but that variation in the levels of a country’s exposure to 
terrorism do affect the citizens’ political trust, as shown in the MLR, this indicates alongside 
the results from the survey experiment that variation in experience, thus variation in 
knowledge, leads to variation in capacity perception, which leads to variation in political trust. 
Several parts of the suggested theoretical framework have thus received validation through the 
studies conducted in this paper, and the framework has some explanatory power.  
 
There are, however, one central element that remains unexplored in this paper. The paper have 
not investigated whether or not variation in the institutions handling of terrorism, i.e. their 
performance, actually  leads to variation in the citizens’ perception of the institutions’ capacity 
(or perception of motivation for that matter), although this is logically assumed. This element 
was, as mentioned previously, not possible to implement in either of the two studies. Therefore, 
while the results in this paper supports a large part of theoretical framework, it cannot be 
claimed that the entire framework has been verified through the studies in this paper. 
 
It can also be pointed out that while the paper can conclude that capacity perception is a causal 
mechanism in the pertinent relationship, the paper cannot conclude the primacy, so to speak, of 
this causal mechanism. First of all, the paper has not explored how motivation perception and 
capacity perception relates to each other, and which mechanism, if any, has supremacy in the 
relationship between terrorism and political trust. Studies conducted by Merolla and 
Zechmeister (2009), although not directly comparable to this paper, find solid empirical results 
showing that terrorism has a somewhat large effect on citizens’ emotions. These affected 
emotions can, in turn, have a large effect on the citizens’ capacity perception.   
 
The consequences of these missing elements and explorations are perhaps best illustrated by 
the fact that there are some results that deviates from the expectations derived from the 
suggested framework. As mentioned in the Theory chapter, one key assumption for, 
particularly, the first hypothesis is that the fact that terrorism happens in the first place provides 
the citizens with an environmental cue (information) that indicates to the citizens that the 
institutions capacity to deal with terrorism is not sufficient. They have, arguably, already failed 
if there’s an increase in the amount of terrorism. The first hypothesis, therefore, assumed that 
all the institutions’ level of trust would suffer from increases in terrorism. However, as the 
result showed, the institution which perhaps should receive the majority of blame for failing to 
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prevent an increase in terrorism due to their societal role, the police, and thus experience the 
largest reduction in the levels of trust (as assumed by the second hypothesis), experienced 
relatively large increases in the trust that they received.  
 
Three conclusions can be derived from the discussions above. First, the theoretical framework 
do have potential for explaining how terrorism affects political trust. Second, there are a missing 
element, i.e. variation in perception of institutions handling of terrorism, that would be 
advantageous to include and explore. In addition, it is relevant to explore to what degree and in 
which ways motivation perception matter as a causal mechanism. Third, there are some 
outcomes that the theoretical framework cannot explain, i.e. that increase in terrorism in some 
instances lead to an increase in trust. The paper have already pointed to a potential explanation 
that can explain the outcome regarding the police, i.e. that the police may be considered the last 
resort for the citizens. They may have no choice but to increase their trust in the police (or the 
military, in general ‘security’ institutions), either consciously or subconsciously, in order to 
deal with terrorism. The citizens therefore out of necessity rally around the police. 
 
Before moving on to the paper’s conclusion, a final theoretical supplement can be discussed, 
which has been touched upon briefly during some of the discussions above. Supplement that 
can further nuance the theoretical framework that is suggested in this paper, and one that could 
be included in empirical studies, provided that the data were (made) available. One that also 
relates to the second conclusion above regarding variation in (perception of) performance, 
which in turn, assumedly, leads to variation in capacity perception. Norris et al. (2003), amongst 
others (see also Nacos et al. (2011) and Svedin (2012)), points to the key role played by the 
news media when it comes to how political trust is influenced in the cases of terrorism (and 
crises in general). This is also implicitly done by the IEP in their construction of the GTI, as 
discussed in the Data-chapter, where they assume that the media will distribute the effects of 
terrorism equally throughout the populace. As assumed by the trust theories that the paper’s 
theoretical framework is built on, it is knowledge/information (together with emotions) that 
determines how trust is affected. That includes both the amount of knowledge, and the type of 
knowledge. This assumption is verified in several studies (Kahneman, 2013). Norris et al. 
(2003) argues, by use of a different phrasing, that most citizens receive their information of the 
institutions’ capacity to deal with terrorism through the media, and therefore that the medias’ 
role is  crucial in understanding how trust is affected. Svedin (2012, 101-107) also argues that 
the media mediates the effect that crises has on the public and is a key institution in holding 
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political institutions accountable (see also Bovens (2007) for a discussion on holding, among 
others, political institutions accountable, and therein the medias’ role). The quantity and the 
content of the information that the media provides the citizens with may therefore have a crucial 
impact on how the citizens’ trust is affected. By investigating the quantity and the type of 
information that the media provides the citizens with (therein how the political institutions 
perform), perhaps investigating somehow how much and what type of the mediated information 
that is absorbed by the citizens, one probably improves the explanatory power of the theoretical 
framework significantly.   
 
The media’s role could explain why the police experience increases in the trust that they receive 
in connection with terrorism. Perhaps the police, in the European overall, have received 
(relatively) positive media coverage. This positive media coverage can have given the citizens 
the impression that the police have sufficient capacity to deal with terrorism, while the ‘strictly’ 
political institutions (the typical scapegoats) have not been as fortunate in how they’re 
portrayed. At the same time and on the other hand, the survey experiment indicates (although 
not with sufficient certainty) that the trust that the police receive increases whether the 
information is favourable or not. This can perhaps be explained by the assumption that the new 
information is mixed with old information, and that it’s the sum of the information that 
determines how and to what degree trust is affected.  
 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter have analysed the results and their implications for the hypotheses and the 
theoretical framework. The first hypothesis was falsified, since the police have received 
increased trust following within-country variation in exposure to terrorism. The second 
hypothesis, building on the first, was also falsified. The proposed ranking in the second 
hypothesis was, however, correct. The third hypothesis was falsified, since none of the 
polynomial variables was significant. The fourth hypothesis was also falsified, since none of 
the interaction variables was significant. The results in connection with the fifth hypothesis was 
mixed, but the significant results verified the hypothesis. Overall, the results shows that the 
theoretical framework employed in this paper has some explanatory power. There is, at the 
same time, room for improvements. The chapter also points to a theoretical supplement that 
could be included in empirical studies to improve the frameworks’ explanatory power: the role 
of the media.  All in all, the paper have produced several results with several implications, and 
an overall summary as well as a conclusion to the research question may be due. 
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7      Conclusion 
 
In a historical perspective, the world today can be called a paradise. People live longer than 
before, have healthier lives, are more educated, have access to more resources, and are generally 
happier. This is statistical facts, based on different studies measuring the levels of citizens’ well-
being all over the globe. The same statistics, furthermore, also show that Europe can be 
considered paradise within paradise. There are few places on this earth where the citizens enjoy 
the same levels of prosperity as Europeans do, that enjoy the same levels peace and harmony, 
and few places where the citizens have the same levels and type of political influence. Overall, 
Europe is a good place to live.  
 
There are however some clouds on the horizon. There seem to be a growing amount of 
animosity towards political authorities and, in general, the political system. Polarization is more 
prominent in politics, and populism seem to be on the rise. Both of which seem to become more 
pronounced in the public discourse. In several European countries populistic, often right-
winged, parties receive a growing share of the popular vote. In many of those countries 
populistic parties have entered government. Receding levels of political trust is often pointed 
to as one source of explanation for the increase in populism, although reallocation of trust may 
be a more pertinent explanation. There are, nevertheless, variation in the levels of political trust, 
both within and between countries over time. Variation that must have explanatory factors 
behind it.  
 
This paper explores whether or not terrorism can help explain this variation in the levels of 
political trust. Although Europe is relatively spared from terrorism compared to some parts of 
the world, particularly the MENA-region, it is relatively exposed to it compared to other parts 
of it. Europe has also experienced a rather large increase in the levels of terrorism since 2002. 
Thousands of citizens have been killed as a result of terrorism (IEP, 2017), and terrorism is high 
on the political agenda. It is, arguably, the main purpose of political authorities to protect the 
citizens from harm. Therefore, whether or not the rising levels of terrorism have affected the 





In order to explore the general question that inspired this paper, the paper put forward a research 
question (discussed below). The research question actually consists of two sub-questions, where 
the first part of the research question focuses on the historical empirical relationship between 
terrorism and political trust in Europe in the time period of 2002 to 2016, while the second part 
focuses on the causal relationship between the two phenomena. The paper have, therefore, 
executed two sub-studies in order to explore the research question, each study mainly focused 
on a designated part of the question. Furthermore, particularly the first part of the research 
question has several suitable venues of exploration, i.e. several directions to explore. The paper 
have, therefore, concretized the first part of the research question into four hypotheses, while 
the second part of the research question, being more specified by nature, was concretized into 
one hypothesis. 
 
The second chapter of this paper, the Theory-chapter, discussed the concepts of terrorism and 
political trust, and different empirical aspects of those phenomena. The chapter also proposed 
a theoretical framework that could explain the relationship between the two phenomena. The 
theoretical framework was derived from trust theories and rooted in institutional theory, and 
the line of thought in the theoretical framework was that terrorism is a political problem, it 
exposes political institutions, including politicians, to functional pressure. This pressure has to 
be dealt with by the political institutions. The terrorism and how the institutions deal with the 
terrorism provides the citizens with information which influence the citizens’ perception of the 
institutions capacity to deal with terrorism. This capacity perception, in turn, affects the 
citizens’ trust in the political institutions. If the capacity perception increases, so does the trust, 
and vice versa. A central assumption guiding the explorations, however, was that the fact that 
terrorism occurs in the first place, as indicated by an increase in the GTI-score, signals to the 
citizens that the institutions had already failed. I.e. their capacity to deal with terrorism is 
insufficient. This assumption guided particularly the first hypothesis, and thus the second 
hypothesis as well. The hypotheses was presented and discussed after having discussed 
previous empirical studies and concluded the Theory-chapter.  
 
The third chapter, the Data-chapter, presented and discussed the data that have been utilized in 
this paper. The discussion included elaborations on the data-sources: ESS and QOG, and within 
the latter the GTD and the UN. The discussion, furthermore, included elaborations on data’ 
scope and representativity, accounting for all the variables and their content, and how the data 
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was treated in order to be utilized properly in MLR and the ANOVA. The chapter ended with 
discussions of the data sources’ reliability, the data’ validity, and the ESS data’ equivalency.  
 
The fourth chapter, the Method-chapter, started with a concrete explanation of how the methods 
would be applied to explore the five hypotheses, pointing to how the results would verify or 
falsify the hypotheses, and also discussing some limitations to be aware of regarding the 
relationship between the data and the hypotheses, and the formers’ ability to illuminate the 
latter. Thereafter, building on standard regression, the chapter discussed the method of MLR, 
therein the models that are employed in the regression, and discussed the assumptions of 
regression and how these were handled. After having discussed MLR, the focus shifted to the 
survey experiment, with a discussion of its design. Then, in connection with the survey 
experiment, the chapter discussed what an ANOVA is, and how it is used to explore the data 
produced in the survey experiment, which ended the fourth chapter. 
 
The fifth chapter presented the Results. The presentation started with a presentation of the 
variation of political trust in the 19 countries included in this paper for the relevant time period. 
The presentation showed that the within- and the between-country variation over time was not 
large, which limits the impact that terrorism can have had on political trust. There was, 
nonetheless, some variation, which warrants the explorations that this paper conducts. Then the 
results from the empty model was presented and discussed. This result showed that most of the 
variation in the levels of political trust was located at the individual level, as expected, but that 
there was some variation at the country-level as well as the country-year level. Pertinently, the 
ICC showed that more than 10 percent of the variation in political trust can be explained by 
factors at the non-individual levels, which, together with the BIC-score, warrants the use of the 
multi-level hybrid model employed in this paper. Everything, including the data, the method, 
and the theoretical assumptions, should therefore be in place in order to produce reliable results 
from the MLRs. 
 
The results from the ‘full’ MLR models showed that the cross-sectional variant of GTI, GTI-
average, representing the more permanent country-exposure to terrorism, was not significant. 
Therefore, it does not seem to matter for the citizens’ political trust whether or not they live in 
a country more permanently exposed to terrorism or more permanently spared from terrorism. 
On the other hand, the result also showed that the longitudinal variant of GTI, GTI-centered, 
representing variation in the amount of terrorism over time, was significant in every case, except 
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from when it comes to the trust that the citizens vest in their legal system. It therefore matters 
for the citizens’ political trust if their country experiences increases and decreases in the amount 
of terrorism. If their country experiences increases the citizens’ trust their parliaments and their 
politicians less, but, somewhat paradoxically following the suggested theoretical framework 
and its assumptions, their trust in the police increases. As for the control variables, the variables 
located on the individual level produced results mainly as expected. There were, however, some 
deviations from the theoretical expectations and previous empirical studies as discussed in the 
Theory-chapter. Although the paper did not try to explain these deviations in a marked and 
explicit manner, they can be considered to indicate that trust is a complex phenomenon. It is a 
phenomenon that probably  is affected in a multitude of complex ways. As for the control 
variable located on the macro level, the HDI, this showed no results which were significant at 
a level of .05, except for when it came to the legal system. This result is discussed, but perhaps 
the main point of interest in this regard was the fact that the variation in political trust seem to 
be more affected by variation in terrorism than a society’s average state of well-being, as 
represented by the HDI. 
 
After the MLR results was presented, the chapter presented the results from the survey 
experiment and the ANOVAs and the succeeding Benferroni-analyses. These results was 
mainly as expected, i.e. variation in capacity perception lead to variation in the participants 
levels of trust. But again, there was a somewhat paradoxical finding. The result regarding the 
police was not significant, but the non-significant result showed that even a relatively bad 
capacity perception, i.e. not sufficient capacity to deal with terrorism, lead to a small increase 
in the participants trust in the police. The results, at the same time, indicated that the treatment 
had worked as intended, but that it had a relatively weak effect on the participants. This, 
however, was as expected, considering that perceptions and trust is something that probably 
requires a great deal of information to change. The ANOVA results ended the Result-chapter. 
 
The Analyses of the results was conducted in the sixth chapter. The analyses was first conducted 
on each of the five hypotheses, and then overall on the theoretical framework that the paper 
suggests.   
 
The first hypothesis was falsified, since it assumed that each of the institutions would 
experience decreased levels of political trust as a consequence of increased or high levels of 
terrorism. High levels of exposure to terrorism did not matter more than low levels of exposure 
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to terrorism, and the police experienced increases in the trust that they receive from the citizens 
as a consequence of an increases in the amount of terrorism.  
 
The second hypothesis further assumed that the police would be more affected by terrorism than 
the politicians, followed by the parliaments, and finally the legal systems. In concordance with 
the first hypothesis, the second hypothesis was also falsified. The suggested ranking was, 
however, correct.  
 
The third hypothesis, building on impressions from particularly the MENA-region, assumed 
that the relationship between terrorism and political trust would be non-linear, i.e. curved, and 
that if the trust do increase following terrorism, as previous empirical studies have found, then 
the relatively high levels of political trust would deteriorate as the amount of terrorism 
increases. The hypothesis was falsified, and the result in itself that suggests that the effect that 
terrorism has on political trust only works in one direction.  
 
The fourth hypothesis took into consideration several studies which find that the citizens’ 
proximity, i.e. their residential area, to terrorism, i.e. terrorist attacks, mediates the effect that 
terrorism has on their political trust. There are, however, limitations regarding the data that are 
available from the IEP today. Taking these into account, the hypothesis was created to explore 
whether or not the political trust of citizens living in urban areas, which are considerably more 
statistically exposed to terrorism than citizens living in non-urban areas, was more affected by 
their country being exposed to terrorism than citizens living in non-urban areas. The results 
were not significant, indicating that the political trust of citizens living in central areas are not 
more affected by their country’s exposure to terrorism than citizens living in non-central areas.  
 
The fifth hypothesis was the sole hypothesis mainly intended to shed light on the second part of 
the research question. It assumed that capacity perception is a causal mechanism in the 
relationship between terrorism and political trust, and that variation in the citizens’ capacity 
perception would lead to variation in the citizens’ political trust. Using a survey experiment 
which ensured that the only thing that varied systematically between the different groups was 





The theoretical framework did in some respects receive empirical backing from the results. The 
MLR showed that variation in terrorism over time is associated with variation in political trust, 
and the survey experiment showed that capacity perception is a causal mechanism in the 
relationship between terrorism and political trust. A confounding mechanism, but a mechanism, 
nonetheless. If one take into consideration previous studies with similar explorations (as 
referred to in the Theory-chapter), where they find confirmation that societal institutions’ 
performance do affect citizens’ political trust, a somewhat large portion of the theoretical 
framework, as summarized and illustrated in figure 2.1, have received empirical backing. There 
are, however, some venues included in or assumed by the theoretical framework that this paper 
have not had the chance to explore. The trust theories that the theoretical framework is based 
on assumes that emotions, in addition to information, influence capacity perception. The 
theories, furthermore, assume that the citizens’ perception of the institutions’ motivation (i.e. 
the different actors that constitutes that institution) in combination with capacity perception 
affects the citizens’ political trust. These lacking elements could increase the theoretical 
frameworks explanatory power. Citizens may, for instance, have a particular pessimistic view 
of politicians’ motivations (i.e. ‘they only seek to enhance their own status’ etc.). The previous 
chapter, inspired by several scholars, also discusses the role of the medias and how they mediate 
the effects that terrorism has on political trust, considering the fact that most citizens receive 
the majority share of information, i.e. one of their two assumedly capacity perception shaping 
elements (and motivation perception shaping, for that matter), from the media. The quantity 
and the type of information that they do receive from the media therefore probably have a huge 
impact on the effect that terrorism have on political trust, which perhaps could explain the 
divergencies between the institutions in this paper. Perhaps the police is portrayed in a 
beneficial way in the media, while the other institutions are not.  
 
Some of the results in the MLR diverge from previous empirical studies. This divergence could, 
in part, be explained by the differences in design between this paper and the previous studies, 
where this paper includes a significantly larger amount of data (both time and units) than 
previous studies. But it also points to the fact that trust is a complex phenomenon, as mentioned 
several times in this paper. A phenomenon that would be beneficial to explore further, 
especially considering its important function as a societal glue. Considering the limitations in 
this paper, especially the limitations regarding the data that is utilized and their aptness to 
explore the third and the fourth hypothesis, and the theoretical elements that are not 
implemented into the suggested theoretical framework, as well as the discrepancy between this 
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study and previous studies, the future is ripe with possible venues of exploration. In this regard, 
perhaps an inclusion of state terrorism, which the GTD and thus the IEP excludes from their 
data, would also be a pertinent venue of exploration. This form of terrorism is probably far more 
detrimental for the citizens’ political trust (although being somewhat absent in a modern 
European context). 
 
All in all, the paper do produce some conclusions that can be used to answer the research 
question. The question being: 
 
In what ways has the political trust in Europe been affected by terrorism in the time 
period of 2002 to 2016, and does capacity perception function as a causal mechanism in the 
relationship between terrorism and political trust? 
 
Terrorism have affected the political trust in Europe in the time period of 2002 to 2016. Overall, 
when European countries have experienced increases in the amount of terrorism the citizens’ 
trust in the parliaments and their politicians decreases. The trust in their police, however, 
increases, while the trust in their legal systems remain unaffected. Furthermore, it is the trust 
that the police receives which is affected the most, followed by the trust that the politicians 
receive and then the parliaments. The effect has been linear, and it has been distributed equally 
between citizens living in central areas and citizens living in non-central areas. Furthermore, it 
is uncovered that terrorism’s effect on political trust works through capacity perception, 
although not necessarily exclusively through this mechanism. 
 
To end with a truism: it is important to prevent terrorism. First of all, due to the horrendous 
elements encompassed into it. Almost by definition, those hurt the most by it are the innocents. 
But also due to its effect on citizens’ trust in political institutions. To prevent terrorism is even 
more vital in the coming years, considering the already growing populism and the growing 
number of citizens adhering to this line of thinking. If the parliaments and the politicians want 
to avoid decreasing trust as a result of increases in the amount of terrorism they have to provide 
the citizens with the impression that they are motivated to prevent terrorism and not least, as 
shown in this paper, that they have the capacity to do so. Somewhat paradoxically, the 
parliaments and the politicians are dependent on the police, the institution that experiences 
increased levels of trust following terrorism and actually ‘benefits’ from terrorism in that 
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A) Institutional trust: The tables shows the variation in the amount of trust that each 
institution receive, for each country for each year. 
  
B) GTI-scores: The table shows each country’s GTI-score for each year. 
 
C) ESS-questionnaire: An overview of the relevant questions in the ESS, that is used as 
variables in this paper.  
 
 
D) Original experiment phrasing: Print screen of the survey experiment codebook, 
which shows the question phrasing in Norwegian. 
 
E) Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg: An overview and explanation of the Breusch-
Pagan / Cook-Weisberg-test. 
 
F) Histogram and QQ-plot: The figure shows the histograms and the QQ-plots used to 
assess the index variable Political trust (comprised of the four dependent variables 
used in the MLRs, each variable having the same weight in the index). The figure 
shows, from left to right, the output regarding the individual level, country-year level, 
and country level. Histograms of each dependent variable (not shown) gave similar 
results. 
 
G) VIF-scores: The table shows the average VIF-scores of each of the models, in 
addition to highlighting the most troublesome variable in each model. 
 
H) Levene’s test: Explanation of a Levene’s test, and the result from a Levene’s test of 
ANOVAs of each of the models. 
    
I) Shapiro-Wilk test: Explanation of a Shapiro-Wilk’s test, and the result from this test 
in connection with the survey experiment data. Appendix H also contains histogram 
portraits of each of the three dependent variables of interests’ response distribution. 
 
J) Empty MLR models: The tables shows the results from empty MLR models for each 
of the dependent variables. Both the two-level model and the hybrid model. 
 







A) Institutional trust: 
Political trust 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Aver. min-
max 
Belgium 4.8 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 5.1 5.0 5.2 5.0 4.8-5.2 
Denmark 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.7 6.5 - 6.7 6.5-6.8 
Estonia 4.7 4.5 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.8 4.8 5.2 4.7 4.5-5.2 
Finland 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.5 6.2 6.5 6.4 6.2-6.5 
France 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.5-4.7 
Ireland 5.0 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 4.8 4.6-5.2 
Netherland 5.3 5.2 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.2-5.8 
Norway 5.9 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.7 6.2 5.8-6.7 
Poland 3.7 3.0 3.4 3.6 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.9 3.6 3.0-4.0 
Portugal 4.1 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.1 3.7 3.3-4.1 
Slovenia 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.3 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.9 3.8 3.3-4.4 
Spain 4.5 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.4 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.4 3.7-4.9 
GB 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.7 5.0 4.9 5.2 4.9 4.6-5.2 
Switzerland 5.9 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.3 6.4 5.8 5.8-6.4 
Sweden 5.9 5.5 5.7 5.7 6.2 5.9 6.1 5.9 6.0 5.5-6.2 
Czech Rep. 3.9 3.4 - 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.4 4.8 3.9 3.4-4.8 
Germany 5.0 4.8 4.8 5.1 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.1 4.8-5.6 
Hungary 4.7 4.0 3.9 3.2 4.3 4.3 4.2 5.0 4.2 3.2-5.0 
Austria 5.2 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.0 - 5.0 5.5 5.2 5.0-5.5 


















 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Aver. min-
max 
Belgium 5.0 4.7 5.0 4.6 4.5 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.5-5.0 
Denmark 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 5.8 6.1 5.9 - 6.2 5.8-6.5 
Estonia - 4.2 4.6 3.9 4.2 3.9 4.4 4.5 4.2 3.9-4.6 
Finland 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.4 6.0 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.4-6.0 
France 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.0-4.5 
Ireland 4.4 4.7 4.8 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.5 4.1 3.6-4.7 
Netherland 5.2 4.6 5.3 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.2 4.6-5.5 
Norway 5.7 5.4 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.3 6.7 6.8 6.0 5.4-6.8 
Poland 3.5 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.0 2.8 3.4 3.0 2.4-3.5 
Portugal 4.3 3.7 3.8 3.5 2.9 2.6 3.2 3.9 3.4 2.6-4.6 
Slovenia 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.4 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.3 3.6 2.8-4.4 
Spain 4.9  5.0 5.0 5.0 4.3 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.4 3.4-5.0 
GB 4.6 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.3 4.1-4.6 
Switzerland 5.7 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.3 5.9 5.5-6.3 
Sweden 5.9 5.4 5.6 5.7 6.3 5.9 6.2 5.9 5.9 5.4-6.3 
Czech Rep. 3.2 3.2 - 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.9 4.3 3.5 3.1-4.3 
Germany 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.6 4.2 4.7 5.0 5.2 4.5 4.1-5.2 
Hungary 5.0 3.6 3.4 2.6 4.2 3.9 3.9 4.5 3.9 2.6-5.0 
Austria 5.1 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.9 - 4.6 5.0 4.9 4.6-5.1 


















Trust legal system 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Aver. min-
max 
Belgium 4.4 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.3 4.9 4.4-5.3 
Denmark 7.1 7.2 7.5 7.3 7.4 7.7 7.4 - 7.4 7.1-7.7 
Estonia - 4.9 5.1 4.8 5.2 4.9 5.2 5.8 5.2 4.8-5.8 
Finland 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 6.9 7.0 6.8 7.2 7.0 6.8-7.2 
France 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.8-5.1 
Ireland 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.0-5.4 
Netherland 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.9 5.9 6.0 5.9 6.2 5.8 5.4-6.2 
Norway 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.9 7.2 7.2 7.4 6.8 6.3-7.4 
Poland 3.7 3.0 3.8 3.9 4.3 3.7 3.5 4.0 3.7 3.0-4.3 
Portugal 4.0 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.4 3.5 3.7 4.0 3.8 3.4-4.0 
Slovenia 4.3 3.8 4.2 4.3 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.6 3.7 3.1-4.3 
Spain 4.3 4.7 5.0 4.3 4.4 3.7 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.7-5.0 
GB 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.5 5.5 5.9 5.3 5.0-5.9 
Switzerland 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.3 6.1-6.6 
Sweden 6.1 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.5 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.2 5.8-6.5 
Czech Rep. 3.8 3.7 - 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.7 5.2 4.2 3.7-5.2 
Germany 5.6 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.8 5.7 6.0 5.7 5.4-6.0 
Hungary 5.1 4.4 4.4 3.8 4.6 4.7 4.6 5.4 4.6 3.8-5.4 
Austria 6.1 5.0 6.0 5.5 5.7 - 5.6 6.3 5.9 5.0-6.3 


















Trust the police 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Aver. min-
max 
Belgium 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.0 6.4 6.0 5.6-6.4 
Denmark 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.6 7.7 8.0 7.7 - 7.8 7.6-8.0 
Estonia - 5.7 5.5 6.0 6.2 5.9 6.1 6.8 6.1 5.5-6.8 
Finland 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.1 7.9 8.2 8.0 7.9-8.2 
France 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.9 6.1 6.2 5.9 5.6-6.2 
Ireland 6.5 6.7 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.7 6.3 6.2 6.4 6.2-6.7 
Netherland 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.7 6.2 5.8-6.7 
Norway 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.0 7.2 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.2 7.0-7.4 
Poland 4.9 4.6 5.0 5.1 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.7 5.1 4.6-5.7 
Portugal 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.1 5.4 5.7 6.0 5.3 5.0-6.0 
Slovenia 4.9 4.7 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.4 5.5 6.0 5.2 4.7-6.0 
Spain 5.5 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.2 5.9 6.3 6.6 6.1 5.5-6.6 
GB 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.0-6.6 
Switzerland 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.8-7.2 
Sweden 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.6 7.0 6.7 6.9 6.7 7.0 6.5-7.0 
Czech Rep. 5.0 4.2 - 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.7 5.8 5.0 4.2-5.8 
Germany 6.6 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.7 7.0 6.7 6.4-7.0 
Hungary 4.9 5.2 4.4 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.3 6.4 5.2 4.4-6.4 
Austria 6.5 6.2 6.3 6.0 5.9 - 6.5 7.0 6.3 5.9-7.0 



















 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Aver. min-
max 
Belgium 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.0 3.9 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.2 3.9-4.4 
Denmark 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.2 5.0 - 5.3 5.0-5.6 
Estonia - 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.3-3.6 
Finland 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.4 4.8 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.4-4.9 
France 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.9 3.2 2.8-3.7 
Ireland 3.8 4.0 3.9 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.7 3.5 3.1-4.0 
Netherland 4.8 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.0 4.8 5.0 5.0 4.6-5.2 
Norway 4.6 4.2 4.4 4.6 5.0 5.1 5.3 5.4 4.8 4.2-5.4 
Poland 2.7 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.5 2.3 1.9-2.7 
Portugal 2.8 2.0 2.6 2.4 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.2 1.8-2.5 
Slovenia 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.4 2.3 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.7 1.9-3.4 
Spain 3.4 3.7 3.5 3.3 2.7 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.9 1.9-3.7 
GB 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.4-3.8 
Switzerland 4.9 4.7 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.6 5.4 5.0 4.7-5.6 
Sweden 4.7 4.2 4.5 4.5 5.0 4.7 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.2-5.0 
Czech Rep. 3.2 2.7 - 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.3 3.6 2.9 2.6-3.6 
Germany 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.5 3.2-4.0 
Hungary 3.9 2.7 2.6 1.9 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.7 3.0 1.9-3.9 
Austria 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.7 - 3.4 3.9 3.5 3.3-3.9 



















 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Aver. min-max 
Belgium 1.68 1.99 .73 .94 1.28 1.04 1.51 1.25 1.30 .73-1.99 
Denmark 0 0 0 .15 .23 .12 .14 - .09 0-.23 
Estonia - .03 0 0 0 .19 .12 1.10 .22 0-.23 
Finland 0 0 0 .63 .45 .11 0 2.38 .43 0-2.38 
France 4.62 4.57 4.84 4.38 3.82 5.15 4.72 5.60 4.73 3.82-5.60 
Ireland .09 .12 .80 1.57 1.94 2.62 3.42 3.43 1.87 .09-3.43 
Netherland 2.03 1.94 .81 .70 2.48 2.03 .73 .86 1.47 .70-2.48 
Norway 0 .12 .62 .42 .84 4.39 3.08 2.08 1,36 0-4.39 
Poland .96 .26 .04 0 0 0 0 0 .18 0-.96 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 1.52 .41 .06 .26 0-1.52 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 5.62 5.87 5.80 5.06 4.59 3.27 2.68 1.20 4.24 1.20-5.87 
GB 5.05 4.46 5.37 4.83 4.76 4.82 5.53 5.08 4.99 4.76-5.53 
Switzerland 1.66 1.40 .23 1.08 .24 1.23 1.69 .29 1.01 .23-1.69 
Sweden .25 .07 1.95 1.28 2.05 2.33 2.40 3.98 1.70 .07-3.98 
Czech Rep. .55 .32 - .09 1.72 .67 1.67 2.18 1.04 .09-2.18 
Germany 3.01 2.39 2.45 2.32 2.41 2.37 2.60 4.31 2.73 2.32-4.31 
Hungary .07 0 0 1.00 1.99 .73 .67 .23 .59 0-1.99 
Austria .01 0 .72 2.34 2.84 - 1.89 .18 1.13 0-2.84 





















Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have 
complete trust. Firstly… READ OUT… 
          No trust                                    Complete          (Refusal)    (Don’t  
                                                    at all                                     trust                                  know) 
B6 …[country]’s parliament? 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                    77               88 
B7 …the legal system?            00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                    77               88 
B8 …the police?                       00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                    77               88 
B9 …politicians?                      00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                    77                88 
B1 How interested would you say you are in politics – are you… READ OUT… 
very interested, 1  
quite interested, 2  
hardly interested, 3  
or, not at all interested? 4  
(Refusal) 7  
(Don’t know) 8 
C6 How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in this area after dark? Do – or would – you 
feel… READ OUT… ... 
very safe, 1  
safe, 2  
unsafe, 3  
or, very unsafe? 4  
(Refusal) 7  
(Don’t know) 8 
C15 CARD 24 Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say 
you are? Please use this card. 
Not at all                                                    Very                    (Refusal)   (Don’t 
Religious                                                  religious                                   know) 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                          77      88 
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F42 CARD 68 Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’s income nowadays? 
Living comfortably on present income 1  
Coping on present income 2 
Finding it difficult on present income 3  
Finding it very difficult on present income 4  
(Refusal) 7  
(Don’t know) 8 
F2 Sex [writes 1 for man and 2 for woman] 
F3 Year born [Fills in birth year -> calculated into ‘agea’/age variable] 
F14 CARD 61 Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?  
A big city 1  
The suburbs or outskirts of a big city 2  
A town or a small city 3  
A country village 4  
A farm or home in the countryside 5  
(Refusal) 7  
(Don’t know) 8 
ASK ALL F16 About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-
time? Please report these in full-time equivalents and include compulsory years of schooling. 
INTERVIEWER NOTE: round answer up or down to the nearest whole year.  
WRITE IN: [writes number of years] 
(Refusal) 77  
(Don’t know) 88 
A4 CARD 2 Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 
means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.  
You can’t be                                                    Most people can                 (Refusal)        (Don’t  
too careful                                                       be trusted                                                      know) 
 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                                                    77                88 
 
A5 CARD 3 Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they 
got the chance, or would they try to be fair? 
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Most people would try                                    Most people would                  (Refusal)    (Don’t 
to take advantage of me                                         try to be fair                                             know) 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                                                              77           88 
A6 CARD 4 Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly 
looking out for themselves? Please use this card. 
People mostly look                                   People mostly try                  (Refusal)    (Don’t 
for themselves                                             to be helpful                                                know) 
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                                               77                 88 
C1 CARD 19 Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are? Please use this card.  
Extremely unhappy                       Extremely happy                       (Refusal)            (Don’t know)  
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                                       77                            88 
C7 How is your health in general? Would you say it is… READ OUT…  
...very good, 1  
good, 2  
fair, 3  
bad, 4  
or, very bad? 5  
(Refusal) 7  
(Don’t know) 8 
B27 CARD 11 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Please 
answer using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied.  
Extremely dissatisfied                            Extremely satisfied                     (Refusal)         (Don’t know) 
 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                                                77                          88 
B28 STILL CARD 11 On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in 
[country]? Still use this card.  
Extremely dissatisfied                          Extremely satisfied                       (Refusal)     (Don’t know) 
 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                                                77                     88 
B29 STILL CARD 11 Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way 
it is doing its job? Still use this card. 
Extremely dissatisfied                      Extremely satisfied                               (Refusal)         (Don’t know)     
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                                                     77                        88 
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B29 STILL CARD 11 Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way 
it is doing its job? Still use this card. 
Extremely dissatisfied                       Extremely satisfied                               (Refusal)         (Don’t know)   
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                                                       77                      88 
B31 CARD 12 Now, using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of education in 
[country] nowadays?  
Extremely bad                              Extremely good                                             (Refusal)       (Don’t Know)   
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                                                         77                     88 
B32 STILL CARD 12 Still using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of health 
services in [country] nowadays?  
Extremely bad                         Extremely good                                                 (Refusal)      (Don’t Know)     
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10                                                                        77                    88 
* The questions are from round 8, but there are few or none differences in the questions’ 









































E) Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg: 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg is a test where the null-hypothesis, assuming that the data 
are heteroscedastic, are tested. The critical value, the value that should not be surpassed, 
depends on the degrees of freedom in the regression model that is being tested. If the critical 
value is surpassed, and the result is significant, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and the 
data are most likely heteroscedastic.  
The MLR models used in this paper have degrees of freedom between 22 to 26. This gives a 
critical value of 33,92-38,89, with a significance level of five percent (Ringdal, 2014, 523).  
 
The Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg produced results with values of 254-13 749 with a p-









































































Model: Average VIF-score Max VIF-score (variable) 
Trust parliament 1 3.27 11.02    (2016 – time variable) 
Trust parliament 2 4.71 19.30    (GTI-average) 
Trust parliament 3 4.59 21.68    (GTI-average) 
Trust legal system 1 3.26 10.99    (2016 - time variable) 
Trust legal system 2 4.71 19.40    (GTI-average) 
Trust legal system 3 4.59 19.40    (GTI-average) 
Trust the police 1 3.26 10.95    (2016 - time variable) 
Trust the police 2 4.71 21.27    (GTI-average) 
Trust the police 3 4.58 21.76    (GTI-average) 
Trust politicians 1 3.26 10.96    (2016 - time variable) 
Trust politicians 2 4.71 21.26    (GTI-average) 




































H) Levene’s test: 
Levene’s test tests the null-hypothesis assuming that the data are homoscedastic (i.e. the 
opposite of a Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test). The test principle is similar to the 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test, but is adapted to experiment designs. If the F-value, 
from the test result, is greater than the critical F-value, and the result is significant, the null-
hypothesis can be rejected. The data is, thus, probably heteroscedastic.   
 
The result produced p-values of 0.071 for the dependent variable measuring trust in the 
parliament, 0.115 for the Government, and 0.053 for the police. In every case the p-value was 
greater than .05, and the null-hypothesis can therefore not be rejected. One can therefore 







































I)  Shapiro Wilk test: 
Shapiro-Wilks test is a test with a null-hypothesis that assumes that the data have a normal 
distribution. The principle is the same as for the aforementioned tests. In this case the critical 
(Z-)value is 1.96 for a two-tailed test  (Ringdal, 2014, 520). 
 
The result produced values of 13.166 for the Parliament, 11.858 for the Government, and 
13.597 for the police. All with p-values of less than 0.000. One can therefore, considering the 





The histogram supports the Shapiro-Wilks test, but shows that the data in some cases are not 





























J) Empty MLR models: 
 
Trust parliament (included in the Results) 
 Two-level model, land (s.e) Hybrid model, country-year 
(s.e.) 
Constant 4.629019    (.214751)*** 4.635715   (.2155008)*** 
Individual level variance 5.446557    (.014627) 5.299441   (.0142353) 
Country level variance .8758578   (.2842761) .8591736   (.2862895) 
Country-year level variance  .1772364   (.0224565) 
ICC country .1385322   (.0387357) .1356051   (.0390672) 
ICC country-year  .1635787   (.0378822) 
BIC 1257269 1250222*** 
N, individuals 277,327 277,327 
N, countries 19 19 
N, country-years  148 
*** 1%-level (change in variance tested against the two-level model: Chi=7060.08, p<0.0000) 
Trust legal system 
 Two-level model, land (s.e) Hybrid model, country-year 
(s.e.) 
Constant 5.304467   (.2459453)*** 5.307342   (.2468429)*** 
Individual level variance 5.571447   (.0149348) 5.488068   ( .0147148) 
Country level variance 1.148901   (.3728629) 1.144412   (.3756283) 
Country-year level variance  .10015       (.0128664) 
ICC country .1709585    (.045999) .1699799   (.0463127) 
ICC country-year  .1848552   (.0455004) 
BIC 1268231 1264504*** 
N, individuals 278,352 278,352 
N, countries 19 19 
N, country-years  148 
*** 1%-level (change in variance tested against the two-level model: Chi=3739.58, p<0.0000) 
Trust police 
 Two-level model, land (s.e) Hybrid model, country-year 
(s.e.) 
Constant 6.239614   (.1931176)*** 6.246328   (.1922786)*** 
Individual level variance 5.119804   (.0136324) 5.039992    (.013423) 
Country level variance .7082386   (.2298875) .6899899   (.2279388) 
Country-year level variance  .0940276   (.0120622) 
ICC country .1215225   (.0346528) .1184733   (.0345047) 
ICC country-year  .1346182   (.0339053) 
BIC 1261494 1257536*** 
N, individuals 282,110 282,110 
N, countries 19 19 
N, country-years  148 





 Two-level model, land (s.e) Hybrid model, country-year 
(s.e.) 
Constant 3.716032   (.2143511)*** 3.721457   (.2152424)*** 
Individual level variance 4.752768   (.0127018) 4.649679   (.0124292) 
Country level variance .8726495   (.2832171) .8637871    (.285576) 
Country-year level variance  .1253599   (.0159477) 
ICC country .1551262   (.0425374) .1531856   (.0428932) 
ICC country-year  .1754172    (.041811) 
BIC 1231413 1225792*** 
N, individuals 280,040 280,040 
N, countries 19 19 
N, country-years  148 



































K) MLR models: 
 
Trust parliament 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -1.773095   (2.325789) -1.269265   (2.507886) -1.263983   (2.502738) 
Year (round)    
2004 -.2524731   
(.0693801)*** 
-.2518387   
(.0694369)*** 
-.251747    
(.069381)*** 
2006 -.2258028   
(.1032526)** 
-.2301341    
(.103723)** 
-.2296633     
(.10354)** 
2008 -.0837659   (.1366574) -.0894359   (.1374368) -.0890956   (.1372696) 
2010 -.2160111    (.133011) -.2206951   
(.1325974)* 
-.2202167    (.132483) 
2012 -.2659989   (.1654428) -.2671469   (.1666686) -.2665146   (.1665416) 
2014 -.0455158   (.2178696) -.0495738   (.2168699) -.0492124   (.2168049) 
2016 -.0090119   (.2140572) -.0020351   (.2118704) -.0014714   (.2116924) 
Individual level    
Political interest .523708   
.(0265655)*** 
.5237294   
(.0265621)***     
.5236903   
(.0265534)*** 
Feeling of safety .0604866   
(.0167731)*** 
.0604787    
(.016781)*** 




.034006   
(.0031851)*** 
.0340064   
(.0031855)*** 




.0743004   
(.0202117)*** 
.0743066    
(.020206)*** 
.0742459   
(.0201813)*** 
Education .0404651   
(.0048959)*** 
.0404632   
(.0048952)*** 
.0404745   
(.0049353)*** 
Social trust .1724449   
(.0085135)*** 
.1724455   
(.0085155)*** 
.1724568   
(.0085069)*** 
Individual well-being -.0443465    
(.009857)*** 
-.0443397    
(.009857)*** 




.724414   
(.0133396)*** 
.7244156     
(.01334)*** 
.7244031   
(.0133651)*** 
Area of residence .1298031   
(.0231103)*** 
.1298126   
(.0231107)*** 
.1265065    
(.036375)*** 
Age -.0035621   
(.0010445)*** 
-.0035621   
(.0010444)*** 
-.0035624   
(.0010477)*** 
Gender -.0091541     (.01632) -.0091555   (.0163204) -.0091424    (.016331) 
Macro level    
HDI-centered .0864211   (.0536184) .0860018    (.053375) .0860022   (.0533682) 
HDI-average .0126335   (.0271448) .0060924   (.0298551) .0060771   (.0298471) 
GTI-centered -.0395098   
(.0174513)** 
-.0420085    
(.018279)** 
-.0466589   
(.0181292)*** 
GTI-average .0213903   (.0436632) .1468027   (.1934652) .1459465   (.1939661) 
GTI-centered^2  -.0117566   (.0073009) -.0115463   (.0073219) 
GTI-average^2  -.0244782   (.0384164) -.0244414   (.0384256) 
GTI-average*AOR   .0020811   (.0154917) 






   
Variance ind. level 3.457641   (.1136973) 3.457642   (.1136974) 3.457605   (.1136834) 
Variance country level .1058652   (.0283978) .1055999    (.027156) .1056196   (.0271582) 
Variance C-Y level .0385686    (.008866) .0383104   (.0088995) .0383141   (.0088907) 
BIC 1075643 1075667 1075689 
N, individuals 263,535 263,535 263,535 
N, countries 19 19 19 
N, country-years 146 146 146 
 
 
Trust legal system 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -5.44107   
(2.585111)** 
-5.783766   
(3.378795)* 
-5.776835    
(3.38027)* 
Year (round)    
2004 .0263126   (.0624197) .027628   (.0630014) .0277891    (.062934) 
2006 .2130755   
(.0880181)** 
.2037116   
(.0899773)** 
.2046509   
(.0898462)** 
2008 .4286613   
(.1231739)*** 
.4169422    
(.122544)*** 
.4176425   
(.1225043)*** 
2010 .5008134   
(.1490179)*** 
.4913797   
(.1503409)*** 
.4923431   
(.1503133)*** 
2012 .5776491   
(.1680234)*** 
.5755409   
(.1704166)*** 
.5768286   
(.1703659)*** 
2014 .8012645   
(.1949888)*** 
.7935258   
(.1970989)*** 
.7943007   
(.1968259)*** 
2016 .8688507   
(.1982879)*** 
.8849601   
(.2039567)*** 
.8861133   
(.2036179)*** 
Individual level    
Political interest .2056417   
(.0202191)*** 
.2056701   
(.0202161)*** 
.2055874   
(.0202604)*** 
Feeling of safety .159307   
(.0179837)*** 
.1592877    
(.017997)**** 




.023938   
(.0048537)*** 
.0239377   
(.0048539)*** 




.0365777   
(.0170188)** 
.0365516   
(.0170317)** 
.0364185   
(.0170898)** 
Education .0407174   
(.0050466)*** 
.0407162   
(.0050463)*** 
.040732   
(.0050463)*** 
Social trust .1954573   
(.0104651)*** 
.1954559   
(.0104654)*** 
.1954764   
(.0104445)*** 
Individual well-being .0223363   
(.0113783)** 
.0223517    
(.011383)** 




.6203545   
(.0142401)*** 
.620341   
(.0142364)*** 
.6203231   
(.0142412)*** 
Area of residence .0796291   
(.0232573)*** 
.0796448    
(.023261)*** 




Age -.0053969   
(.0013388)*** 
-.0053969   
(.0013387)*** 
-.0053984   
(.0013391)*** 
Gender .0320163   (.0293034) .0320057   (.0293037) .0320241   (.0293386) 
Macro level    
HDI-centered .1873752   
(.0443897)*** 
.1867901     
(.04442)*** 
.1867981   
(.0443483)*** 
HDI-average .059384   (.0304643) .0638749   (.0410575) .0638511    (.041063) 
GTI-centered -.0045778    (.029912) -.0097505   (.0307206) -.0189699   (.0347162) 
GTI-average -.0290603   (.0621207) -.0835949   (.3808977) -.0848444   (.3806849) 
GTI-centered^2  -.0246596   (.0199695) -.0242353   (.019794) 
GTI-average^2  .0113027   (.0672911) .011373      (.0673119) 
GTI-average*AOR   .002698      (.0132525) 




   
Variance ind. level 3.977723   (.1446071) 3.977724   (.1446072) 3.977583   (.1445106) 
Variance country level .1983858   (.0529002) .1984444   (.0551745) .198476   (.0551829) 
Variance C-Y level .0421833   
(.00841829) 
.0413658   (.0079109) .0413967   (.0079361) 
BIC 1116307 1116330 1116345 
N, individuals 264,420 264,420 264,420 
N, countries 19 19 19 




 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -1.577758   (1.808638) -2.371385   (2.113448) -2.363525     (2.1094) 
Year (round)    
2004 -.0501485   (.0727033) -.0489572   (.0725269) -.0489093   (.0725267) 
2006 -.043978   (.0756892) -.0527716   (.0760438) -.0525208   (.0762098) 
2008 .1086207   (.1200299) .0978707   (.1157772) .0980643   (.1158655) 
2010 .1879079    (.136477) .1793246   (.1358155) .1796089   (.1360016) 
2012 .2911297   
(.1574259)* 
.2892181   
(.1563394)* 
.2895931   
(.1565467)* 
2014 .3865262   
(.1780128)** 
.3796739   
(.1778415)** 
.379869   
(.1779096)** 
2016 .5330469   
(.1845168)*** 
.5484852   
(.1971156)*** 
.5488127   
(.1971499)*** 
Individual level    
Political interest .0577202   
(.0205156)*** 
.0577293    
(.020516)*** 
.0577129     
(.02051)*** 
Feeling of safety .0605734   
(.0312752)* 
.0605543   
(.0312812)* 




.0329292   
(.0057921)*** 
.0329291   
(.0057931)*** 




.0419374   
(.0174546)** 
.0419027   
(.0174509)** 




Education .0049944   
(.0024475)** 
.0049954   
(.0024478)** 
.0050116   
(.0024473)** 
Social trust .1874624   
(.0087025)*** 
.1874619   
(.0087021)*** 
.1874679   
(.0086942)*** 
Individual well-being .1105051   
(.0097908)*** 
.1105175   
(.0097974)*** 




.4713827   
(.0155689)*** 
.471368   
(.0155704)*** 
.471354   
(.0155576)*** 
Area of residence -.0458913   
(.0238409)* 
-.0458825   
(.0238398)* 
-.0510042   (.0358403) 
Age .0062003   
(.0012945)*** 
.0062004   
(.0012945)*** 
.0062014   
(.0012962)*** 
Gender .148748   
(.0210503)*** 
.1487372   
(.0210515)*** 
.1487685   
(.0210443)*** 
Macro level    
HDI-centered .0322306   (.0392309) .0318265    (.039298) .0318299   (.0392898) 
HDI-average .0308034   (.0217809) .041159   (.0266652) .0411411   (.0266692) 
GTI-centered .1099616   
(.0305093)*** 
.1051859   
(.0353011)*** 
.1028139   
(.0344938)*** 
GTI-average .0229055   (.0447069) -.1357015   (.3000459) -.1368071   (.3006131) 
GTI-centered^2  -.0227462   (.0221444) -.0226222   (.0221596) 
GTI-average^2  .0317931   (.0538384) .0318185   (.0538582) 
GTI-average*AOR   .0031409    (.011133) 




   
Variance ind. level 3.986038   (.2035388) 3.986038   (.2035389) 3.986024   (.2035173) 
Variance country level .1417087   (.0472014) .1400074   (.0429535) .1400631   (.0429612) 
Variance C-Y level .0575579   (.0125008) .0567354   (.0116612) .0567539   (.0116665) 
BIC 1130931 1130954 1130978 
N, individuals 267,746 267,746 267,746 
N, countries 19 19 19 




 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -4.927846   
(1.965877)** 
-4.528155   
(2.193148)** 
-4.527088    
(2.18994)** 
Year (round)    
2004 -.2052703    
(.043005)*** 
-.2047218   
(.0429079)*** 
-.2047002   
.(0428874)*** 
2006 -.2103037   
(.0780693)*** 
-.213974   
(.0807417)*** 
-.2138589   
(.0806311)*** 
2008 -.0478687   (.0990256) -.0527041   (.1017176) -.0526179   (.1016213) 
2010 -.1233852   (.0976982) -.1273693   (.0984691) -.1272503   (.0983286) 
2012 -.1674908   (.1295458) -.1684158   (.1307867) -.1682555   (.1306146) 
2014 -.0658011   (.1576709) -.0692405   (.1580823) -.0691447   (.1580205) 
153 
 
2016 -.0440976   (.1481343) -.0380924   (.1475051) -.0379509   (.1473628) 
Individual level    
Political interest .5590357   
(.0282099)*** 
.559058   
(.0282117)*** 
.5590483   
(.0282075)*** 
Feeling of safety .0100834   (.0137819) .0100747    (.013785) .0100667   (.0137731) 
Degree of 
religiousness 
.0407299   
(.0029211)*** 
.0407299   
(.0029204)*** 




.0819245   
(.0173531)*** 
.0819276    
(.017344)*** 
.0819143   
(.0173382)*** 
Education .0063367   
(.0027323)** 
.006335   
(.0027318)** 
.0063374   
(.0027275)** 
Social trust .1858261   
(.0111808)*** 
.1858279   
(.0111827)*** 
.1858303    
(.011183)*** 
Individual well-being -.0679708   
(.0087571)*** 
-.067964   
(.0087592)*** 




.6741178   
(.0129116)*** 
.6741183   
(.0129134)*** 
.6741157   
(.0129248)*** 
Area of residence .053878   
(.0184612)*** 
.0538878   
(.0184609)*** 
.0532314   
(.0262524)** 
Age -.002787   
(.0010486)*** 
-.002787   
(.0010485)*** 
-.0027871   
(.0010492)*** 
Gender .1464707   
(.0181727)*** 
.1464701    
(.018176)*** 
.1464728   
(.0181775)*** 
Macro level    
HDI-centered .0738314   
(.0395037)* 
.0734772   
(.0394918)* 
.0734781   
(.0394904)* 
HDI-average .0453081   
(.0232704)* 
.0401197   (.0265078) .0401163   (.0265002) 
GTI-centered -.0505943   
(.0157579)*** 
-.0527261    
(.015231)*** 
-.0538557   
(.0156666)*** 
GTI-average -.0368086   (.0225709) .0633465   (.1655098) .0631676    (.165281) 
GTI-centered^2  -.0100618   (.0112646) -.0100099   (.0113228) 
GTI-average^2  -.0195341   (.0315743) -.0195254   (.0315717) 
GTI-average*AOR   0004161   (.0060213) 




   
Variance ind. level 3.048213   (.0987637) 3.048214   (.0987638) 3.048211   (.0987658) 
Variance country level .0734372   (.0261963) .0714484   (.0246194) .0714519   (.0246188) 
Variance C-Y level .0274702   (.0055564) .0273932   (.0055264) .027398   (.0055267) 
BIC 1052017 1052041 1052066 
N, individuals 265,968 265,968 265,968 
N, countries 19 19 19 
N, country-years 146 146 146 
 
 
 
